APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The trial court granted motions to dismiss and for summary judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff/Appellant appealed. Due to the deficiencies in Appellant's brief on appeal, we conclude that Appellant waived consideration of any issues on appeal and hereby dismiss the appeal.

The issues presented in this case arise from a dispute over attorney fees between Wife and her former attorney that arose following Wife’s reconciliation with Husband in the underlying divorce. The trial court entered several orders related to the fee dispute and held the attorney in contempt for her failure to comply with those orders. On appeal, we conclude that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction over the fee dispute between Wife and her attorney after the Husband and Wife reconciled and expressed their desire that the case be dismissed. We therefore vacate the trial court’s orders related to the fee dispute. We also vacate the trial court’s order holding Wife’s attorney in contempt and dismiss this appeal.

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. Appellant Husband and Appellee Wife have one minor child. The trial court’s final decree of divorce included a division of marital property previously agreed to in a consent order, which also included an agreement regarding the sale of the marital residence. The trial court also ordered Husband to pay Wife’s COBRA benefits for three months. Concurrently with the entry of the final decree of divorce, the trial court entered a permanent parenting plan naming Wife as primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child. The trial court found Husband guilty of four counts of criminal contempt for failure to comply with an interim parenting order, and ordered him to pay five thousand dollars in attorney’s fees arising from wife’s petition for criminal contempt. In addition, the trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife’s attorney an additional twenty thousand dollars toward her attorney’s fees. We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Landowner had a contract to sell two five-acre parcels of her 38.29 acres. Some of her neighbors heard about the sale and discussed it with a lawyer, who sent a letter to the real estate broker whose firm represented the buyers and the seller. The letter informed the broker of a purported restriction on the property whereby there could be only one house per twenty acres. The buyers subsequently pulled out of the contract. The landowner sued three neighbors, the attorney, and his law firm for tortious interference with contract, intentional interference with business relationship, libel of title, and civil conspiracy. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. We affirm.  

The Defendant, Chad M. Nicol, pleaded guilty to passing a worthless check of more than $500. The trial court sentenced him as a career offender to serve six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him as a career offender. He further contends that the trial court erred when it ordered his sentence to be served consecutively to his sentence for another conviction and when it ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Ralph T. O’Neal III, appeals the trial court’s order summarily dismissing his pro se petition for post-conviction, habeas corpus, and error coram nobis relief.  We find that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal results from the trial court's order reversing the City of Memphis Civil Service Commission's decision to terminate the employment of one of its employees. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

Petitioner, Shane Michael Grogger, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  He argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate Petitioner’s mental health issues and by failing to raise the rejection of a requested jury instruction as an issue on direct appeal.  After a careful review of the record, the decision of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The defendant, Katherine Louise Holmes, was convicted of attempted first degree (premeditated) murder, a Class A felony.  The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-two years.  On appeal, she argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction; that the trial court unduly restricted her cross-examination of a witness; that the trial court erred in revoking her bond; that the trial court erroneously did not permit surrebuttal evidence; and that the trial court improperly enhanced her sentence.  Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Ewing Green, IV, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  He pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony, especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and tampering with evidence, a Class C felony.  Pursuant to the agreement, he was sentenced to an effective forty-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the petitioner contends that his plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel.  Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to review discovery with him and by misleading the petitioner with regard to the consecutive nature of the sentences.  Following review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Roderick Dewayne Crosby, was convicted of four counts of aggravated kidnapping, Class B felonies, three counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies, one count of burglary, a Class C felony, one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and one count of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony.  The trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty-four years.  On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated kidnapping; the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a photographic lineup identification; and that the trial court erroneously applied an enhancement factor and erred by imposing consecutive sentencing.  After reviewing the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the case for resentencing for the firearm offense and for the entry of a corrected judgment.

In this breach of contract action, the plaintiff appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants on res judicata grounds. The plaintiff in his complaint alleged that the defendant school district and defendant school superintendent breached a contract with him for continuing employment as a certified public school teacher. Upon consideration of competing motions for summary judgment, the trial court found that the plaintiff had no enforceable contract with the defendants and that his claim was identical to that asserted in at least one previous lawsuit decided on the merits. The court therefore concluded that the action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children's Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother to her two minor children and of the father to his minor child that he shared with the mother. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of the mother's parental rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to visit, abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home, and failure to comply with the requirements contained in the permanency plan. The court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of the father's parental rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home and failure to comply with the requirements contained in the permanency plan. The court also found that termination of each parent's rights was in the best interest of the children. The parents appeal. We affirm the court's termination of the mother's parental rights but reverse the court's termination of the father's parental rights.

The defendant, Ashley Altman, appeals her Giles County Circuit Court jury convictions of manufacturing marijuana, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, claiming that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress evidence obtained during a search of her residence and that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony.  We affirm the convictions and sentences but remand for correction of clerical errors in one of the judgments.

Defendant, Jeffery D. Aaron, was indicted by the Williamson County Grand Jury for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), and driving while his blood alcohol concentration was .08 percent or more (DUI per se). Prior to trial, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the state trooper’s stop of Defendant. The State appeals. After a thorough review of the record, relying upon our supreme court’s decision in State v. Brotherton, 323 S.W.3d 866 (Tenn. 2010), we conclude that the trooper had reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that Defendant had committed or was about to commit the Class C misdemeanor offense set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-8-123(1). Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.

A Maury County jury convicted petitioner, Steven D. Hill, of aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, and theft over $1,000. The trial court sentenced him to an effective term of twenty years. He unsuccessfully appealed his convictions to this court and subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A corrections officer for the Tennessee Department of Corrections (“TDOC”) was assaulted in the course and scope of his work by an inmate. His workers’ compensation claim for post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) was settled and approved. The next month, the employee resigned from TDOC and began working at a local county jail. Thereafter, he filed a petition for reconsideration of his settlement based on his resignation. The State contended that his resignation was voluntary and not related to his work injury. The Claims Commission ruled that his resignation was reasonably related to his work injury and awarded additional disability benefits. The State has appealed. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal was referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the judgment of the Claims Commission.

The Defendant, Alfred Calvin Whitehead, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of possession of 0.5 gram or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver in a Drug-Free School Zone, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a)(4) (2010) (amended 2012, 2014) (possession of cocaine with intent to sell), 39-17-417(c)(1) (classifying the offense as a Class B felony), 39-17-432(b)(1) (2014) (requiring that offenses committed in a Drug Free School Zone be sentenced one classification higher and affecting the minimum required service and release eligibility of the sentence). The Defendant, a Range II offender, was sentenced to serve twenty-eight years with a minimum required service of twenty-five years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, (2) the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial because a juror slept during a portion of the proof, (3) the trial court erred in permitting a police officer to testify as an expert witness, and (4) the sentence imposed constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Christopher Allen Cummins, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

This appeal involves a trial court's award of alimony in a divorce action. Wife filed for divorce in November 2012. Following a two-day trial, the trial court entered an order awarding Wife $10,000 as alimony in solido and transitional alimony of $1,000 per month for three years and, thereafter, $650 per month for an additional four years. Husband appealed the alimony awards. We affirm.

The defendant, Deandre D. Rucker, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever, the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction, and the court erred in denying a motion for a mistrial or a cautionary instruction because of prosecutorial misconduct during the State’s closing argument. Following our review, we conclude that the defendant’s first two assignments of error are without merit. However, we agree that the State’s closing argument was improper to such a degree that we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

The pro se petitioner, Frank Shackleton, appeals the Davidson County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his conviction and sentence are illegal and void because he pled guilty to an offense with a different date from the offense date in the indictment. Because the petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The lessor of commercial property brought this action for breach of a lease agreement against the tenant, a limited liability company, and the tenant’s president/owner, Richard Johnson, whom Plaintiff contends agreed to be personally liable for “all of tenant’s obligations” under the lease. Mr. Johnson signed the lease in two places. It is undisputed that his first signature was in a representative capacity on behalf of the tenant; the disputed issue is whether his second signature expresses a clear intent to be personally liable for the tenant’s obligations. After a default judgment was entered against the tenant, Mr. Johnson’s alleged personal liability was tried without a jury. At the close of Plaintiff’s proof, Mr. Johnson made an oral motion for involuntary dismissal. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Mr. Johnson did not personally agree to be liable for the tenant’s obligations. This determination was based on the findings that Mr. Johnson was entitled to the presumption that he signed the lease in a representative capacity because he handwrote the words “for Mobile Master Mfg. L.L.C.” after his second signature, and that the sole provision in the lease, which states that he agreed to be personally liable, was not in capital or bold letters, nor was the one-sentence paragraph indented or otherwise emphasized. The court also noted that the signature provision at issue did not bear the title Guarantor. Plaintiff appealed. As the foregoing indicates, our review is benefited by the trial court’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02 findings of facts and conclusions of law, which disclose the reasoned steps by which the trial court reached its ultimate conclusion and enhance the authority of the trial court’s decision. Having reviewed the trial court’s findings of fact in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d), we have concluded that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, and that the trial court identified and properly applied the applicable legal principles. For these reasons, we affirm.

Because I conclude that the clear intent of the Lease Agreement was to bind Mr. Johnson individually, I respectfully dissent. As the majority states, “[a] cardinal rule of contractual interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties.” Allmand v. Pavletic, 292 S.W.3d 618, 630 (Tenn. 2009). The parties’ intent is determined through examination of the plain language of the contract as a whole. 84 Lumber Co. v. Smith, 356 S.W.3d 380, 383 (Tenn. 2011). In conducting this analysis, the hidden, subjective intent of the parties is of no value because the unexpressed intent of one party is not binding on another party without notice. Cone Oil Co. v. Green, 669 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983). Interpretation of the parties’ intent is a matter of law subject to de novo review. 84 Lumber, 356 S.W.3d at 383.