APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Robert Edward Williams III, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  In this appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to adequately communicate with him and because trial counsel “coerced” the Petitioner to enter guilty pleas, rendering his pleas unknowing and involuntary.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

We granted permission to appeal to address two issues: (1) Whether the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 to -408 (2012 & Supp. 2014), applies to Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (2008 & Supp. 2009), claims against governmental entities; and (2) If the GTLA does not apply, whether a constitutional or statutory right to trial by jury applies to TPPA claims brought in circuit court. As to the first issue, we hold that the GTLA does not apply to TPPA claims because the TPPA is an independent and specific body of law, which removes governmental immunity and thus controls the adjudication of TPPA claims against governmental entities. As to the second question, we hold that there is no constitutional right to trial by jury for TPPA claims and that there is no statutory right to trial by jury for TPPA claims filed in circuit court. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed on the separate grounds stated herein, and this matter is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

The Defendant, Decornick Moore, pleaded guilty to attempt to commit second degree murder and received a ten-year sentence. More than ten years later, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting that the trial court correct an illegal sentence because his sentence should have been served consecutively to a previously imposed sentence. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Ricky Hopson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He received a sentence of ten years which was suspended and ordered to be served on probation. On appeal Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because he acted in self-defense at the time of the offense. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Fayette County jury convicted the Defendant, Kevin Ladell Grandberry, of burglary, theft of property valued at $500 or more but less than $1,000, vandalism less than $500, and theft of a motor vehicle valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to a total effective sentence of twenty-seven years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered the Defendant to be shackled and handcuffed during the trial and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

The Defendant, Varquez K. Sails, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, first degree felony murder, and employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony.  The trial court merged the homicide convictions, dismissed the count pertaining to the weapons offense, and imposed a life sentence.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (first degree felony murder) (2014).  On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress an identification of him from a photograph lineup, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, (3) the trial court erred in excluding evidence that an eyewitness to the crime misidentified defense counsel as the defense investigator on a separate occasion, (4) the trial court erred in prohibiting cross-examination regarding a witness’s gang affiliation, (5) the trial court erred in excluding testimony regarding the software used to generate the photograph lineup, (6) the trial court erred in excluding an expert witness’s opinion testimony regarding whether the photograph lineup was impermissibly suggestive, (7) the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial when a witness testified that the Defendant had been incarcerated previously, (8) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, and (9) the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Verchant Joshua Williams, was convicted of one count of first degree (premeditated) murder, one count of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony, and one count of abuse of a corpse, a Class E felony.  On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of his convictions for tampering with evidence and abuse of a corpse, arguing that the two convictions should merge.  Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Hickman County jury found the Defendant, John Henry Pruitt, guilty of two counts of first
degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, and three counts of aggravated assault. Thereafter, the jury sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for both the first degree murder convictions. The trial court imposed a consecutive sentence of twenty-five years for his attempted first degree murder conviction and concurrent six-year sentences for each of the three aggravated assault convictions. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant. The Defendant also contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder, and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his sentence of life without the possibility of parole. After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff, a sole proprietor of an entertainment business featuring trivia and bingo games, filed this action to enforce an Independent Contractor Agreement, a Noncompetition Agreement, and a Contractor Confidentiality Agreement and for violation of the Tennessee Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The defendant asserted that the covenant not to compete was unenforceable and that none of the information provided to him by Plaintiff constituted trade secrets or confidential information. The trial court dismissed all claims finding the covenant not to compete was unenforceable and that none of the information qualified as a trade secret. Following the dismissal of the claims, the defendant filed a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to the Trade Secrets Act. The trial court denied the motion finding that the claim under the Trade Secrets Act was not brought in bad faith. Both parties appeal. We affirm the trial court in all respects. 

At issue in this case is the interpretation of an agreement that, inter alia, provides for a lease for the use of Open Lake in Lauderdale County by Lauderdale Haywood Angling Club. Following summary judgment proceedings, the trial court determined that the parties' agreement had terminated on two grounds. After declaring that all rights under the agreement had ended, it later required one of the parties to post a bond in order to continue using certain duck blinds for the remainder of the 2013-2014 duck hunting season. Although we conclude that one of the grounds relied upon by the trial court in declaring that the agreement was terminated was in error, we affirm the entry of summary judgment on the other ground. We also affirm the propriety and amount of the bond ordered by the trial court.

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Antoneo Williams, of attempted second degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and reckless endangerment. The jury also found him to be a criminal gang member who committed criminal gang offenses, resulting in enhanced punishment for his attempted murder and aggravated assault convictions, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of fifty-three years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his audio-recorded conversation with a fellow jail inmate, who was acting as a government agent; and that the trial court erred by using his juvenile criminal history to enhance his offender classification. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Shon Quintel Blanks, filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell, a Class B felony, and possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, a Class E felony, and the accompanying ten-year sentence. The petitioner alleged that his counsel was ineffective and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, John A. Snider, pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court for Madison County to three counts of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell, simple possession of a controlled substance, possession of synthetic cannabinoid, and possession of drug paraphernalia. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417 (Supp. 2012) (amended 2014) (possession of psilocybin, marijuana, diazepam, alprazolam with intent to sell), 39-17-418 (2010) (amended 2014) (simple possession of oxycodone), 39-17-425 (2014) (possession of drug paraphernalia), 39-17-438 (Supp. 2012) (amended 2013, 2014, 2015) (possession of synthetic cannabinoids). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective ten years, ordered him to serve eleven months, twenty-nine days in confinement, and ordered him to serve the remainder on community corrections. On appeal, the Defendant presents a certified question of law regarding the legality of the warrantless entry into the Defendant’s home and the seizure of the Defendant from his doorway. We dismiss the appeal because the certified question is not dispositive of the case.

The Defendant, Allen Anthony Hammett, entered best interest guilty pleas in case number 18648 to aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and in case number 18930 to violating the sex offender registry, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-504 (2014), 40-39-208 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of ten years for the aggravated sexual battery conviction and two years for the registry violation. Following the guilty plea hearing, the Defendant sought to withdraw his pleas alleging that they were involuntarily and unknowingly entered and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied relief. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his best interest guilty pleas. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Fredrick Sledge, of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, and it imposed a sentence of death for the first degree felony murder conviction. The trial court imposed a consecutive twenty-year sentence for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. The Defendant appealed his convictions and sentences, and we affirmed his conviction and sentence for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. We also affirmed his conviction for first degree felony murder but concluded that errors during the sentencing phase required reversal of the death sentence. We remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing for the first degree felony murder conviction. See State v. Fredrick Sledge, No. 02C01-9405-CR-00089, 1997 WL 730245, at  (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 25, 1997). On remand, the Defendant was sentenced to life for the first degree murder conviction to be served consecutively to his twenty-year sentence for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. State v. Fredrick Sledge, No. W2001-02402-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 57313, at  (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jan. 6, 2003). The Defendant’s sentence was affirmed by this court. Id. In 2014, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36.1 seeking to correct an illegal sentence. The trial court summarily denied the Defendant’s motion. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Shelby County jury found the Defendant, Robert Townsend, guilty of first degree premeditated murder. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against him. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court‟s judgment.

Appellant, Marcus Deon Jarnigan, challenged his guilty-pleaded convictions for robbery, simple possession of a controlled substance, and being a felon in possession of a handgun by filing a motion in the trial court seeking to correct his allegedly illegal sentences. The trial court summarily denied the motion, concluding that the judgments were facially valid. On appeal, he raises for the first time the applicability of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 as a basis for relief. Following our review, we discern that appellant has failed to state a colorable claim for relief and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This consolidated appeal involves the denial of two motions to alter or amend the court's dismissal of a complaint requesting corporate dissolution of a medical practice and a shareholder derivative suit involving the same medical practice. We affirm.

This consolidated appeal involves the denial of two motions to alter or amend the court's dismissal of a complaint requesting corporate dissolution of a medical practice and a shareholder derivative suit involving the same medical practice. We affirm.

This is an appeal from a judgment in a certiorari review action. The petitioner sought approval for the construction of a surface parking lot as a use permitted on review in Knoxville, Tennessee. The Metropolitan Planning Commission denied the application. The petitioner appealed the denial to the Knoxville City Council, which failed to vote on the matter. The trial court upheld the de facto denial, holding that the Knoxville City Council had not exceeded its jurisdiction, followed an unlawful procedure, acted illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently, or acted without material evidence to support its decision. The petitioner appeals. For the reasons discussed herein, we reverse and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to remand to the Knoxville City Council for a definitive ruling on whether the requested surface parking lot is permissible as a use permitted on review.

Two months after the child was born, Father filed a petition to establish paternity and change the child’s surname by deleting Mother’s surname and replacing it with Father’s surname. Mother opposed changing the child’s surname. Following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court denied the petition to change the child’s surname upon the finding that Father failed to prove that it was in the child’s best interests. Father appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns the construction of a welcome center along I-65 North in Ardmore, Tennessee. The State entered into an agreement with a contractor to construct the welcome center and the adjacent roadways and parking lots. As construction progressed, the contractor submitted requests for several changes to the scope of the project, which were denied; the State also denied several pay requests for work the contractor or its subcontractors had already completed. The contractor filed suit against the State alleging nine separate claims for damages. The Claims Commission ruled in favor of the contractor on all claims. The State appeals four of the claims, asserting that the Commission erred in awarding damages. Concluding that the evidence does not preponderate against the Commission’s findings of fact, we affirm the Commissioner in all respects.

The employee was the manager on duty at the employer’s store. After two persons posing as customers stole her purse from the store, the employee pursued the assailants into the employer’s parking lot. The employee sustained physical injuries in the encounter, and was later diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder caused by the incident. The employee sought workers’ compensation benefits for her injuries. At the ensuing trial, only the employee’s psychological injuries were at issue. The trial court held the psychological injuries were compensable, citing the street risk doctrine. However, the trial court limited the employee’s damages to 1.5 times her impairment rating, based on the statutory cap contained in Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). After a careful review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that the injuries are compensable under the street risk doctrine but reverse its application of the statutory cap to the employee’s injuries.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal arises from the trial court‘s denial of motions for recusal in two separate health care liability cases. We have consolidated the cases on appeal because they contain common facts and questions of law. Having reviewed the motions under the de novo standard of review required by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the trial court‘s decision to deny both motions.

A Sullivan County Criminal Court Jury found the appellant, Roger James Lee Arnold, guilty of burglary of an automobile; theft of property valued over $1,000; and vandalism of property valued over $1,000. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of eighteen years. On appeal, the appellant contends that the indictment failed to provide sufficient notice that the State was proceeding under a theory of criminal responsibility and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.