APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves the termination of a mother's parental rights to her eleven-year-old son. In 2004, the son was adjudicated dependent and neglected due to his mother's substance abuse and was placed in the custody of his maternal grandmother and step-grandfather. In 2012, these same grandparents filed a petition, as prospective adoptive parents, seeking to terminate the mother's parental rights on the statutory ground of persistent conditions. The trial court found that the ground of persistent conditions had not been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The grandparents appeal. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a divorce. Freddie Odell Norris (“Husband”) sued Susan Marguriete Norris (“Wife”) for divorce in the Probate and Family Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court granted a divorce to Husband on the ground of irreconcilable differences and ordered him to pay transitional alimony. Wife appeals to this Court, raising a number of issues. We amend the divorce decree to modify the grounds for divorce, modify the alimony type from transitional to in futuro, and remand this case for a calculation of reasonable attorney's fees for Wife. The judgment of the Trial Court is modified and this matter is remanded to the Trial Court for further proceedings.

This case arises from the 1986 sale of a family farm. One family member filed suit against another family member, who was also an attorney, and his law firm alleging malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud in connection with the sale. The attorney and his law firm filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the trial court. Because we find, as did the trial court, that the claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, we affirm. 

Defendant, James Eggleston, appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery and sentence of eighteen years and six months in incarceration. On appeal, he insists that the evidence was not sufficient to support the conviction and that his sentence is excessive, especially in light of his reported mental illness. After a review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Maurice Johnson, was convicted by a jury of three counts of rape. The trial court merged Counts 2 and 3 into Count 1 and sentenced petitioner to serve twenty years at 100% release eligibility. Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied by the post-conviction court after an evidentiary hearing. He now appeals the denial of relief, alleging that the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to the culpable mental state for rape and that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the same. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Justin Hadley, of theft of property valued $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, career offender to twelve years. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce inadmissible propensity evidence, and that the State failed to give proper notice of its intent to seek enhanced punishment. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The employee sustained an injury to her arm in the course of her employment. Her authorized treating physicians diagnosed her with Complex Regional Pain Syndrome and assigned a permanent impairment rating. At trial, the employer presented testimony from evaluating physicians who opined that she did not meet the criteria for the assigned impairment rating and that the treating physicians had misapplied the American Medical Association guidelines for the evaluation of permanent impairment. The trial court credited the testimony of the treating physicians and found that the employee suffered from Complex Regional Pain Syndrome. It awarded the employee permanent disability benefits. The employer appeals. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel. We affirm.

Defendant, Steven Roy Wilburn, appeals his conviction for DUI, pursuant to a certified question of law, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the arresting officer was not authorized to arrest Defendant outside of his municipal jurisdiction. Because the arresting officer was authorized to stop and arrest Defendant under Tennessee’s arrest by a private person statute, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.

We accepted a question of law certified by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee to determine whether a job applicant has a cause of action under the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act against a prospective employer for failure to hire if the prospective employer failed to hire the job applicant because that applicant had filed, or is likely to file, a workers’ compensation claim against a previous employer, and if such a cause of action exists, what standard should apply. We hold that there is no cause of action for failure to hire under the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act.

This appeal involves a dispute stemming from a resolution adopted by the Memphis City Council renaming three public parks. Several organizations and individuals filed a lawsuit challenging the validity of the resolution. The Shelby County Chancery Court dismissed the lawsuit, holding that the allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint were insufficient to establish their standing. On appeal, we hold that the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to establish standing as to one of the organizations, Sons of Confederate Veterans Nathan Bedford Forrest Camp #215. We therefore reverse the trial court’s dismissal as to that organization. We affirm dismissal of the remaining plaintiffs’ claims for lack of standing.

In this post-divorce matter, the appellant challenges an award of attorney fees to his former wife in the amount of $15,591.43. We affirm the ruling of the trial court.

Following his conviction, Mr. Bradley was placed at the Hamilton County Jail in March 2012. Over the next seven months, Mr. Bradley spent several weeks in and out of Erlanger Medical Center and Moccasin Bend Mental Health Institute due to his poor health. In October 2012, he passed away from tuberculosis. His sister brought this action for wrongful death and negligence under Tennessee's Governmental Tort Liability Act against Hamilton County. She later amended the complaint in order to add a claim for severe emotional distress she personally suffered as a result of her brother's alleged mistreatment. Hamilton County filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. The trial court consolidated the two motions together and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The sister appeals. We affirm.

The parents of a minor child filed a pro se complaint asserting claims on behalf of their daughter and individual claims by each parent. The complaint alleges that the daughter was born with brain injuries and remains severely disabled due to the failure of health care providers to treat her mother for a severe womb infection during two hospitalizations preceding birth. Plaintiffs also allege that the complaint was filed timely, although it was filed ten years after birth, because the defendants fraudulently concealed the fact that the mother was not treated for the infection. The complaint states that the parents learned of the infection in 2012 when they obtained medical records that included a previously-undisclosed placenta pathology report. The defendants responded to the complaint by filing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motions to dismiss the parents’ individual claims pursuant to the one-year statute of limitations, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-116(a)(1)-(2), and the daughter’s claims based upon the three-year statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-116(a)(3).

The petitioners, Joshua David Kruse and Donald Wayne Bowman, appeal the denial of their petitions for the writ of habeas corpus. They argue that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing their petitions because their sentences of confinement have expired. After thoroughly reviewing the briefs of the parties, the record, and the applicable law, we conclude that the petitioners' sentences have not expired, and we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Brice C. Whaley, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his best interest guilty plea convictions for criminal responsibility for especially aggravated kidnapping and abuse of a corpse. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This divorce action involves a marriage of twenty-seven years' duration. Both parties were employed outside the home throughout the marriage. The parties kept their finances separate during the marriage, maintained separate bank accounts, and divided household expenses equally. At the time of trial, the wife had accumulated a significantly larger amount of money, despite having a much lower earning capacity. The trial court therefore determined that the wife had made a greater contribution to the marital estate and awarded her approximately 68% of the marital estate upon divorce. The court further awarded the wife her attorney's fees and costs. The husband timely appealed. We affirm the trial court's division of the parties' marital property. We reverse the trial court's award of attorney's fees incurred at trial to the wife, but we affirm the award of discretionary costs in the amount of $2,713. The wife's request for an award of attorney's fees on appeal is denied

This divorce action involves a marriage of nineteen years' duration. The deed to the parties' marital residence, purchased during the marriage, reflected title in the names of the husband and his mother. Also during the marriage, the husband had purchased a vacant lot adjacent to the marital residence, and the parties had acquired a boat. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the husband's one-half ownership interest in the marital residence was marital property subject to division. The trial court also determined that the adjacent lot and boat were marital assets. An equitable division was ultimately ordered. The trial court further awarded the wife alimony in futuro, determining that she had demonstrated a need for alimony and that the husband maintained an ability to pay. The husband has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court's judgment in all respects. The wife has sought an award of attorney's fees incurred in defending this appeal. In our discretion, we remand this matter to the trial court for determination of a reasonable award of attorney's fees to the wife.

This appeal arises from competing claims by a landlord and tenant that the other breached their commercial lease agreement. Less than one year after entering into a five year lease, tenant vacated the premises declaring that landlord had materially breached Paragraphs 10 and 29 of the lease by, inter alia, refusing to make ADA accessibility improvements that tenant insists were required for tenant to obtain a use and occupancy permit. After tenant vacated the premises, landlord commenced this action alleging that tenant breached the lease by vacating the premises and refusing to pay rent (a) without justification, (b) based upon an unreasonable ultimatum, (c) before landlord could submit code compliant architectural plans to the Department of Codes and (d) before the Department of Codes could make a determination regarding the necessity of making ADA accessibility improvements. Tenant responded by asserting claims for breach of the lease, fraudulent misrepresentation, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Following a four-day bench trial, the court found that tenant breached the lease by vacating the premises without justification and failing to pay rent, and awarded landlord damages for breach in the amount of $90,342 and attorney’s fees. The trial court dismissed the remainder of tenant’s claims. Finding no error, we affirm and remand for the trial court to award landlord its reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

This appeal concerns the division of a marital estate. The trial court ordered a special master to investigate and report on the identification, classification, and valuation of all marital property and assets. The special master issued a detailed report and recommended awarding seventy-two percent of the marital home’s equity to the husband and twenty-eight percent to the wife. The special master also proposed that both parties be given an option to purchase the marital home, first husband and then wife, and that, if neither exercised the option, the house be auctioned. Both parties filed objections to the special master’s report, but neither party alleged that the special master had acted outside his authority. Following a hearing on the objections, the trial court adopted the special master’s findings and recommendations. In connection with a hearing on the auction of the marital home, wife objected on the basis that the special master acted outside of his authority. Wife appeals, challenging the manner in which the marital home was valued and divided. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.  

This appeal arises from a property damage dispute. Homeowner claims his sewer line was damaged during the installation of a natural gas pipeline in 1984 and that the damage was concealed. The gas company maintained that a subcontractor for a predecessor entity installed the pipeline and that it had no knowledge of any damage. After homeowner obtained a judgment in general sessions court, the gas company appealed to the circuit court for Davidson County. Homeowner moved to dismiss the appeal on the basis that the gas company did not timely set the case for trial. After homeowner’s motion to dismiss was denied, the gas company moved for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the gas company because: (1) there was no evidence in the record that the gas company or the predecessor entity damaged the sewer line or concealed any damage; (2) homeowner’s claims were barred by the statute of repose; and (3) homeowner failed to allege facts to support an award of punitive damages. Homeowner appeals. Although the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages, we conclude the court erred in limiting homeowner’s discovery. In light of this conclusion, we vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in all other respects and remand.

The sole issue in this action by a decedent’s estate to set aside a fraudulent conveyance in order to execute on a monetary judgment is whether life insurance proceeds paid to the decedent’s surviving spouse are exempt from claims of a creditor of the surviving spouse. The unusual twist in this matter is that the creditor is the estate of the surviving spouse’s deceased husband. Following the husband’s death and the appointment of the decedent’s mother as the Administrator of his estate, the estate obtained a judgment against the surviving spouse for conversion of the decedent’s separate assets soon after his death. After obtaining the judgment against the surviving spouse in a separate action, the estate commenced this action to satisfy the judgment by executing on real property that the surviving spouse acquired after her husband’s death and subsequently conveyed to her sister-in-law for no consideration. The trial court set aside the conveyance of the real property as fraudulent and authorized the estate to “levy execution against the real property to the extent necessary to satisfy the judgment.” The surviving spouse does not appeal the fraudulent conveyance ruling; instead, she contends the real estate is immune from the estate’s claim because she used life insurance proceeds to purchase the real estate, and proceeds from a life insurance policy are immune from the claims of the estate’s creditors pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-202 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-203. The trial court found the surviving spouse’s reliance on the statutes to be misplaced because the statutes exempt life insurance proceeds payable to the surviving spouse or children from claims of “the decedent’s creditors,” not from creditors of the surviving spouse. We affirm. We also find that the appeal is frivolous and remand so the trial court may award just damages pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122.

The Petitioner, James Dellinger, appeals from the trial court‘s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis, his petition for a writ of audita querela, his motion for a declaratory judgment, his claims pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and his claims under the due process, law of the land, and open courts provisions of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. The Petitioner seeks relief from his conviction for first degree murder and his resulting death sentence, claiming that he is ineligible for the death penalty because he is intellectually disabled and that his conviction violates principles of double jeopardy. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from proceedings on remand from a prior appeal concerning a long-standing boundary dispute between two hunting clubs in West Tennessee. Previously, in an attempt to resolve their dispute, the clubs agreed to be bound by the findings of a third-party surveyor. After the agreed-upon surveyor filed his survey, however, one of the clubs moved to set the survey aside, arguing that the surveyor had not made an independent determination. The trial court declined to hold a hearing on the motion, and the case was subsequently appealed to this Court. On appeal, we concluded that the case should be remanded to the trial court for a hearing on the motion to set the survey aside. Specifically, we directed the trial court to consider whether the surveyor made an independent determination of the disputed boundary line. Following a hearing on remand, the trial court held that the findings of the third-party surveyor were the product of an independent determination. We affirm.

Petitioner, Anthony Williams, was convicted of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to an effective sentence of life in prison. State v. Anthony Williams, No. W2012-00014-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 5355706, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 31, 2012). Petitioner now alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to test the victim's jacket for soot and gunpowder; (2) failing to inquire into a deal that was struck between the State and a witness; (3) failing to object to the trial court's giving a jury instruction on flight; (4) failing to show petitioner a video recording prior to trial; and (5) failing to impeach a witness. Following our review of the parties' briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Charlotte Renee Stanford, was convicted by a Giles County Circuit Court jury of theft of property in an amount of $10,000 or more, a Class C felony; filing a false report, a Class C felony; and conspiracy to commit theft in an amount of $10,000 or more, a Class D felony.  The trial court imposed an effective sentence of five years, with one year served in incarceration and four years on supervised probation.  On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence.  After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.