APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns a child custody dispute between a child’s Mother and Grandparents. When the child was one year old, Mother signed an order transferring custody of the child to Grandparents. One year later, Mother petitioned to modify custody and have the child returned to her. Grandparents claimed that Mother was addicted to drugs and emotionally unstable. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that Mother presented a risk of substantial harm to the child if custody was returned to her. However, the court granted Mother visitation for the majority of each year. Grandparents appealed, claiming the trial court erred by granting more parenting time to Mother than to Grandparents. We affirm.  

Former Tennessee State University Professor filed a claim for damages, asserting causes of action for breach of contract and negligent deprivation of statutory rights. On the State’s motion to dismiss the claim, the Claims Commission held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the breach of contract claim and that the professor failed to state a claim for negligent deprivation of statutory rights; accordingly, the Commission granted the State’s motion. Professor appeals. We reverse the dismissal of the breach of contract claim and remand for further proceedings; in all other respects the judgment is affirmed.

Petitioner, Antonio Johnson, appeals the summary dismissal of his two petitions for writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his sentences on the basis that the trial court failed to properly award all requisite pre-trial jail credits.  Following our extensive review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Jimmy Heard, stands convicted of criminal conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and attempted second degree murder, for which he received an effective twenty-nine-year sentence.  He unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief from his convictions and now appeals, claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to: (1) submit a transcript of the hearing on petitioner’s motion to recuse the trial judge; (2) address petitioner’s bond increase without a hearing; (3) address petitioner’s allegedly unlawful interrogation by law enforcement officers; and (4) object to a judge hearing his appeal who allegedly was once assigned to hear his case at trial.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, William Keith Blackburn, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and especially aggravated robbery. He received an effective life sentence. Petitioner challenged his convictions on appeal, and a panel of this court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. State v. William Keith Blackburn, No. M2009-01140-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 2893083 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 20, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 19, 2011). On appeal, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call John Haggard, Adrian Rich, and Brent Olive as witnesses at trial. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, John Edward Lynch, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. After the post-conviction court was unable to locate the Petitioner for ten months because the Petitioner had been transferred to federal custody and did not notify the court that his address had changed, the post-conviction court “sua sponte” dismissed the Petition on its merits. After careful review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we conclude that the petition alleged a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, thereby entitling Petitioner to appointed counsel and to an opportunity to amend his petition with the aid of post-conviction counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed and remanded.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Hen Lac Liu, of four counts of sexual battery. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence; (2) that the trial court improperly excluded defense evidence of the victim’s bias and lack of credibility; and (3) that the cumulative effect of these errors warrants a new trial. After a thorough review, we conclude that the cumulative effect of the errors by the trial court warrant a new trial for the Defendant.

This action was filed against a surgeon for breach of an employment agreement by his employers, a group owned equally by four optometrists and one non-physician. The trial court found that the group was entitled to recover damages arising from the breach. The surgeon appeals. We affirm.

The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against the defendant in General Sessions Court for problems related to the remodel of her residence. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to “withdraw” her complaint. The General Sessions Court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Approximately one year after the dismissal, the plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the judgment. The General Sessions Court denied the motion. The plaintiff appealed to the Circuit Court. The Circuit Court dismissed the appeal. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the Circuit Court.

The petitioner, Gary Bohannon, was convicted of first degree (premeditated) murder and received a life sentence. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the postconviction court denied. He now appeals, arguing that his right to due process and a fair trial was violated by statements that the trial court made to the jury during voir dire. He also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel did not object to the statements of the trial court, failed to ask for a continuance or a recess after the direct testimony of a witness, failed to locate and call a witness, and erroneously stated in closing argument that the petitioner made a statement to police. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on K.G.S. (the Child), the minor daughter of K.G.S. (Mother).1 The Department of Children’s Services (DCS) took emergency custody of the Child based on allegations of sexual abuse and lack of supervision. The trial court adjudicated the Child dependent and neglected. Both parents conceded the factual basis for this holding. After a trial, the court terminated Mother's parental rights after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) grounds for termination were established, and (2) termination is in the best interest of the Child. Mother appeals and challenges each of these holdings. We affirm.

This appeal arises from an action to quiet title to property that was acquired by Plaintiff at a tax sale in 2008. The former owner of the property opposed the petition contending he did not receive proper notice of the tax sale and, therefore, the sale was void. Following discovery, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment contending there were no material facts in dispute and it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment quieting title in favor of Plaintiff. Defendant appeals contending the court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material facts exist concerning whether the county provided proper notice of the tax sale. He also contends the trial court failed to state the legal grounds upon which it granted the motion as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. We have concluded that Plaintiff filed a properly supported motion for summary judgment demonstrating that it acquired title through an order confirming the tax sale, which shifted the burden of production to Defendant to establish that a genuine dispute of material fact exists that precludes summary judgment. However, Defendant failed to carry that burden. As for Rule 56.04, the trial court failed to state the legal grounds upon which the motion was granted; however, we are able to discern from the record the grounds for granting the motion; therefore, this omission constitutes harmless error. There being no dispute of material fact concerning whether the county provided constitutionally sufficient notice of the tax sale, Plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, we affirm the trial court.

Defendant, Kyle Roger Stewart, appeals from the trial court’s revocation of probation. On March 21, 2012, Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated burglary. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Defendant received concurrent sentences of four years with 180 days to be served in confinement and the balance to be suspended on probation. Defendant also agreed to pay $17,875.00 in restitution to the victims. On December 19, 2013, a “Probation Violation Report” was filed, alleging that Defendant had violated the conditions of his probation by failing to report a change in his residence, failing to report to his probation officer, and failing to pay restitution as ordered. Following a probation revocation hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered Defendant to serve his sentences in confinement. Defendant appeals and asserts that the trial court denied him procedural due process by failing to make adequate findings regarding the evidence supporting his probation revocation. Defendant also asserts that the trial court’s decision to revoke probation and order Defendant to serve his sentence does not comply with the sentencing principles. Having reviewed the record before us and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Otis Quirino Loyola, Sr., appeals his Montgomery County Circuit Court convictions of aggravated child neglect and aggravated child abuse which resulted in an effective 20-year sentence to confinement.  On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect.  Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the circuit court.

Appellant, Roy Lee Sewell, pleaded guilty to the sale of dihydrocodeinone and the sale of alprazolam.  Appellant was placed on probation as a result of his plea agreement, and after appellant’s conviction on new charges, the trial court revoked his probation.  On appeal, appellant argues that his probation had expired prior to this revocation due to an illegal extension of his probation a year earlier.  After reviewing the record, the arguments, and the relevant law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a foreclosure on a deed of trust. Lisa Gay Love (“Love”) sued Federal National Mortgage Association (“FNMA”), SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. (“SunTrust”), and Self Help Ventures Fund (“Self Help”) (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that the foreclosure of her home was wrongful. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that Love had defaulted on her mortgage, that SunTrust had exercised its power under the deed of trust to foreclose, and that FNMA had obtained a final judgment in an earlier detainer action. Love, in turn, argued that, because FNMA was not named on the deed at the time of the detainer action, FNMA lacked standing and the detainer judgment is void. The Trial Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that Defendants had established res judicata. Love appeals. We hold that the judgment in the detainer action is a final judgment, that we will not revisit the issue of FNMA’s standing in that suit, and that res judicata bars Love’s claims. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court

Defendant, Michael Crockett, was indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury for third offense driving on a suspended license, possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, and theft over $500. Defendant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence obtained from the traffic stop and subsequent search of his vehicle. In his motion, Defendant asserted that: 1) probable cause did not exist to conduct a traffic stop of Defendant’s vehicle; 2) the duration of the stop was unreasonable and resulted in an unlawful detention of Defendant; and 3) the canine sweep of Defendant’s vehicle was improper. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion. Defendant subsequently entered a guilty plea to possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant was sentenced to three years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. As part of his plea, Defendant reserved a certified question of law, in which he challenges the trial court’s ruling on his motion to suppress. Having reviewed the parties’ briefs and the record before us, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Ronnie Bradfield, appeals the trial court's denial of his pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Following our review, we affirm the trial court's judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The issue in this health care informed consent case is whether the trial court erred by limiting the testimony of plaintiff patient’s expert witness regarding the risks that the defendant doctor was required to disclose to obtain the patient’s informed consent for surgery.  The doctor performed a spinal fusion on the patient.  His back pain initially improved, but subsequently worsened.  The patient sued the doctor, claiming his back pain was caused by nerve compression due to ectopic bone growth at the site of the fusion.  The patient alleged that the doctor failed to give him adequate information to enable him to give an informed consent to the surgery.  In a pretrial deposition, the patient’s expert testified that to obtain informed consent, the doctor was required to advise the patient that he would use a bone-grafting protein and inform the patient about all the potential risks arising from its use, including risks that allegedly caused harm and risks that did not cause harm.  The trial court granted the doctor’s motion to limit the patient’s expert witness testimony to only those risks that allegedly materialized and injured the patient.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of the doctor.  In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of the expert medical testimony.  We hold that the trial court erred by excluding expert testimony regarding undisclosed medical risks that had not materialized.  Because this error, more probably than not, influenced the jury’s verdict, the patient is awarded a new trial.  

A developer submitted a final site plan for a mixed-use development in the Green Hills area of Nashville for approval to the Metropolitan Nashville Planning Department; the plan was approved first by the Department’s Executive Director and later by the Metropolitan Planning Commission. A neighborhood association composed of residents in the area, as well as an individual Green Hills resident, filed a petition for certiorari review of the Commission’s approval of the final site plan. Upon review of the administrative record and following a hearing, the trial court affirmed the decision and dismissed the writ with prejudice; Petitioners appeal. We concur with the trial court and affirm the decision of the Commission.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jessica Green, entered guilty pleas to one count of theft of property less than $1,000 and one count of forgery under $1,000, both Class E felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103; 39-14-114. The trial court denied judicial diversion and imposed one-year concurrent sentences for each offense, which were suspended to probation. In this appeal, the Defendant-Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her request for judicial diversion. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Myron Tate, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to advise him regarding the sufficiency of his indictment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Timothy Lewayne Morton, appeals the revocation of the probationary sentence imposed for his Sumner County Criminal Court convictions of disorderly conduct, public intoxication, repetitive telephone harrassment, and solicitation to bribe a witness.  Discerning no error, we affirm.