APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss Appellant’s medical malpractice action against defendants named in Appellant’s amended complaint filed more than one year after the cause of action accrued. The trial court found that Appellant’s claims against the additional parties were time barred because the amended complaint adding these parties was not filed within ninety days of the original answer asserting comparative fault against non-parties. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

This extraordinary appeal arises from the trial court’s placement of a minor child while the minor child remains in the legal custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The minor child was removed by DCS from the home of her Foster Parents, who had cared for her almost since birth, after allegations that the Foster Parents had abused one of their other children. The minor child’s guardian ad litem filed an emergency petition seeking the return of the child to the Foster Parents’ home, or alternatively, for an award of legal custody to the Foster Parents. After a hearing wherein DCS, the Foster Parents, and the GAL presented evidence, the trial court ordered that the child be returned to the Foster Parents’ home, but declined to remove the child from DCS’s legal custody. On appeal, we hold that a trial court may not direct placement of a child in the legal custody of DCS. We reverse the ruling of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

In 2003, Kenneth Deangelo Thomas, the Petitioner, was convicted of felony murder and sentenced to life. In 2012, Paul Talley, an accomplice who testified against the Petitioner, executed a sworn statement claiming he lied about the Petitioner’s involvement in the murder. The Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis based on the newly discovered evidence. Following a hearing in which Mr. Talley testified, the coram nobis court found Mr. Talley was not credible and dismissed the petition. Following a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

I respectfully dissent with the conclusions of the majority that Defendant’s late filing of his notice of appeal should be waived and that Defendant has stated a colorable claim for relief, entitling him to the appointment of counsel and a hearing.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict. The case arises from a motor vehicle accident. Appellant State Farm defended the case as the original plaintiffs’ uninsured motorist carrier. The original plaintiffs subsequently died, one as a direct result of injuries sustained in the accident, the other some two years after the accident. The plaintiffs’ children were substituted as plaintiffs/appellees. State Farm appeals the judgment on the jury verdict on numerous grounds, including: (1) denial of its motion for directed verdict; (2) scope of cross-examination; (3) denial of its motion for mistrial based upon inappropriate closing argument; (4) exclusion of notations on medical records; (5) various acts of alleged wrongdoing on the part of Appellees’ attorneys; (6) jury instructions; (7) admission of medical bills for original plaintiff’s long term assisted living expenses; (8) excessive verdict; (9) incorrect application of statutory cap on non-economic damages; (10) denial of credit for medical and death payments made by State Farm under the insurance policy; and (11) award of discretionary costs. Because there is material evidence to support the jury’s verdict, and because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm and remand.

The dispositive issues in this appeal are: (1) whether the defendant’s extrajudicial statement was sufficiently corroborated for purposes of the corpus delicti rule to support his conviction of aggravated sexual battery; and (2) whether deviations from the jury selection procedures prescribed in Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 24 are subject to harmless error review or require automatic reversal without a showing of prejudice. First, we hold that the corpus delicti rule does not apply because the defendant testified at trial and adopted his extrajudicial statement, although he denied one portion of it on cross-examination. Even assuming the corpus delicti rule applies, the trustworthiness of the defendant’s extrajudicial statement was sufficiently corroborated by his own testimony and by that of the prosecution witnesses. Second, we hold that deviations from prescribed jury selection procedures are non-constitutional errors subject to harmless error analysis. Such errors require reversal only if a defendant establishes either that the error “more probably than not affected the judgment or would result in prejudice to the judicial process.” Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). We conclude that the substantial deviations from Rule 24 during the selection of a jury for the defendant’s trial resulted in prejudice to the judicial process, which entitles the defendant to a new trial. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed; the defendant’s conviction is vacated; and this matter is remanded to the trial court for a new trial, consistent with this decision.

The plaintiffs are siblings and two of the four adult children of the decedent. The defendants include a third adult child and his wife. In the months preceding her death, the decedent changed her bank accounts, originally titled solely in her name, to become joint accounts with the defendant son with right of survivorship. The plaintiffs asserted that the defendant sibling exerted undue influence over the decedent in these transactions. They sought the return of all monies withdrawn from those bank accounts to the decedent's estate. Following a two-day trial, the jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiffs in the amount of $284,800. The defendants have appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Sevier County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Dustin Matthew Lucio, of aggravated rape, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-three years in confinement to be served at 100%. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to suppress a suggestive pretrial identification of him as the perpetrator, that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to introduce evidence of the victim’s drug use to corroborate his version of the events, and that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jamie Lou Haneline, appeals the dismissal of his petition for the writ of error coram nobis. He was convicted of rape of a child in 2001 and received a sentence of thirty-eight years. In the petition for relief, which was filed in 2013, the petitioner alleged a newly discovered witness with information not previously known at trial. After a hearing, the court dismissed the petition as untimely and, further, found that the witness’s testimony would not have changed the verdict in the petitioner’s case. The petitioner contends that the error coram nobis court erroneously reached those conclusions. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the court.

The pro se appellant, Jerry McGaha, appeals as of right from the Cocke County Circuit Court’s order denying his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his guilty-pleaded convictions of nine counts of rape of a child. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion to affirm by memorandum opinion is well-taken and affirm the judgment of the Cocke County Circuit Court.

The Petitioner, Troy D. Bartley, appeals the Circuit Court for Lauderdale County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This parenting dispute arose upon the parents' competing motions for modification of the existing permanent parenting plan as to the parties' minor child. The trial court previously had entered a permanent parenting plan order on May 11, 2010, designating the mother as the primary residential parent and awarding equal residential co-parenting time to both parents in an alternating weekly schedule. Following a hearing, the trial court found that a material change in circumstance warranting modification of the residential co-parenting schedule had occurred since entry of the permanent parenting plan. The trial court further found that reducing the father's co-parenting time to alternate weekends during the academic year, while reversing this co-parenting schedule during the summer break, was in the child's best interest. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Appellant, Mario D. Taylor, was convicted of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and three counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, appellant argues that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions; (2) his conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony violates his double jeopardy rights; (3) the trial court erred by refusing to allow a lay witness to testify regarding appellant’s mental and physical health; and (4) the trial court erred by refusing to allow appellant to introduce the entirety of his videotaped interrogation. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I agree with the majority’s conclusions in all aspects relative to the issues raised by the Appellant. I write separately to address the Appellant’s dual convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated assault because I conclude as a matter of plain error that the dual convictions violate double jeopardy principles.

Laquan Napoleon Johnson (“the Petitioner”) appeals from the denial of his Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis (“the petition”). The coram nobis court interpreted the petition to allege an error coram nobis claim as well as a post-conviction claim. It summarily denied the error coram nobis claim and dismissed the post-conviction claim as time-barred. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

This appeal presents the issue of whether service of process was properly effected upon a nonresident defendant. The defendant filed a limited appearance and motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02, asserting that he had never been properly served with process. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, finding that service of process was never properly completed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm

I join in the majority opinion except that portion which concerns the appellant’s challenge that his constitutional right to confront a witness was denied by admission into evidence of the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Ann L. Bucholtz, M.D. The appellant was entitled to cross-examine Dr. Bucholtz prior to admission of the autopsy report. Therefore, I conclude it was error to admit the autopsy report itself into evidence as an exhibit. However, my conclusion does not extend to bar the use of Dr. Bucholtz’s autopsy report by the testifying physician to form his own expert opinion.

The appellant, Andrew Lee Davis, was convicted of domestic assault.  He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail, with all but thirty days of the sentence suspended.  On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, James Murray Washington, was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his conviction, that the trial court erred by denying a motion to suppress his statement to the police, and that the trial court violated his constitutional right to confrontation by allowing a doctor who did not perform the victim’s autopsy to testify regarding the autopsy and by admitting the autopsy report into evidence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.