APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Something rather odd appears to be happening in this case and others similar to it. It appears that this defendant pled guilty to three offenses and received an agreed-to effective sentence of three years in December 1995. His sentences should have expired in December 1998. Yet this court has either denied or dismissed this defendant’s challenges to his convictions in 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012. And now in 2015, almost 20 years later, we feel obligated to set this defendant’s convictions aside as illegal and allow him to withdraw his 1995 guilty pleas because he did not receive twice as much time in jail as he should have in 1995. What makes this case stranger is that it is not the State who is asking for relief; rather, the defendant complains that he did not get consecutive sentencing when he should have in 1995. It is a rare case indeed when a defendant complains about not getting more time in jail. If the defendant was seeking the remedy of serving additional jail time because the law required it at the time he pled guilty, I would be happy to oblige him. But he is not. He is attempting to have his conviction set aside and presumably to have a trial, whereupon if he is found guilty, he will have to do additional time to that ordered in 1995. What, if anything, has changed to allow such a seemingly absurd result to take place?

A former member of a law firm filed a complaint against the law firm in 2009 alleging breach of contract. The trial court dismissed the complaint because it was filed after the statute of limitations had run. The individual member filed another complaint in 2014, alleging a breach of the same contract. The law firm moved to dismiss the 2014 complaint on the basis that it was barred by res judicata. The trial court agreed and dismissed the 2014 complaint. The individual appealed the trial court‟s dismissal, and we affirm. We find the appeal is frivolous and grant the law firm‟s request for an award of its attorneys‟ fees and expenses.

A Cheatham County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Jimmy Lee Reeder, of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony.  After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective thirty-five-year sentence to be served at 100%. On appeal, the appellant contends that he was denied his right to an impartial jury, that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during the State’s case-in-chief and closing arguments, and that the trial court’s decision to exclude any evidence regarding prior allegations of sexual abuse of the victim deprived him of his right to present a defense.  Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Clinton Austin, was found guilty by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to ten years’ confinement at 100% service as a violent offender. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) the trial court erred by admitting the video recording of the victim’s forensic interview. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Ugenio Ruby-Ruiz, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in a 25-count indictment charging him with five counts of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor; six counts of aggravated sexual battery; ten counts of rape of a child; one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor; two counts of rape; and one count of solicitation of a minor. At the request of the State, the trial court dismissed one count of rape of a child; the solicitation of a minor count; and two counts of sexual exploitation of a minor. Defendant was convicted by a jury of the remaining offenses. Following a sentencing hearing, Defendant received a total effective sentence of 121 years. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that: 1) the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing; 2) that Defendant’s sentence is unjustly deserved in relation to the seriousness of the offenses; and 3) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Having reviewed the briefs of the parties and the entire record, we conclude that Defendant has waived review of his convictions for sufficiency of the evidence. We further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering consecutive sentences. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Julius Wiel Walton, was convicted by a Robertson County jury of sexual battery for an incident involving his granddaughter.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years to be served on probation.  On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves an automobile accident in which the plaintiff's vehicle was struck by an oncoming pick-up truck when the truck's driver attempted to turn left in front of the plaintiff's vehicle. The plaintiff suffered injuries to her neck and back, as well as significant damage to her vehicle. The plaintiff brought this action, alleging negligence against the driver of the truck and negligent entrustment against the truck's owner, who was the defendant driver's brother-in-law. The plaintiff also alleged that the truck's owner was vicariously liable for damages under the family purpose doctrine. The driver of the truck was never successfully served with process and is not a party to this appeal. The defendant owner of the truck filed a motion for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant owner. The plaintiff appeals. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In 2005 Defendant, James Cauley, pled guilty to felony possession of less than 0.5 gram of cocaine, felony evading arrest, possession of contraband in a penal institution, and felony failure to appear.  Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant received an effective sentence of nine years to be served on probation, and other pending charges were dismissed.  In November 2012, a violation of probation warrant was issued.  Additional amendments to the warrant were issued in January 2013, April 2013, and September 2013.  At a hearing in October 2013, Defendant admitted that he had violated probation as alleged in the warrants.  Defendant asserted he was entitled to jail credit for time he served in a federal prison while he was on state probation.  The matter was continued to allow Defendant the opportunity to file a brief in support of his argument.  Another hearing was held in February 2014, and the trial court ordered the effective sentence to be served by incarceration.  Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve the entire nine-year sentence at a time when he had less than one year remaining on probation and without giving him credit for the time he spent in federal custody.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Robert Guerrero, was convicted by a Maury County Circuit Court jury of two counts of first degree murder and nine counts of attempted first degree murder. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-201 (2014), 39-13-202 (2014), 39-12-101 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to two consecutive life sentences and to nine consecutive fifteen-year sentences to be served consecutively to the life sentences, for an effective sentence of two life terms plus 135 years. Almost six years later, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting that the trial court correct an illegal sentence because his life sentences requiring 100% service of sixty years’ confinement less sentencing credits up to 15% were tantamount to life sentences without the eligibility or possibility of parole. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Martha Hungerford (“Plaintiff”) filed a petition seeking a declaration that Jimmy Hungerford was a child and legal heir at law of Thomas Hungerford. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing the Chancery Court for Hawkins County (“the Trial Court”) granted Plaintiff summary judgment. James E. Price (“Defendant”) appeals the grant of summary judgment to Plaintiff. We find and hold that Plaintiff failed to comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04 and, therefore, summary judgment should not have been granted. We vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand this case for further proceedings.

This is an appeal from the decision of the trial court that certain separated mineral interests reverted to the surface owner of the land due to abandonment by the purported holder of the mineral interests. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal results from the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for recusal. Having reviewed the trial court’s ruling on the motion for recusal pursuant to the de novo standard of review required under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm.

Appellant, Dusty Ross Binkley, pleaded guilty to manufacture of methamphetamine and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and received an effective eight-year sentence to be served in community corrections.  His sentence was revoked after he received new charges, and the trial court aligned the original sentence consecutively to the sentences for the new offenses.  Appellant later filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentences pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court denied after a hearing.  On appeal, he argues that trial court incorrectly aligned his original sentences consecutively to his sentences for his new offenses. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, David Wayne Hearing, filed in the Greene County Criminal Court a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The motion was summarily denied, and the appellant appeals the ruling. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Bobby Glen Crocker, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was dismissed by the post-conviction court as being barred by the statute of limitations. He appeals the post-conviction court‟s finding that the statute of limitations should not be tolled due to Petitioner‟s mental incompetency. Following a careful review of the record, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Fredrick Thomas, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury with first degree murder and employing a firearm during the commission of a felony after the shooting death of his wife and his unsuccessful attempt at suicide. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first degree murder. The trial court dismissed the remaining count. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court's refusal to allow expert testimony on premeditation, deliberation, passion, and provocation. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, James Todd, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by inadequately presenting a motion to suppress to the trial court. Because trial counsel’s performance was not deficient, the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition is affirmed.

The appellant, Connie Sue Messick, pled guilty in the Coffee County Circuit Court to vehicular homicide by intoxication, one count of reckless aggravated assault, and four counts of vehicular assault. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a total effective sentence of sixteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the length and manner of service of the sentences. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment to reflect that reckless aggravated assault is a Class D felony.

The petitioner, Timothy L. Jefferson, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of error coram nobis. He is currently serving a forty-year sentence in the Department of Correction as a result of his 2001 guilty plea to second degree murder. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the coram nobis court’s dismissal was in error for multiple reasons, including that: (1) the court failed to give proper consideration to veracity of the newly discovered evidence; (2) the court reached the wrong conclusion as to whether the newly discovered evidence may have affected the result; (3) the petition was not time-barred because the statute of limitations was waived; and (4) the issue had not been previously litigated. Following review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

We granted review in this case to determine whether a jury instruction based on our decision in State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), must be given when a defendant is charged with the offenses of kidnapping and aggravated burglary. The defendants threatened the victim with guns and took her purse as she was getting into her car outside of her residence. The defendants forced the victim to enter her home and followed her inside. They forced the victim to sit on her couch while they ransacked her home. Police apprehended the defendants as they attempted to flee. The defendants were indicted for aggravated robbery of the victim’s purse, aggravated burglary of the victim’s home, especially aggravated kidnapping, and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony. A jury convicted the defendants of all charges. The trial court set aside the guilty verdicts for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary, finding that these convictions, in conjunction with the aggravated robbery convictions, violated principles of due process. The trial court also dismissed the firearms convictions. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and reinstated the verdicts. Upon appeal, we remanded the case to the Court of Criminal Appeals for consideration in light of our holding in State v. Cecil, 409 S.W.3d 599 (Tenn. 2013), which made our holding in White applicable to cases in the appellate process. On remand, the intermediate appellate court reached the same result. We hold that a kidnapping charge accompanied by an aggravated burglary charge does not, standing alone, warrant a White jury instruction. However, the trial court erred by not giving a White jury instruction based on the especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery charges, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Vermaine M. Burns (“the Defendant”) was convicted of several sexual offenses, all stemming from illicit Facebook chats (“chats”) and emails between himself and the victim, K.P. On appeal, the Defendant raises three issues: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the Defendant’s chats with the victim and an emailed photo of a penis; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the Defendant was the author of the communications; and (3) whether the trial court erred by prohibiting the Defendant from referring to a fake Facebook profile created by the Defendant’s stepdaughter. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant alleging negligence resulting in an automobile accident. Plaintiff procured issuance of multiple summonses, but did not return the final summons within ninety days after its issuance. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss asserting insufficiency of process, insufficiency of service of process, and expiration of the statute of limitations. The trial court granted defendant’s motion and concluded that Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 3 and 4.03 required dismissal when a plaintiff failed to file a return of proof of service within ninety days. Based on this finding, the trial court also concluded that plaintiff had intentionally delayed service. We reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand.