APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this grandparent visitation case the mother of the child appeals the grant of the petition to establish grandparent visitation privileges. We vacate the judgment and remand the case for entry of an order in compliance with Tenn. Rule Civ. P. 52.01.

This case arises out of an appeal by the State of Tennessee, from an Order dismissing a Complaint for Judicial Forfeiture. The trial court granted Appellees’, the purported owners of two Tennessee Walking Horses, motion to dismiss for failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 39-14-210(f) and 39-11-707(c). We vacate and remand.

Petitioner, Willard William Wright, filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking his conviction, pursuant to a negotiated guilty plea, for burglary of a motor vehicle in Davidson County Criminal Court case number 2010-C-2534. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition because it was filed after the applicable one year statute of limitations had run. Petitioner appeals, arguing that the statute of limitations should be tolled on due process grounds. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Sanchez Lewan Bradford, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, asserting that his sentences were illegal in that he was not sentenced to consecutive terms.  After review, we affirm the summary dismissal.

The petitioner was convicted by a jury of attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, both Class A felonies, and sentenced to an aggregate sentence of forty-three years. The petitioner filed a timely post-conviction petition, which was amended by appointed counsel. After conducting a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Post-conviction counsel failed to file a timely notice of appeal. Because we do not conclude that the interest of justice requires us to hear the appeal, we dismiss it as untimely.

The Defendant, Dennis Karr, appeals as of right from the Sevier County Circuit’s revocation of his community corrections sentence1 and order of incarceration of his five-year-sentence relative to his guilty-pleaded sale of methamphetamine conviction. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community corrections sentence based upon his failure to report, which, according to the Defendant, was due to necessity because he was a single father and homeless. He submits that, although he was an absconder from supervision as charged, he had, in his opinion, demonstrated an ability to comply with the conditions of his release by addressing his substance abuse problem, by not obtaining any new charges, and by returning to Tennessee to address this violation. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of the Defendant’s community corrections sentence.

The underlying claim in this appeal concerns age discrimination. The action was filed initially against a single defendant. Three additional defendants were later added, but the plaintiff served process for them on the attorney for the initial defendant, instead of the individual defendants, a fact about which the added defendants learned only a few days prior to the trial. The trial ensued after the court refused to grant a continuance. A jury found all the defendants liable. The trial court awarded the plaintiff $70,000. The defendants collectively filed a motion for a new trial and raised the issues of insufficient service and the inadmissibility of direct evidence. In its first order, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for a new trial. The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to alter or amend, after which the court reversed its prior ruling granting the new trial and reinstated the jury verdict. The defendants appeal. We reverse.

The defendant, Paul Williams, a/k/a Paul Williams El, was convicted by a Carroll County jury of driving with a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license with a prior offense, a Class A misdemeanor, and failure to show registration, a Class C misdemeanor. He was sentenced by the trial court to eleven months, twenty-nine days for the driving conviction and thirty days for the registration conviction. In this pro se appeal, the defendant appears to challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court‟s jurisdiction over his person. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

We granted review in this case to determine whether Tennessee’s bail revocation statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-141(b), is constitutional, and if so, to establish the procedure to be followed in bail revocation proceedings. A Knox County grand jury returned a presentment against the defendant for simple possession of marijuana. The defendant posted bond and was released. Subsequently, a Knox County grand jury issued a nineteen-count presentment against the defendant, charging her with multiple crimes, including attempted first degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, attempted especially aggravated robbery, attempted carjacking, and aggravated assault. The trial court, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40 11 141(b), granted the State’s motion to revoke the defendant’s bail. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the statute violated article I, section 15 of the Tennessee Constitution. We hold that the Tennessee Constitution guarantees a defendant the right to pretrial release on bail, but this right is not absolute. A defendant may forfeit her right to bail by subsequent criminal conduct. Before pretrial bail can be revoked, the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  

The Town of Collierville, Tennessee, passed an ordinance prohibiting the construction of new billboards. The Town, through its Development Department, asserted that two billboards erected prior to the passage of the ordinance were illegal and ordered that they be removed. The owner of the billboards appealed the removal order to the Board of Zoning Appeals, which did not affirm the order. The Town and the Development Department petitioned for writ of certiorari, seeking judicial review of the decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals. The Shelby County Chancery Court dismissed the petition for lack of standing. We conclude that the Town and the Development Department have standing. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Plaintiff submitted the winning bid for the purchase of improved real property from Defendant Bank at auction. Plaintiff and Bank executed a purchase agreement and Plaintiff paid earnest money. Before the scheduled closing date, Bank informed Plaintiff that it did not own part of the real property advertised for auction. It offered to sell Plaintiff the unimproved parcel for the contract amount or to terminate the contract. After Plaintiff informed Bank’s closing agent that he intended to close on the entire parcel as advertised for auction, Bank returned Plaintiff’s earnest money and terminated the contract. Plaintiff filed an action alleging intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act against Bank and the auction company. The trial court granted Bank’s motion to dismiss and granted the auction company’s motion for a judgment on the pleadings. We affirm the decision of the trial court and remand.

We granted the application for permission to appeal of Jeremy Wendell Thorpe (“the Defendant”) in this case to determine whether the trial court properly included a jury instruction for criminal attempt as a lesser-included offense of sexual battery by an authority figure. If we answer in the affirmative, we also must determine whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction for criminal attempt to commit sexual battery by an authority figure. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we hold that the trial court properly included a jury instruction for criminal attempt as a lesser-included offense of sexual battery by an authority figure and that the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Petitioner, Ines Mendez Monreal, entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of not less than ten (10) pounds nor more than seventy (70) pounds of marijuana, a Class D felony. He was placed on judicial diversion for a period of four years. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-313. Almost nine years after entering the plea, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was summarily dismissed by the post-conviction court. On appeal, petitioner raises the following issues: (1) whether due process principles require that he be permitted to pursue his petition for post-conviction relief; (2) whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel; and (3) whether his plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in an action on a homeowner’s insurance policy that contained a one-year contractual limitations period on actions arising under the policy. The home of the insured parties was damaged by a fire on December 15, 2011. The insured parties submitted a claim with the insurer pursuant to their homeowner’s insurance policy. The insurer submitted an estimate and tendered a settlement check to the insured parties on April 2, 2012. Over a year later, on October 3, 2013, the insured parties filed suit alleging they were owed an additional $75,000 for personal use and construction improvements on a new home. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer, finding that the insured parties’ claims were barred by the one-year contractual limitations period. After reviewing the record, we find no error in the trial court’s decision and affirm its grant of summary judgment.

The defendant, Ed Loyde, was convicted of one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. He received an effective sentence of thirty-five years. On appeal, he raises the sole issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions. After thoroughly reviewing the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case concerns the proper interpretation of a contract governing an interest in real property. The trial court concluded that the contract unambiguously granted a lease to one party, rather than an easement. Affirmed and remanded.

The defendant, Joseph Newton, was convicted of two counts of rape, Class B felonies, which the trial court merged. He received an effective eight-year sentence. On this direct appeal, he raises the sole issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. He argues that trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to pursue a reasonable defense and failing to provide assistance; (2) failing to fulfil a promise made in the opening statement that the defendant would testify; and (3) for statements made during closing arguments. He also contends that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors operated so as to deprive him of his right to receive a fair trial. After thoroughly reviewing the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the criminal court.

The defendant, Kenneth McCormick, was indicted for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (first offense), a Class A misdemeanor. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence against him on the basis that law enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion to effect the seizure of his parked vehicle through the activation of emergency lights. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the defendant was convicted after a jury trial. Because we conclude that the activation of the emergency lights was an exercise of the community caretaking function and did not constitute a seizure, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After a shooting at a public housing complex, a jury convicted the defendant, Charzelle Lamontez Swafford, of one count of first degree (premeditated) murder, four counts of attempted first degree murder, each a Class A felony, and one count of employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. The defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence; the denial of a mistrial based on an emotional outburst from a witness; the trial court’s decision to admit a recorded prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence; and the trial court’s decision to impose partial consecutive sentences at the upper end of the range. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, James Russell Jones, Jr., was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; attempted aggravated rape, a Class B felony; aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony; and simple assault, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II, multiple offender to thirty years at 100% for each of the aggravated rape convictions, as a Range III, persistent offender to twenty-five years at 45% for the attempted aggravated rape conviction and twenty-five years at 100% for the aggravated sexual battery conviction, and to eleven months, twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor assault conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences for the four felony convictions served consecutively, for an effective sentence of 110 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to the defendant’s life sentence for a South Carolina conviction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his convictions and argues that the trial court erred by denying his request for a mistrial, by ordering consecutive sentences, and by allowing the jury to deliberate on Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment when venue in Davidson County had not been established. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.