APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, who was indicted for driving under the influence and violating the open container law, moved to suppress all evidence discovered during the search of her car, which included an open container of alcohol and a small amount of marijuana. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, holding that one of the officers involved had unreasonably prolonged the investigatory stop. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Because the officer had a reasonable basis for extending the stop by ten to fifteen minutes while awaiting a second officer and the duration of the detention did not exceed the proper parameters, we set aside the order of suppression and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

Appellant, John D. Bailey, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by failing to suppress his statement to the police and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Eddie Joe Whitaker, was convicted by a Campbell County jury of retaliation for past action and failure to appear. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-16-510, -16-609. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction for retaliation for past action but that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction for failure to appear. Therefore, the conviction for retaliation for past action is affirmed, and the conviction for failure to appear is reversed and that charge is dismissed.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Eric Williams, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, that the trial court erred by refusing to allow State witnesses to testify about his statements after the killing, that the trial court erred by allowing the State to use a shotgun for demonstrative purposes when the gun was not involved in the crime, and that the trial court erred by not using the “reasonable effort method” for the jury’s consideration of the charge. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred by prohibiting the appellant from crossexamining State witnesses about his stating after the shooting that he did not intend to shoot the victim, by allowing the State’s expert to testify about the trigger pull of double-barrel shotguns, and by allowing the jury to handle a shotgun that was not the murder weapon. Moreover, we conclude that the cumulative effect of the errors warrants reversal of the appellant’s conviction. Therefore, the conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

The defendant, Allen Cornelius Bond, was convicted by a Madison County Criminal Court jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and attempted sexual battery, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to an effective term of sixteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction to be served consecutively to a prior sentence. On appeal, he argues that: (1) his right to an impartial jury was violated because one of the jurors knew him; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the nurse examiner to testify as an expert witness; and (4) the trial court erred in not exercising its authority as the thirteenth juror and setting aside his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal asks whether a wife’s loss of consortium claim, brought pursuant to her husband’s underlying health care liability action, is itself a health care liability action subject to the pre-suit notice provision of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act. The trial court granted the hospital’s motion to dismiss, finding that the wife’s claim was a health care liability action under the Act and that she had failed to comply with the pre-suit notice provision. As an alternative ground for dismissal, the court also found that the wife had failed to file suit within the statute of limitation. We vacate the trial court’s order of dismissal with prejudice and remand.

The petitioner, Trutonio Yancey, was convicted of aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, carjacking, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and received an effective sentence of twenty years. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the petitioner’s aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping convictions but reversed the carjacking and firearm convictions and remanded for a new trial. The Tennessee Supreme Court denied application for permission to appeal. State v. Trutonio Yancey and Bernard McThune, No. W2011-01543-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 4057369, at (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 14, 2013). Subsequently, he filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Counsel was appointed and, following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves an obligor’s petition to modify or terminate his alimony obligation due to his retirement. The trial court found that the obligor’s income had decreased to approximately one-third of his previous income level, so the trial court reduced the alimony payments by a corresponding percentage, to roughly one-third of the previous obligation. The recipient appeals. We hold that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard when considering the petition to modify and also erred in its factual findings. Based on our review of the evidence, the obligor failed to demonstrate that modification of his alimony obligation was warranted. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s decision, reinstate the previous alimony award, dismiss the petition for modification, and remand for further proceedings.

Convicted of rape by a Sullivan County Criminal Court jury, the defendant, Maxwell Monroe Hodge, appeals and claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the definition of “sexual penetration” expressed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-501(7) is impermissibly vague relative to that subsection’s use of the terms “genital or anal openings.” Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the criminal court.

This appeal concerns a dispute over which statute of limitations applies. Hershel and Alma Sanders (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit against First Tennessee Bank, National Association (“the Bank”) in the Circuit Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”).1 Plaintiffs alleged that the Bank breached its contractual obligations to them by failing to provide long-term financing toward the building of their home as promised. The Bank denied it made any such promise. The Bank filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted the Bank’s motion for summary judgment on the basis that the three-year statute of limitations for injury to property or interest in property barred Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs appeal. We hold that the financial damages alleged by Plaintiffs are in the nature of breach of contract and, therefore, a six-year statute of limitations governs. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court.

The petitioner, Crystal Miranda Kirby, appeals the denial of her petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that her judgment for first degree murder is void and illegal on its face because of the trial court’s merger of her second degree murder conviction into the first degree murder conviction after separate judgments had already been entered and the jury had been dismissed. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court summarily denying the petition.

This appeal involves various financial issues related to a divorce. Father appeals the trial court’s determination of variable income for Father that he earns as an amateur bowler; the trial court’s award of transitional alimony to Mother; and the trial court’s order that Father pay half of the minor children=s private school tuition. We affirm the trial court’s rulings regarding child support and alimony. However, we vacate the trial court’s ruling on the payment of private school tuition due to the trial court’s failure to comply with the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines.

The defendant was charged with and convicted of rape of a child, and he received a twentyfive-year sentence. The defendant appealed, raising seven issues. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court erred by(1) allowing the prosecution to introduce the child’s prior consistent statement, a recorded forensic interview, during its case-in-chief before the child’s credibility had been challenged; and (2) ruling that if the defendant chose to testify the prosecution would be permitted to ask him whether he had been previously arrested or convicted of an unnamed felony. Nevertheless, in a divided decision, two judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that these errors were neither individually nor cumulatively prejudicial. The dissenting judge opined that the second error alone was prejudicial and entitled the defendant to a new trial. We affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals’ conclusions that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and that the election is sufficiently specific and definite. We hold that the cumulative effect of the two conceded trial errors is prejudicial and entitles the defendant to a new trial. Because of the remand for a new trial, we do not address the defendant’s other allegations of evidentiary errors. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed in part; the defendant’s conviction is vacated; and this matter is remanded to the trial court for a new trial, consistent with this decision.

This is a lawsuit brought for damage to property. After partial summary judgment was denied to the defendant, and after the trial court ruled that the defendant’s request for a jury trial was waived, the parties proceeded to a bench trial. During a hiatus after three days of trial, the parties settled the case and announced the essential terms of the settlement to the court in open court. The parties failed to agree to a written settlement document, and the plaintiffs asked the trial court to enforce the settlement. The trial court found that the settlement was enforceable. The defendant appealed. We affirm.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found that six grounds for termination of her parental rights had been established. Mother does not challenge three of the grounds for termination; thus, the trial court’s ruling regarding three of the grounds is final. Because the trial court may terminate parental rights on the basis of only one statutory ground, In re D.L.B., 118 S.W.3d 360, 367 (Tenn. 2003), we need not examine the other grounds. See In re Alexis L., No. M2013-01814-COA-R3-PT, 2014 WL 1778261, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2014). Mother also contends the trial court erred in finding that the requirements of the permanency plan were reasonably related to remedying the conditions that necessitated the child’s removal and that termination was in the child’s best interests. Finding no error, we affirm.

Plaintiff, a firefighter, who sustained personal injuries while serving in the course and scope of his employment with the Nashville Fire Department, brought this action against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) asserting that he sustained serious personal injuries due to the negligence of a paramedic who was employed by Metro. The injury occurred while Plaintiff and the paramedic were moving a patient in a wheelchair. Following discovery, Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. After determining that no material facts were in dispute, the trial court granted summary judgment on the issue of liability upon the findings that an established procedure existed for the lifting of patients in a wheelchair, that the paramedic violated the established procedure, that the violation caused Plaintiff’s injuries, and that Plaintiff was not comparatively at fault. Following an evidentiary hearing on the issue of damages, the trial court awarded Plaintiff a judgment of $300,000 in damages. On appeal, Metro contends that there is a genuine dispute of fact regarding the policy for moving patients in wheelchairs, whether the paramedic violated the procedure, and whether Plaintiff is comparatively at fault. We affirm the trial court’s findings that there was an established policy for moving patients in a wheelchair, that the paramedic violated the policy by lifting the foot of the wheelchair without communicating with Plaintiff prior to initiating the lift, and that the paramedic’s violation of the established policy was the sole and proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

This appeal concerns a contentious boundary dispute involving multiple parties. Plaintiffs Garrett and Alma Rittenberry (“the Rittenberrys”) initially filed suit seeking to have an easement set aside for their benefit through the property of Kevin and Lana Pennell (“the Pennells”) pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 54-14-101 et seq. Later, the Rittenberrys filed an amended complaint that alternatively sought relief by way of an easement across the property of Appellants Chris Burke and Lesa Hall (“Burke/Hall”). The Pennells moved for summary judgment arguing that the Rittenberrys did not need to resort to the statutory remedy of an easement by necessity. Upon finding that the Rittenberrys’ property was not, in fact, landlocked, but that it abutted a public road, the trial court granted the Pennells’ motion and dismissed the Rittenberrys’ cause of action. We affirm the trial court’s judgment

Defendant, Jeremy McWherter, pled guilty in the Montgomery County Criminal Court to the offense of especially aggravated burglary. Defendant received a sentence of eight years to serve one year in confinement followed by seven years of probation. On March 26, 2014, a probation violation warrant was issued. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked probation and ordered Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence by incarceration. Defendant appeals, and does not challenge the revocation of probation, but argues that the trial court erred by ordering the entire sentence to be served by incarceration and not granting him a furlough to enter an alcohol rehabilitation program. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Billy L. Grooms, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus and/or motion to correct an illegal sentence. He argues that: (1) the indictment is void because it was returned without a juvenile petition for transfer, prior to transfer to the criminal court, and without the criminal court’s acceptance; (2) the indictment is void because it and the endorsements were not part of the record insofar as they were never spread upon the minutes of the trial court to become part of the record; (3) the indictment is void because it alleged only legal conclusions, did not provide adequate protections against double jeopardy, and did not enable the trial court to enter an appropriate judgment; and (4) his sentence is void in light of Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Gary Wayne Bush, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief.  He was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to call the Petitioner to testify in his own defense.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The pro se appellant, Corey Alan Bennett, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. Because the record reflects that the appellant filed a subsequent petition for post-conviction relief, we affirm the order of the Knox County Criminal Court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

The pro se appellant, Corey Alan Bennett, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. Because the record reflects that the appellant filed a subsequent petition for post-conviction relief, we affirm the order of the Knox County Criminal Court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

The trial court granted Defendant/Appellee’s motion to dismiss based upon expiration of the applicable statute of limitations and made its judgment final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. Because we find that the trial court considered matters outside the pleadings in ruling on Defendant/Appellee’s motion to dismiss we converted it to a motion for summary judgment. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

This is a contract case arising from the sale of a business. Appellant orally agreed to sell his fastener business to the Appellee. After Appellant allegedly violated the terms of the sale agreement, Appellee stopped making payments. Appellant filed suit to recover the balance of the purchase price. The parties later agreed to rescission of the sale and to allow the trial court to decide the issue of rescissory damages. The trial court heard evidence regarding such damages and entered an order awarding Appellant $8,601.73 in damages, plus the remaining inventory of unused old fasteners. Appellant appeals. We affirm and remand.