APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Shelby County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Jeffrey Horskins, charging him with attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, two counts of aggravated burglary, and theft of property valued at more than one-thousand dollars. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of reckless endangerment, aggravated assault, two counts of aggravated burglary, and theft of property valued between $500 and $1,000. The trial court merged the two convictions for aggravated burglary and imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for reckless endangerment, nine years for aggravated assault, nine years for aggravated burglary, and three years for theft of property. The trial court further found Defendant to be an offender whose record of criminal activity was extensive and ordered Defendant’s sentences for aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and theft to be served consecutively for an effective twenty-one-year sentence as a Range Two offender. The misdemeanor sentence for reckless endangerment was ordered to be served concurrently to the other sentences. On appeal, Defendant argues that the length of his sentences are excessive and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This post-conviction appeal involves ineffective assistance of counsel claims made by a prisoner who fatally shot his wife. A Hamilton County jury, rejecting the prisoner’s defense that his rifle had malfunctioned and fired accidentally, convicted him of first degree premeditated murder. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. State v. Kendricks, 947 S.W.2d 875 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). The prisoner later filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Criminal Court for Hamilton Countyalleging, among other things, that his trial counsel had been ineffective because he decided not to seek an expert to rebut the anticipated testimony of the prosecution’s expert and because he did not attempt to use an exception to the hearsay rule to introduce statements favorable to the prisoner. The post-conviction court conducted a hearing and denied the petition. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the post-conviction court and granted the prisoner a new trial after concluding that trial counsel’s representation had been deficient and that, but for these deficiencies, the jury might have convicted the prisoner of a lesser degree of homicide. Kendrick v. State, No. E2011-02367-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 WL 3306655 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 27, 2013). We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal. Trial counsel’s decisions not to consult an expert to rebut the anticipated testimony of a prosecution expert and not to attempt to introduce a potentially favorable hearsay statement did not amount to deficient performance that fell below the standard of reasonableness. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand for consideration of the prisoner’s remaining claims.

The Defendant, Roger Wayne Henry, Jr., was found guilty by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2014).  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to nine years and six months at 100% service.  On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred by restricting his cross-examination, (3) the trial court erred by allowing the State to elicit inadmissible hearsay testimony, (4) the trial court erred by failing to order the State to play all of the Defendant’s recorded statements to the police, (5) the trial court erred by failing to grant trial counsel’s motion to withdraw, (6) the trial court erred by denying his requests to continue the trial and for funds for an expert, and (7) the trial court erred by failing to compel the State to produce the police file relative to the victim’s acting as a confidential informant.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Teresa Deion Smith Harris, appeals the denial of her petition for writ of error coram nobis. In the circuit court, petitioner raised a claim of newly discovered evidence relating to the timing of the victim’s death and the degree of torture that he endured. The coram nobis court summarily denied the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Petitioner, Frazier Perry, appeals as of right from the Dyer County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The trial court awarded permanent total disability benefits to the employee for bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. It apportioned the award between the employer and the Second Injury Fund. Both have appealed. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the trial court in its award for permanent and total disability benefits for a subsequent scheduled member injury.

The petitioner, Tina M. Dixon, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that her trial counsel were ineffective for failing to request a ruling on a motion for additional findings of fact related to a motion to suppress; failing to raise the issue of the trial judge and the prosecutor’s potential conflicts of interest prior to trial; and failing to advise her of a proposed plea agreement.  The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Lorenzo Malone, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which was summarily denied by the trial court.  Because Appellant has failed to state a colorable claim that his life sentence for first degree felony murder is illegal, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jeremy Leniel Middlebrooks, was indicted for two counts of aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-102, -13-103, -17-1307. Prior to trial, the State dismissed one of the counts of aggravated assault. Following a bifurcated jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of aggravated assault and facilitation of reckless endangerment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-403. The Defendant then pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm while the jury was deliberating during the second phase of the trial. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of five years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for facilitation of aggravated assault and facilitation of reckless endangerment; and (2) that the trial court erred by ruling that the Defendant’s prior conviction for attempted aggravated burglary could be used to impeach the Defendant if he chose to testify at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se appellant, Jarrett Dunn, appeals as of right from the McMinn County Criminal Court’s order denying his motion to correct illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court.

The Petitioner, James Clark, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his petition for procedural defects and for failing to state a cognizable claim. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jefferson Lawton Freeman, appeals as of right from the Henry County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition for having been untimely filed. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, James Richardson Reece, appeals the judgment of acquittal of aggravated assault and the trial judge’s findings of contempt of court.  The appeal of the judgment of acquittal is hereby dismissed and the findings of contempt are affirmed.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Devonta Amar Cunningham, of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony.  After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective life sentence. Subsequently, he filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis.  On the same day, he filed a motion for new trial and for judgment of acquittal.  The petition and the motion were denied by the trial court.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his murder conviction and that the trial court erred by refusing to compel a witness to testify after the witness asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; by refusing to admit a co-defendant’s prior statement as substantive evidence; by limiting his cross-examination of a State’s witness; by allowing evidence to be admitted in violation of the rules of discovery; and by denying his petition for a writ of error coram nobis.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

We granted the State of Tennessee permission to appeal in this criminal proceeding to address two issues: (1) the analytical framework that a successor judge should utilize in deciding whether he can act as the thirteenth juror, and (2) the standard of appellate review of a successor judge’s determination that he can or cannot act as the thirteenth juror.  We hold that there is a rebuttable presumption that a successor judge can act as the thirteenth juror.  We also hold that an appellate court should review de novo a successor judge’s decision about acting as the thirteenth juror.  Applying these principles to the instant case, we hold that the successor judge committed no reversible error in determining that he could act as the thirteenth juror.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgments of conviction.
 

The Defendant-Appellant, Skylar Matthew Gant, entered guilty pleas to two counts of the sale of .5 grams or more of crack cocaine, two counts of the delivery of .5 grams or more of crack cocaine, and one count of failure to appear, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of the sentences.  Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the alternative counts of the sale and delivery of crack cocaine and imposed two concurrent twelve-year sentences for the drug offenses.  For the felony failure to appear, the court imposed a four-year sentence to be served consecutively to the twelve-year sentences, for a total effective sentence of sixteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying him an alternative sentence.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a health care liability action in which Defendant sought summary judgment, claiming that Plaintiffs’ expert was not qualified to render an expert opinion because she was not practicing in her field during the year preceding the date of the injury. The trial court agreed and dismissed the action. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse the decision of the trial court.

This is a premises liability action in which Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant for injuries she sustained as a result of a trip and fall accident in a parking lot. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that he owed no duty to Plaintiff and that Plaintiff was more than 50 percent at fault for her injuries. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The Petitioner, David Dewayne Smith, was indicted along with three other individuals for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Before trial, the State entered a nolle prosqeui as to the charges against one co-defendant and entered into a plea agreement with another. The trial proceeded against the Petitioner and the remaining codefendant. On the third day of trial, the State announced that it had entered into a plea agreement with the remaining co-defendant, and the co-defendant would testify against the Petitioner. Trial counsel made oral motions for a mistrial and a continuance, both of which were denied by the trial court. The Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder, and this Court affirmed his conviction on appeal. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the petition was denied. On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the denial of post-conviction relief on 12 grounds. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a jury trial, Terrence Lamont McDonald (“the Defendant”) was convicted of four counts of aggravated rape and one count of reckless endangerment, as a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault. At a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the Defendant’s convictions for aggravated rape in counts two and four into his aggravated rape convictions in counts one and three, respectively. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of 25 years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises claims that: 1) the State violated Batson by striking African-American potential jurors from the venire; 2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument; 3) the trial court erroneously admitted evidence under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); 4) his convictions for two counts of aggravated rape violate principles of double jeopardy; 5) count five of the indictment fails to state an offense; 6) the Defendant’s conviction for reckless endangerment in count five violated his right to an unanimous verdict; and 7) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing  Following a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we discern no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Dylan M. Yacks, entered a guilty plea to driving under the influence (DUI), see T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (1) (2012), in exchange for a 1 sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, which was suspended after service of two days confinement. As a condition of his guilty plea, the Defendant-Appellant properly reserved a certified question of law challenging the constitutionality of the stop and subsequent arrest. Upon our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and vacate the Defendant-Appellant’s convictions.

The defendant, Johnny Frank Royston, Sr., was tried by a jury and convicted of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; two counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; and aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony. The defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of fifty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence, including the trial court’s instructions pursuant to State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 577 (Tenn. 2012); (2) an alleged amendment to or variance from the indictment; (3) the denial of his motion for a change of venue; (4) the “contamination” of certain evidence; (5) the trial court’s alleged limits on jury deliberations; (6) alleged prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments; and (7) cumulative error. Having conducted a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the defendant is not entitled to relief, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., concurring.
I respectfully concur in the majority opinion. I write separately because I would have concluded that there was no White error in instructing the jury. In my view, the trial court properly instructed the jury. I part with the reasoning of the majority because the issue raised by the Defendant- ppellant in his brief was as follows:

The defendant, Derek Horne, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of the latter. We affirm the convictions but remand for correction of clerical errors in one of the judgments.