APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Carl J. Wagner, of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated burglary. The trial court imposed a life sentence. The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the judgment for the second degree murder conviction and reversed the judgments for the first degree felony murder and especially aggravated kidnaping convictions. State v. Carl J. Wagner, No. M2010-00992-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 2893098, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, July 20, 2011), perm. app. granted (Tenn. Jan. 11, 2012). Our Supreme Court reinstated the judgments for all three convictions. State v. Wagner, 382 S.W.3d 289, 291 (Tenn. 2012). The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that he was entitled to relief on multiple grounds, including that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This post-divorce parenting dispute arose when the father filed a petition to modify the parties’ permanent parenting plan as to their two minor children. Concomitantly with entry of the final judgment for divorce, the trial court had entered a permanent parenting plan order on January 19, 2007, designating the mother as the primary residential parent and granting the father residential co-parenting time on alternating weekends and Wednesday evenings. This parenting plan was later modified by agreement in an order entered June 17, 2008. Nearly five years later on July 27, 2012, the father filed the instant petition to modify the permanent parenting plan. He alleged that a dangerous situation existed at the mother’s home and requested an emergency ex parte order naming him the primary residential parent, which the trial court immediately granted. Upon a hearing, the trial court entered an order, inter alia, confirming the father as the primary residential parent, pending further proceedings, on August 13, 2012. Following a final hearing conducted approximately one year later, the trial court found that a material change in circumstance had occurred since entry of the June 2008 permanent parenting plan and that it was in the children’s best interest for the father to be declared their primary residential parent with sole decision-making authority. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s pro se complaint for failure to state a claim. Due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s brief on appeal, we find that he waived consideration of any issues on appeal and hereby dismiss the appeal.

This is a declaratory judgment action in which Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment regarding the transfer of Marcia Hull’s monetary assets and jointly-held property to the Culver Estate. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jameca M. Tipler, was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury for attempted first degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, felony evading arrest, reckless endangerment, and felony vandalism. The jury convicted Tipler of all the charged offenses except the felony vandalism charge, which the jury determined was a misdemeanor. The trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction with the attempted first degree murder conviction and sentenced Tipler to an effective sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, Tipler argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, and misdemeanor vandalism, and (2) the jury charge and verdict form were erroneous because they did not require the jury to determine whether he was criminally responsible before determining whether he was guilty of the underlying charges, and the trial court erred by not including an instruction on the natural and probable consequences rule in its instruction on criminal responsibility. Upon review, we remand to the trial court for entry of a judgment reflecting the modified conviction for facilitation of attempted first degree murder, which should also reflect the merger of the modified conviction for facilitation of aggravated assault with the conviction for facilitation of attempted first degree murder, for entry of a judgment reflecting the indicted offense of reckless endangerment by discharging a firearm into a habitation and the modified conviction for facilitation of reckless endangerment by discharging a firearm into a habitation, and for resentencing. We affirm the trial court in all other respects.

A Montgomery County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, James Antonio Bagwell, of two counts of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; two counts of aggravated assault while acting in concert with two or more other persons, a Class B felony; and one count of reckless endangerment by discharging a firearm into a habitation, a Class C felony. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received concurrent sentences of ten years for each Class B felony conviction and five years for the Class C felony conviction for a total effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; that the trial court committed plain error by failing to require that the State elect facts to support the attempted murder and aggravated assault charges; and that his effective sentence is excessive and should be served in an alternative to confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Richard Blanchard, was convicted of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to an eleven-year sentence. This Court affirmed his conviction and sentence on appeal. State v. Richard Lowell Blanchard, No. M2010-1186-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 2533753, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 24, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 12, 2013). The Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the Petitioner relief. The Petitioner now appeals, maintaining that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Everett Spencer Barnette, appeals as of right from the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his nolo contendere pleas. The Defendant contends (1) that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel; and (2) that his pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and understandingly entered. Following our review, we conclude that the Defendant’s pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and understandingly entered. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This case involves the proper interpretation of a contract between a general contractor and a subcontractor. The trial court determined that the subcontractor was entitled to recover additional sums above the original contract price based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The general contractor timely appealed. Having determined that the scope of the parties’ contract covered the work in question and that the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply in this matter, we vacate the trial court’s judgment.

The plaintiffs sued the defendant, their former attorney, to recover fees the plaintiffs had paid to the defendant, as well as punitive damages for alleged misrepresentations made by the defendant. The trial court granted a default judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendant thereafter filed a motion seeking to set aside the default judgment, alleging that she was not properly served with process. Before the trial court entered a written order regarding the defendant’s motion to set aside the default judgment, the defendant filed a motion seeking recusal of the trial judge. The trial court subsequently entered an order denying the defendant’s motion to set aside the default judgment, as well as an order dismissing various motions for sanctions, while the recusal motion was pending. The court thereafter entered an order granting the defendant’s motion for recusal. The defendant has appealed. We determine that the trial court erred in entering orders regarding contested matters while the motion seeking recusal was pending. We therefore vacate the trial court’s orders and remand the case for further proceedings regarding the defendant’s motion to set aside the default judgment.

The defendant, who was indicted for child neglect based upon her failure to obtain medical treatment for her daughter, challenged the constitutionality of the “spiritual treatment” exemption within the child abuse and neglect statute. The exemption, which is set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-15-402(c), precludes the prosecution of parents who “provide[] treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone in accordance with the tenets or practices of a recognized church or religious denomination by a duly accredited practitioner thereof in lieu of medical or surgical treatment.” The defendant moved to dismiss the charge against her,claiming that the exemption was unconstitutionallyvague and violated the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal Constitution, as well as the comparable provisions of the Tennessee Constitution. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the defendant did not qualify for the spiritual treatment exemption, found her guilty of child neglect, and imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, all to be served on unsupervised probation. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction without addressing the merits of the constitutional claims. We hold that the spiritual treatment exemption is not unconstitutionally vague. Because the exemption may be elided without invalidating the remainder of the child abuse and neglect statute, the defendant’s remaining constitutional challenges, even if successful, would not afford her relief. As a result, we decline to address whether the exemption violates the Establishment or Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal Constitution or the corresponding provisions in article I, section 3 and article XI, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

This is an estate case. Appellant was the executor of his mother’s estate. Appellant’s siblings, Appellees herein, brought suit against the Appellant in the Knox County Chancery Court for depletion of the estate alleging he exercised undue influence over the decedent to obtain certain funds for himself and his wife. A jury awarded the estate $284,800, and that award is on appeal. While that appeal was pending, the Probate Division of the Knox County Chancery Court heard Appellees’ motion filed in the estate case to have the Appellant removed as executor of the estate. The Probate Division of Knox County Chancery Court granted the Appellees’ motion removing the Appellant. Appellant appeals, arguing that because the depletion case was on appeal, the Probate Division of the Knox County Chancery Court lacked jurisdiction to remove him as executor of the estate. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Blount County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Thearon Antonio Grambling, of statutory rape by an authority figure and incest; the victim of both offenses was his fifteenyear- old daughter. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of four years and six months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Keith Edward Clements, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his four aggravated burglary guilty plea convictions.  On appeal, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, but for which he would have elected to take his case to trial.  After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Lloyde Susanne McSpadden Marcum (“Daughter”) appealed the judgment of the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) appointing Katie Loftin and Emily McSpadden (“Granddaughters”) as co-conservators of Dorothy Elizabeth Sprinkle McSpadden (“Mother”). Mother died during the pendency of this appeal. We find and hold that Mother’s death rendered this appeal moot. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal, decline to address whether the appeal is frivolous, and decline to award either party attorney’s fees on appeal.

This action concerns the sale of three properties Plaintiff purchased at a tax sale held by Anderson County. Plaintiff alleged that Anderson County breached its contract with her by failing to convey marketable title to the properties when the owners of the subject properties had not received proper notice of the tax sale. Anderson County filed a motion to dismiss, asserting, in pertinent part, that the statute of limitations had passed for filing such actions and that it had not breached a contract with Plaintiff. The court dismissed the action, finding that Plaintiff failed to establish that it had entered into a contract with Anderson County, that the statute of limitations for such actions had passed, and that Plaintiff lacked standing to attack the alleged insufficient notice provided to the original property owners. Plaintiff
appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Plaintiffs,  two  grandchildren of the  decedent  who  are  executors of their  deceased mother‟s estate, brought this action on behalf of the decedent contending that Barbara Stephens, one of the decedent‟s three daughters, unduly influenced the decedent to name Ms. Stephens as the sole beneficiary of her estate, to the exclusion of her other children and grandchildren. The decedent died in 2009, this action was commenced in August 2012, and the decedent‟s will was admitted to probate in January 2013, without contest.  Thereafter, Ms. Stephens filed a motion for summary judgment for lack of standing and two motions to dismiss under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) for lack of standing and lapse of  the three-year statute of limitations. The trial court granted all three motions. Plaintiffs appeal contending, inter alia, they have standing because their mother‟s estate suffered a financial loss when Ms. Stephens deprived their mother, and her estate, of the substantial economic interests (her inheritance), and their claims are not time-barred, because the statute of limitations was tolled due to the decedent‟s incompetence under Tenn. Code  Ann. § 28-1-106. Because the decedent‟s will was admitted to probate and Plaintiffs did  not attempt to contest the validity of the decedent‟s will until after summary judgment was granted, it was undisputed, when the trial court ruled on this matter, that the decedent  died  testate, and  Ms.  Stephens  was  the  sole  beneficiary of the decedent‟s  estate. Therefore, neither Plaintiffs, individually, nor their mother‟s estate suffered a “distinct and palpable injury” for which the court could grant relief; as a consequence, they do not have standing. See Lynch v. City of Jellico, 205 S.W.3d 384, 395 (Tenn. 2006). We, therefore, affirm the summary dismissal of this action.

This is a termination of parental rights case brought by Appellees, who are the prospective adoptive parents. Although Mother/Appellant initially joined in the petition to terminate her parental rights and for adoption, she later withdrew her consent. Appellees moved forward with the termination of Mother’s parental rights on their own petition, which the trial court granted. Mother now appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support the child. Mother also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support both the ground for termination of Mother’s parental rights and the trial court’s finding that termination is in the child’s best interest, we affirm and remand.

This appeal arises from the denial of a petition to establish a lost will. Following a bench trial in which the opportunity and motive of key witnesses to destroy the original will were at issue, the trial court failed to “find the facts specially” as mandated by Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The only findings of fact made by the trial court read: “The evidence in the case was relatively undisputed so this court will not reiterate a lot of the facts. The dispute between the parties is over how the evidence is to be interpreted.” Whether or not the evidence was “relatively undisputed” is debatable; nevertheless, we have concluded thatconflictinginferencescan be drawn from undisputed evidence concerning the dispositive issue, that being whether persons who had access to the original will had the motivation to destroy the original will. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the trial court to make findings, even on stipulated or undisputed facts. See Lovelace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 35 (Tenn. 2013). Because the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact to afford this court a clear understanding of the basis of its decision, and realizing that the credibility of two key witnesses who may have had the opportunity and motive to destroy the original will was at issue at trial, we are unable to conduct an effective de novo review. Under these circumstances, we would generally remand a case such as this to afford the trial court the opportunity to state its findings of fact and conclusions of law and enter judgment accordingly; however, the judge who tried this case retired in August of 2014. Therefore, we have no choice but to vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial.

On November 19, 2012, Eastman Credit Union (“Eastman”) filed suit against Chadwick D. Hodges (“Hodges”) seeking recovery for indebtedness owed by Hodges pursuant to two separate credit agreements. Eastman’s complaint noted that it had declared all amounts owed under the agreements to be due and payable and prayed that a judgment be entered in its favor for all monetary advances made under the agreements.

The defendant, Rhakim Martin, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of carjacking, a Class B felony, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to an effective term of sixteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that: (1) his conviction for employing a firearm during a dangerous felony violates the terms of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(c) and the prohibitions against double jeopardy; (2) the failure to name the predicate felony in the indictment for employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony voids the conviction; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the victim’s identification of him; (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (5) the trial court committed plain error by failing to charge the jury on possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony as a lesserincluded offense of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Norman McDowell, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; two counts of aggravated rape, Class A felonies; and aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony. The trial court merged appellant’s aggravated rape convictions and sentenced appellant to an effective twenty-two-year sentence. On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his aggravated rape and aggravated robbery convictions. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we reduce one of appellant’s merged aggravated rape convictions to rape, affirm the trial court’s judgments as modified, and remand to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.

Defendant, Kerry Randall Meadows, entered a guilty plea to driving while being an habitual motor vehicle offender pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement and properly reserved a certified question of law for appeal.  The precise issue, as reserved, is “[w]hether reasonable suspicion or probable caused existed to stop and seize [Defendant’s] vehicle based on incorrect information contained in the police database?”  After thorough review we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Marisa Ann Shrum, appeals the sentencing decision of the trial court following the revocation of her probationary sentence. The defendant pled guilty to two counts of prescription drug fraud and one count of failure to appear. Pursuant to the plea agreement, she received an effective sentence of five years, with sixty days to be served in confinement, sixty days to be served on consecutive weekends, and the balance on supervised probation. A violation report was subsequently filed and, following a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered that the balance of the sentence be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant does not contest the revocation of her probation, but she argues that the trial court erred in ordering total confinement. Following review of the record, we conclude no error occurred and affirm the decision of the trial court.