APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

An individual employed by Claiborne County as Director of Schools was terminated over two years earlier than the employment term set forth in the parties’ contract. The county and the individual entered into another contract (“modified contract”) whereby the individual agreed to work as Safety Coordinator for five months and be compensated in an amount equal to the amount he would have been paid had the prior contract not been terminated. This resulted in a salary increase of nearly $40,000 per month for each of the five months the individual was employed as Safety Coordinator. The modified contract provided that the employee would be paid whether he performed any work or not, and the employee agreed to waive and release any claims he might have against the county. When the employee applied for retirement benefits,the agencyin charge of calculating the amount of benefits did not treat the nearly $40,000 increase in compensation as “earnable compensation” because the additional compensation was not for “services rendered,” as required by the statute. The employee contested this decision, and the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) ruled in favor of the agency, granting the agency’s motion for summary judgment. The employee filed a petition for judicial review, and the trial court affirmed the ALJ’s decision. The employee appeals the trial court’s judgment to this Court, and we affirm.

Defendant in wrongful death action appeals the grant of a default judgment entered against him on the ground that he did not receive a copy of the motion prior to the hearing and, consequently, could not present a defense. Upon consideration of the entire record, we affirm the judgment in all respects.

This appeal arises from the modification of Father’s parenting time and the juvenile court’s allocation of child support obligations. Father petitioned to modify custody or, alternatively, the residential parenting schedule. The juvenile court found that there had been no material change in circumstance and did not modify the primary residential parent designation. However, the court decreased Father’s parenting time and increased his child support obligation. Father appeals the juvenile court’s finding of no materialchange in circumstance, the modification of his parenting time, and the juvenile court’s failure to apply a credit for transportation costs against his child support obligation. Because we find the juvenile court applied an incorrect legal standard and failed to comply with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we vacate the judgment and remand for entry of an order with appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Defendant, Coty Shane Smith, pled guilty to one count of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence by improperly applying an enhancement factor and imposing a sentence that is disproportionate to the sentence received by one of the co-defendants in his case and to sentences received in other second degree murder convictions throughout the state. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a breach of contract and promissory estoppel action in which Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant for failure to fulfill an oral modification of leases for several pieces of earthmoving equipment. Defendant denied wrongdoing and filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, in part, and dismissed the promissory estoppel claim. The case proceeded to a jury trial on the breach of contract claim, but the jury failed to render a verdict. The court declared a mistrial, and Defendant filed a renewed motion for a directed verdict. The court granted the motion and dismissed the case. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case brought by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services. The trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents on the grounds of severe child abuse and wanton disregard for the welfare of the child. Parents appeal. There is clear and convincing evidence to support the grounds of wanton disregard with respect to both parents and severe child abuse with regard to the father. However, we do not find that there is clear and convincing evidence to support the ground of severe child abuse with regard to the mother. There is clear and convincing evidence that termination of both parents’ rights is in the child’s best interest. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand.

Appellant, John Talley, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his motion to correct illegal sentences, imposed over twenty-eight years ago, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The trial court found it lacked jurisdiction because the sentences have already expired and because the trial court could not determine that the “sentence[s] are illegal.” We determine, because of the broadness of Rule 36.1, the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the motion and that Appellant stated a colorable claim, as currently defined. Accordingly, the judgment of the Criminal Court is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I concur in results only, and I write separately in order to express my disagreement with the statement in the lead opinion by Judge Easter that if the sentences have been fully served, “the controversy is moot.” I respectfully submit that this conclusion is erroneous.

Petitioner, Misty Jane Brunelle, was convicted of three counts of aggravated child abuse in relation to broken bones sustained by her infant daughter. Her convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. State v. Misty Brunelle, E2006-00467-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 2026616 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 13, 2007), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 22, 2007) (“Brunelle I”). Petitioner then filed a post-conviction petition, which was denied. This Court affirmed the denial of the post-conviction petition on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, but reversed the lower court’s determination that no newly discovered evidence existed. Misty Jane Brunelle v. State, No. E2010-00662-CCA-R3-PC, 2011 WL 2436545 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 16, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 18, 2011) (“Brunelle II”). Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, claiming that newly discovered evidence existed which may have resulted in a different outcome had it been presented at trial. After a hearing, the coram nobis court denied the petition. Based upon a thorough review of the law, record, and arguments in this case, we hold that the coram nobis court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the coram nobis court.

Appellant, James D. Wooden, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, as permitted by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, for lack of jurisdiction because the sentences have already expired. Although the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the motion, we determine Appellant has failed to state a colorable claim entitling him to relief and, therefore, affirm the denial of the motion.

An employee injured his left shoulder in 2005. He returned to work for his employer and settled his workers’ compensation claim. In 2011, he had recurrent symptoms in the shoulder. Eventually, hemade a claimfor benefits, alleging thathehad sustained a new injury. His employer contended that his symptoms were caused by the earlier injury and that he was entitled only to medical care under the previous settlement.  The trial court found that the employee had sustained a new injury and awarded permanent partialand temporary total disability benefits. Theemployerhas appealed. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the SpecialWorkers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report offindings of fact and conclusions of law.  We affirm the judgment.

This case involves the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.  The  trial court found multiple statutory grounds for the termination of Mother’s and Father’s  rights.  The court also found termination of the parents’ rights to be in the children’s best interest.  The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred in finding that Mother  and  Father  abandoned their  children  by willfully failing  to  support them. Because the parents appealed fewer than all of the multiple grounds relied upon by the trial  court for  termination,  the trial court’s decision  as  to the  other  grounds  is final.   Because a finding of only one statutory ground is necessary for termination, we affirm  the decision of the trial court.

This case involves post-divorce litigation over child support and residential parenting time. In connection with a petition for a decrease in child support, the parties found themselves in a discovery dispute, which resulted in the trial court awarding Mother $10,000 in attorney’s fees.  Later, as a result of his move out of state, Father filed a motion to modify the parties’ permanent parenting plan. When Father decided not to pursue his motion to modify, Mother filed an emergencymotion for relief to set holiday parenting time. The court ordered that the parenting plan remain in effect for the holiday period and required Father to personally pick up and return the children for visitation. Father appeals the award of attorney’s fees to Mother stemming from the discovery dispute and the order requiring him to personally pick up and return his children when exercising holiday parenting time. We affirm the trial court’s order awarding attorney’s fees to Mother. Because we find the issue to be moot, we dismiss Father’s appeal regarding holiday parenting time.

Appellant, Lester Arnold Clouse, was convicted of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; simple assault, a Class A misdemeanor; and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor.  After merger of the resisting arrest conviction with the aggravated assault conviction, the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively.  Appealing from his convictions and sentences, appellant argues that: (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress; (2) the trial court failed to approve the verdicts as thirteenth juror; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his assault convictions; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing him to fifteen years in confinement consecutive to other outstanding sentences.  Following our review, we affirm the convictions.  However, we reverse appellant’s sentences and remand this cause for a new sentencing hearing.

The Petitioner, Vincent Sims, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, in which he claimed he is intellectually disabled and, therefore, ineligible for the death penalty. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis and his stand-alone claim under the intellectual disability provisions in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendants appeal a jury award in favor of Plaintiff. Finding material evidence to support the verdict, we affirm.

Pro se Petitioner, Dexter Frank Johnson, appeals the summary dismissal of his third motion seeking to reopen his post-conviction proceedings and/or the denial of a writ of coram nobis by the Criminal Court of Hamilton County. He further claims that the post-1 conviction court erred by failing to appoint counsel to assist him with his petition because he is illiterate. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Jerome Wall, pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery and robbery. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court summarily dismissed because appellant’s sentences had expired. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion because an illegal sentence may be challenged at any time pursuant to Rule 36.1 and that on remand, his case should be assigned to a different trial judge because the trial judge was not impartial as to the Rule 36.1 motion. The State concedes to appellant’s Rule 36.1 argument and states in its brief that this case should be reversed and remanded to the trial court. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This workers’ compensation appeal involves the application of the recently enacted pain management provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(j) (2014). An employee who sustained a work-related injury in 2007 settled his workers’ compensation claim with his employer in 2010. The settlement enabled the employee to continue receiving pain management treatment from a physician in Lebanon, Tennessee. The employee moved to Vonore, Tennessee in late 2012. Because his pain-management physician was now 162 miles away, the employee requested his former employer to provide a new panel of pain management physicians closer to his new residence. The employer declined, citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(j)(2)(A) that exempts pain-management physicians who live within 175 miles of the employee from the general statutory “community” residence requirement. The employee filed a motion in the Circuit Court for Rutherford County to compel the employer to provide a new doctor. The trial court held that the new 175-mile rule did not apply to the employee’s claim and ordered the employer to provide a new panel of pain management physicians. The employer has appealed to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 51. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jason Lee Fisher, was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of felony escape, a Class E felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-16-605(a) (2014).  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years’ confinement at 60% service to be served consecutively to a previous sentence.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Oblin Sabier Euceda, was charged in an eight-count indictment returned by the Davidson County Grand Jury with aggravated robbery of A.H. (the victims will be identified by initials) in Count 1, aggravated robbery of J.H. in Count 2, aggravated robbery of Z.H. (a child less than thirteen years of age) in Count 3, especially aggravated kidnapping of A.H. in Count 4, especially aggravated kidnapping of J.H. in Count 5, especially aggravated kidnapping of Z.H. (by use of a deadly weapon) in Count 6, especially aggravated kidnapping of Z.H. (a victim under thirteen years of age) in Count 7, and rape of a child, Z.H. in Count 8.  All charges were committed during a home invasion, and there was a co-defendant who is not before the court in this appeal.  The case proceeded to a jury trial where Defendant pled guilty to the first two aggravated robbery charges and the jury found him guilty as charged of the remaining offenses.  At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the convictions in Count 6 and Count 7 for one conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping of Z.H.  After determining the length of sentence for each of the seven convictions, the trial court ordered partial consecutive sentencing for an effective sentence of seventy-five years.  In his sole issue on appeal, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing.  After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a divorce action involving issues of marital property valuation and distribution. The parties were married in 1975. The wife, Terri Dunn (“Wife”), filed for divorce from the husband, William M. Dunn, Jr. (“Husband”), on September 12, 2011. Following a somewhat protracted pre-trial history, the trial was conducted over four non- consecutive days in June and July 2013. Thereafter, the trial court issued a memorandum opinion valuing the assets in the marital estate and awarding Wife approximately 60% and Husband approximately 40% of the estate. The trial court also charged against Husband’s share of the marital estate $200,000.00 in dissipated assets. Wife has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case involves the trial court’s grant of a post-judgment motion to clarify conflicting provisions regarding the residential co-parenting schedule in the parties’ agreed permanent parenting plan. The mother filed the motion approximately five weeks after entry of the permanent parenting plan order. Following a hearing at which the trial court considered argument from both parties’ counsel but heard no proof, the court found in favor of the mother’s interpretation of the parties’ intent when the order was submitted. The father now appeals, asserting that the court’s ruling was a modification of the parenting plan made without proof of a material change of circumstance warranting a modification. We determine that the trial court’s order operated as a clarification of an ambiguous and contradictory provision in the permanent parenting plan, rather than a modification of the plan. However, because the trial court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the parties’ intent at the time the agreed permanent parenting plan was entered, we vacate the judgment and remand for an evidentiary hearing with subsequent clarification of the ambiguous provision at issue.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Craig Patrick Hebert, of assault, and the trial court sentenced him to six months, which was suspended and ordered to be served on probation.  On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury in accordance with Tennessee Pattern Jury Instruction – Criminal No. 42.23 (Duty to Preserve Evidence); and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following the denial of the motion for new trial, the defendant filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, which was heard and denied.  This court consolidated the appeal of the denial of his petition with the original appeal as of right in this cause.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a child custody and support case. The order appealed is not a final judgment so as to confer jurisdiction on this Court under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and remand the case to the trial court.