APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this accelerated interlocutory appeal from the denial of a recusal motion, the newly-elected trial court denied a recusal motion on the basis that he continued to represent one of the parties to the litigation in unrelated matters while winding down his law practice. The opposing parties filed an accelerated interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Because this situation creates an appearance of impropriety, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

This is an interlocutory appeal regarding the trial court’s denial of the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit following a shooting that occurred on December 24, 2011, outside Club Fathom in Chattanooga, a youth outreach ministry operated by two of the defendants. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied their motions, and the defendants sought and were granted an interlocutory appeal. We determine that the court erred in failing to grant summary judgment to the defendants regarding the plaintiffs’ negligence claims. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court. We remand the case for entry of summary judgment regarding the plaintiffs’ negligence claims and for a determination regarding the remaining lease issue.

A jury convicted the defendant, William Darelle Smith, of first degree (premeditated) murder, and he was sentenced to life in prison.  On appeal, this court affirmed the denial of the motion for a new trial.  The defendant appealed a single issue to the Tennessee Supreme Court: that his right to an impartial jury was compromised because the trial court did not hold a hearing after the discovery, during jury deliberations, that a juror was not only acquainted with one of the State’s witnesses but had sent the witness a communication through Facebook complimenting her on her testimony.  The Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had erred in refusing to hold a hearing and remanded the case.  After a hearing during which the juror and the witness testified regarding the nature of both their relationship and the communication, the trial court again denied the defendant a new trial.  The defendant appeals.  We conclude that the State sufficiently rebutted any presumption of prejudice raised by the juror’s extrajudicial communication or by his concealment of his acquaintance with the witness, and accordingly we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, William Edward Arnold, Jr., was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for three counts of aggravated sexual battery and three counts of rape of a child for acts that took place while Defendant was a mentor for the victim through Big Brothers Big Sisters.  Prior to trial, Defendant sought to introduce evidence of the victim’s prior sexual knowledge pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412.  The trial court granted the motion in part but prohibited the introduction of any extrinsic evidence at trial.  At the conclusion of the proof at trial, the trial court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal on two counts of aggravated sexual battery, finding them “impossible” under the facts as presented to the jury.  The jury convicted Defendant of the remaining charges: one count of aggravated sexual battery and three counts of rape of a child.  The trial court denied the motion for new trial and sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-five years.  On appeal, Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal as to the counts for which he was found guilty, the denial of the motion for new trial, and the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412.  After a thorough review of the record, the applicable authorities, and the issues, we determine the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions, and the trial court properly denied the motion for judgment of acquittal.  Further, we determine that the trial court properly determined that specific instances of conduct of prior sexual behavior of the victim were not admissible under Rule 412(c)(4).  Additionally, we agree with the trial court’s determination that due process permitted the victim to be subject to cross-examination, limited by Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608.  Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Plaintiff/Appellee Mark Andrew Miller (“Father”) filed a petition for contempt against Defendant/Appellant Annie Elizabeth Miller(“Mother”). After conducting a hearing, the trial court found Mother guilty of two counts of criminal contempt. Mother appealed asserting that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the matter or, alternatively, that the evidence did not support a finding that she acted willfully. Although we conclude that the trialcourthad jurisdiction to adjudicate Father’s petition for contempt,we agree with Mother that the contempt convictions should be overturned. We reverse.

Father brought suit against Son in general sessions court for repayment of certain alleged debts. After Father’s case was dismissed, he appealed to circuit court, which also dismissed Father’s claims after a trial.  Based on the record on appeal, sufficient facts exist to support the trial court’s determination, and the decision of the trial court is affirmed.

This is an appeal from a three-day divorce trial. The trial court classified and valued the parties’ assets and divided the marital estate. The court awarded the wife $2,000 per month in transitional alimony for a period of 14 months, and it denied the parties’ requests for attorney’s fees. The wife appeals, challenging the trial court’s classification and valuation of certain assets, the alimony award, and the trial court’s decision to deny her request for attorney’s fees. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights appeal brought by the incarcerated father. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to support termination of the father’s parental rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment and confinement under a sentence of ten years or more. The court further found that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. The father appeals. We affirm.

An employee injured her shoulder while working for her employer and failed to make a meaningful return to work. The Claims Commission awarded the employee 55% permanent partial disability. The employer appealed, arguing that the award is excessive 1 because the Commissioner erred in assessing an 11% anatomical impairment rating and in applying a five times multiplier. We modify the Commissioner’s judgment, and affirm as modified.

This is an irreconcilable differences divorce case. The trial court entered a final judgment of divorce that incorporated the parties’ mediated marital dissolution agreement. Shortly thereafter, Husband filed a motion to set aside or to alter or amend the final judgment, claiming he was under duress when he entered into the marital dissolution agreement and also claiming that the trial court was required to conduct a hearing before entering the final judgment. The trial court disagreed and denied Husband’s motion. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Grover D. Cowart, appeals the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, or, in the alternative, motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that (1) the judgments of conviction in Case No. 50934 are void; (2) the judgment of conviction in Count 1 of Case No. 50934 is too “indefinite nd ambiguous” to run consecutively to his conviction in Case No. 49900; (3) the judgments of conviction in Counts 2 and 3 in Case No. 50934 are too “indefinite, uncertain, and ambiguous” to run consecutively to Count 4 in Case No. 49900; and (4) the sentences in Case No. 50934 are expired. Discerning no error, we affirm the summary dismissal of the Petitioner’s petition.

This appeal involves various financial issues relative to a divorce. Husband appeals the trial court’s determination of several factual findings relative to alimony, including Wife’s ability to secure employment, Husband’s ability to earn in the future, the award of attorney’s fees to Wife, and the value of several marital assets divided in the property division, including the value of an LLC jointly owned by the parties. Wife also appeals the trial court’s determination of value and the division of the parties’ joint interest in the LLC, which the trial court awarded to Husband without assigning a value. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The Defendant, William Bryan Gatlin, was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of possession of marijuana with the intent to sell and possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver, Class E felonies, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor.  See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a)(4) (possession of a controlled substance) (Supp. 2012) (amended 2014), 39-17-425 (possession of drug paraphernalia) (2014).  The trial court merged the possession of marijuana convictions.  The Defendant was sentenced to serve two years for the merged possession of marijuana conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for possession of drug paraphernalia.  The sentences were imposed consecutively to each other and to any unexpired sentence.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a knock-and-talk encounter and a warrantless entry into his apartment and that the judgments should be reversed because without the illegally obtained evidence, the remaining evidence is insufficient to support his convictions.  We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Frederick O. Edwards, appeals the Weakley County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by treating his Rule 36.1 motion as a petition for post-conviction relief and further asserts that he has presented a colorable claim for relief. We agree that the trial court’s treatment of the Petitioner’s motion to correct an illegal sentence as a petition for post-conviction relief was error, but because we conclude that the Petitioner has not presented a colorable claim, the trial court’s order denying relief is affirmed.

The pro se petitioner, Marcus Terry aka Marcus Benson aka Torian Benson, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, which petition challenged his 1997 Shelby County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded conviction of escape. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration. The beneficiaries of a trust filed this lawsuit against the trustee alleging trustee self-dealing arising from a transaction in which the trustee and his wife purchased certain real property from the trust as tenants by the entirety. The beneficiaries sought to set aside a portion of the sale. The trustee filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the trust agreement. The beneficiaries opposed the motion, arguing that they could not be compelled to arbitrate their claims against the trustee’s wife. The trial court agreed and denied the motion. The court found that the trustee’s wife was a necessary party to the resolution of the dispute, but because she was not a party to the trust agreement, there was no enforceable arbitration agreement between her and the beneficiaries. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jeffery Yates, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. He contends that the court abused its discretion by dismissing his petition without conducting a hearing. He claims that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because his current sentence is illegal because it was enhanced based upon prior illegal sentences and that the illegal sentences were improperly used to impeach him at trial. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Defendant-Appellant, Edward Carter, was convicted by a Madison County jury of attempted theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve 11 months and 29 days in the county jail, suspended to community corrections. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Andrew Barry Diebold, entered pleas of guilty to possession of marijuana with the intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell and possession of drug paraphernalia. He was sentenced, respectively, to two years as a standard offender, to serve ninety days, with one year and nine months of unsupervised probation, and to ninety days at 75%. As a condition of his pleas, he reserved as a certified question if the warrantless search of his backpack by a law enforcement officer was illegal. The search was made by the defendant’s father, who was a lieutenant with the Brownsville Police Department, as the backpack was in the passenger side of the father’s truck, which the defendant had been operating. We conclude that the certified question is not dispositive of the case and, therefore, dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, Albert Jackson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; employing a firearm during the commission of a felony, a Class C felony; reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony; and felon in possession of a handgun, a Class E felony. He was sentenced to an effective term of twenty-four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Boyce Turner, was indicted by the Washington County Grand Jury on two counts of driving under the influence (“DUI”), two counts of DUI 4th offense, evading arrest, resisting arrest, and driving on a revoked license. The Defendant refused law enforcement’s request to submit to a blood test to determine his blood alcohol content, and his blood was taken, without a warrant and over his objections, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-406(f)(2) (2012). The trial court subsequently granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of his blood alcohol content test, concluding that the Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated. In this appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in granting the Defendant’s motion to suppress because the Defendant consented to the test by driving on the roads in Tennessee and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Antonio Williams (“the Petitioner”) pleaded guilty to three counts of possession with intent to sell a Schedule II controlled substance within a drug-free zone and agreed to a revocation of probation on a prior sentence. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the Petitioner received a total effective sentence of ten years to be served at 100%. In this appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding: (1) that his plea was intelligently and voluntarily made; and (2) that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Lashay Nicole Scruggs (“the Defendant”) appeals from the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) placing heavy emphasis on charges listed as “pending” in the pre-sentence report but that were actually disposed of prior to the sentencing hearing; (2) placing emphasis on the presence of marijuana in the Defendant’s system when marijuana use was not an element of vehicular manslaughter as charged in this case; and (3) placing emphasis on the need to deter others from driving irresponsibly when there was no evidence of such a need in the record. Upon review, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1996, the Petitioner, Alicia Shayne Lovera, was found guilty by a jury of first degree premeditated murder of her husband. On the morning of the sentencing hearing in which the State was seeking a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, the Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to first degree premeditated murder in return for a sentence of life with the possibility of parole. In March 1999, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Following a hearing, the trial court denied relief, and the Petitioner appealed. This Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On December 19, 2013, the Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus alleging the judgment of conviction was void on its face because it was entered upon her plea of guilty after she had been found guilty by a jury. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing for failure to state a claim. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.

A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility determined that an attorney failed to act diligently in his representation of a client and suspended the attorney from the practice of law for forty-five days. The trial court affirmed the suspension. After careful consideration, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.