APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Lori D.F.P. (“Mother”) to the minor child Bryce F. (“the Child”). After a trial the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Child after finding and holding, inter alia, that grounds had been proven by clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights for abandonment by willful failure to pay child support pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i); for failure to substantially comply with the permanency plan pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2); and for severe child abuse pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4), and that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. Mother appeals to this Court. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s findings made by clear and convincing evidence, and we affirm.

The Defendant, Katius J. Williams, was indicted on one count each of aggravated burglary, aggravated rape, and aggravated robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-402, -13-502, -14-403. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary, aggravated rape, and the lesser-included offense of theft of property valued at $500 or less. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103, -105. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred by making “no findings as to why maximum sentences were appropriate”; and (3) that the total effective sentence was excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Dennis Turner was injured while playing softball in a charity tournament at Marvin Rich Field in Bean Station. He sued the City of Bean Station, among other defendants, alleging that the City negligently failed to properly maintain the pitcher’s mound, pitcher’s rubber, and the field as a whole, resulting in his injury. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that its governmental immunity is not removed by the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA), which removes immunity for “any injury caused by the dangerous or defective condition of any public building, structure, dam, reservoir or other public improvement owned and controlled by [a] governmental entity.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-204(a)(2012) (emphasis added). The City presented proof establishing that it does not own Marvin Rich Field. The trial court denied the motion but granted permission for an interlocutory appeal. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and grant the City’s motion for summary judgment.

The petitioner, Mike Settle, appeals from the denial of his sixth petition for writ of habeas corpus, which challenged his 2001 guilty-pleaded convictions of felony escape, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and two counts of aggravated assault. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a parental termination case. It focuses on the three children of a married couple, D.G.B. (Mother) and D.C.B. (Father), and Mother’s child (V.L.J.) from an earlier relationship. The four children came into the custody of the Department of Children’s Services (DCS) in 2009. Nearly four years later, DCS filed a petition to terminate the rights of the parents. Following a trial, the court granted the petition based upon its finding (1) that multiple grounds for termination exist and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the children. Both findings were said by the trial court to be made by clear and convincing evidence. Mother and Father appeal. We affirm.

Patient brought a health care liability action against his eye surgeon, alleging that the surgeon’s negligence in performing a LASIK procedure resulted in several eye injuries. The trial court granted a directed verdict for the surgeon, finding the patient failed to present evidence establishing the standard of care and causation. Because we find the evidence was sufficient to create an issue for the jury, we reverse and remand to the trial court.

The Defendant, Angel Geovanna Hurtado, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of three counts of aggravated child abuse, one count of reckless aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of aggravated child abuse, and one count of aggravated child neglect.  The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-five years for her convictions.  In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court committed plain error by failing to grant a mistrial given the “significant problems that arose during trial revealing the existence of potential new witnesses and exculpatory evidence”; (2) the trial court erred by permitting the State to elicit testimony about and argue that evidence of domestic violence established the Defendant’s guilty knowledge, under a theory of criminal responsibility, of the child abuse and neglect of the victim by her live-in boyfriend; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, including a challenge of material variance between the proof and the State’s election of offenses.  Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.  However, we must remand for entry of a corrected judgment in count two to reflect the proper conviction of reckless aggravated assault.

An employee was exposed to a chemical in the course of his employment. He alleged that he developed a disabling pulmonary condition as a result of the exposure.  His employer denied that the condition was caused by the exposure. The trial court found for the employee and awarded permanent partial disability and other benefits.  The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the finding of causation.  The appeal has been referred to the  Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51.  We affirm the judgment.  

In December 2011, Chad Seigmund (“Employee”) was involved in a motor vehicle accident in the course of his employment. His employer, Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC (“Employer”) provided medical treatment but denied that Employee sustained permanent impairment or disability. Following a trial, the trial court found that Employee had sustained permanent disability and awarded Employee 16.5% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the permanent disabilityfinding. In accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant appeals a judgment holding that he ran a stop sign, contending that the court did not have subjectmatter or in personam jurisdiction over the matter, and that the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County lacked standing to bring the action. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This appeal arises from divorced parents’ child custody dispute. After Mother was arrested twice for driving under the influence, Father requested that he be designated as the primary residential parent and that Mother have supervised parenting time only. Without making any specific factual findings, the trial court found that there had been a “substantial and material change in circumstances” since the prior custody order, and the trial court designated Father as the primary residential parent. Mother’s parenting time was decreased by 196 days, her decision-making authoritywas removed, and she was ordered to pay child support to Father. Because the trial court’s order fails to comply with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand.

The plaintiff in this interlocutory appeal filed a complaint asserting health care liability claims against the original defendants, at which time she included a certificate of good faith in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122. The original defendants asserted comparative fault against non-party health care providers. The plaintiff waived compliance by the original defendants with section 29-26-122(b), which required the defendants to file a certificate of good faith regarding the non-party health care providers. The plaintiff thereafter amended her complaint to add the named non-party health care providers as new defendants but did not file a new certificate of good faith. The new defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint. The trial court denied the motions and granted this interlocutory appeal. We reverse.

Suit for breach of contract to recover on a homeowners policy for losses sustained when policyholder’s home was allegedly burglarized and was allegedly damaged as a result of a storm. Upon defendant’s motion, the trial court granted summary judgment, holding that the insurance company defendant had demonstrated that policyholder could not meet his burden of proof as to any of his claims.  After a thorough review of the record, we discern no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother’s parental rights to her children were terminated on grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, persistence of conditions, and noncompliance with a permanency plan. Mother challenged the ground of abandonment, arguing there was a no contact order in place that prevented her from visiting her children. When the no contact order was put into place, Mother was informed she would be able to visit her children if she passed drug tests and took parenting classes. Mother continued to test positive for illegal drugs and failed to take advantage of services offered by the Department of Children’s Services. We affirm the trial court’s judgment that Mother abandoned her children by failing to visit them and that it is in their best interest to terminate her rights. A petition for custody that may have been pending when Mother’s rights were terminated is part of a different proceeding and does not render the court’s decision to terminate Mother’s rights premature.

In this divorce action, Father appeals the rehabilitative alimony and alimony in solido awarded to Mother, the amount of parenting time he received, the designation of Mother as sole decision-maker and the failure of the trial court to find that Mother was voluntarily underemployed. We affirm the award of rehabilitative alimony and alimony in solido and the designation of Mother as primary residential parent; we vacate and remand for further consideration the residential parenting schedule,the allocation of decision-making authority, and the determination of Mother’s income.

This case arises out of an investigation by the Memphis police department of a business suspected of selling illegal inhalants. The business owner was arrested and charged with the criminal sale of inhalants. The police seized bank accounts belonging to the owner and two corporations related to the business and instituted forfeiture proceedings regarding the funds in those accounts. The bank account owner and the two corporations filed suit against the city and multiple police officers seeking damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The trial court granted the city’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In denying the plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend, the trial court stated that the amended complaint failed to allege any Fourth or Fifth Amendment violations, the grounds upon which the plaintiffs sought relief. With respect to the only remaining individual defendant, the trial court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to amend the first amended complaint, holding, in part, that the existence of adequate post-deprivation remedies precluded any Fourth or Fifth Amendment claims. We affirm.

In this detainer action, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the loan servicing company. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Leslie Allen Ware, Jr., appeals his Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convictions of conspiracy to possess 26 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, possession of 26 grams or more of cocaine for sale or delivery, maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances are used or sold, facilitation of theft, facilitation of conspiracy to commit robbery, and two counts of criminally negligent homicide. The defendant received an effective sentence of 36 years. He claims on appeal that the sentences imposed by the trial court were excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Glyn Terrance Dale, Sr., appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for introducing into evidence at trial two statements the victim made to an investigator from the Department of Children Services (DCS). Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Christian Philip Van Camp, was indicted for driving under the influence, driving while his blood alcohol was in excess of the legal limit, and failing to maintain his proper lane of traffic. Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, arguing that it was not properly supported by either probable cause or reasonable suspicion. After a hearing, the trial court denied his motion. After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted as charged. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the unconstitutional seizure of his vehicle. Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a brief investigatory stop based on information received from a known citizen informant. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This litigation is a dispute between the boards of education of the cities of Athens and Etowah (“the City School Boards”) on the one hand and McMinn County (“the County”) over the distribution of tax revenues among the various school systems within the county. Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-3-315(a) (2013) mandates that “[a]ll school funds for current operation and maintenance purposes collected by any county . . . shall be apportioned by the county trustee” among the local education agencies in the county based upon average daily school attendance. Over the years spanning from 1996 to 2011, the County apportioned funds in the account designated “general purpose school fund” to the City School Boards, but did not apportion funds from the County’s “educational capital projects fund.” The County argues that funds appropriated for and spent on school capital projects are not “school funds for current operation and maintenance purposes” under the language of the statute. The trial court agreed and granted the County summary judgment. It dismissed the complaint of the City School Boards. We affirm.

At an earlier time, in 2011, Betty Graham had filed a lawsuit arising out of a failed real estate transaction against (1) her real estate agent, Ginny Hall; (2) Crye-Leike Realty Corporation; (3) S&J Southeast Investments, LLC, the potential buyer of her condominium with whom she had unsuccessfully negotiated a contract; and (4) attorney Ellie Hill, her trial court appointed guardian ad litem. The trial court granted the defendants’ Rule 12.02(6) motions to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Graham appealed, but later voluntarily dismissed her appeal. Following her dismissal, our mandate, see Tenn. R. App. P. 42, 43, was issued on January 4, 2013. On April 26, 2013, Graham, acting pro se, “refiled” a lawsuit that is functionally identical to her first complaint. In her second suit, she relied upon the saving statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105(a) (2000). The trial court dismissed her second complaint on the ground of res judicata. We affirm that dismissal. Furthermore, we conclude that Graham’s suit is frivolous. Hence, this case is remanded to the trial court for a determination of the defendants’ reasonable fees and expenses associated with this appeal.

Petitioner, Thaddeus Johnson, was convicted of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. For these crimes, he received a life sentence and a consecutive twenty-five year sentence. Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. The post-conviction court denied relief, finding that Petitioner failed to prove his claims by clear and convincing evidence. In this appeal, Petitioner challenges the dismissal of his petition and also alleges ineffective assistance at the post-conviction hearing. After reviewing the parties’ briefs, the record, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A funeral director sustained injuries to his shoulder and back while assisting with carrying a casket. His injury was accepted as compensable. Within a few days, he submitted a letter of resignation to his employer. After recovering from his injuries, he filed this action seeking permanent disability benefits. He also sought reconsideration of a previous settlement pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d). His employer asserted that the employee was not entitled to reconsideration of the earlier settlement and that any award for his later injury was subject to the one and one-half times impairment cap because of his voluntary resignation. The trial court found that the employee did not voluntarily resign, granted the petition for reconsideration, and awarded benefits for the second injury in excess of the cap. The employer appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff in suit to recover damages for injuries allegedly suffered in the course of his arrest appeals the grant of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim filed on behalf of the City and Police Chief and the grant of summary judgment to the police officers who participated in his arrest. In responding to the motions, plaintiff acknowledged that the claims against City, Police Chief and two of the officers should be dismissed; we affirm the dismissal of those claims and parties. The order granting summary judgment to the remaining officer does not state the legal ground therefor or make findings of fact relative thereto; consequently, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. We reverse the denial of plaintiff’s motion to amend to substitute one of the officers for the defendant named John Doe.