APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from a divorce. Sheila Christine Jones Calloway (“Wife”) sued Willard Randall Calloway (“Husband”) for divorce in the Chancery Court for Roane County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court granted Wife a divorce on the ground of adultery by Husband. The Trial Court equally divided the parties’ marital residence but awarded Husband’s onehalf interest in the marital residence to Wife as alimony in solido. The Trial Court also awarded Wife alimony in futuro and attorney’s fees. Husband appeals. Given the parties’ relative earning capabilities and other relevant circumstances of this case, we affirm the Trial Court’s award to Wife of Husband’s one-half interest in the marital residence as alimony in solido. However, once Wife was awarded Husband’s one-half interest in the marital residence, she no longer was financially disadvantaged relative to Husband, and, therefore, the Trial Court erred in awarding Wife alimony in futuro and attorney’s fees. We affirm, in part, and, reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Robert Echols, of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and theft of property valued over $1,000. The trial court merged the theft of property conviction and the aggravated robbery conviction, and it ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the admission of the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony violated his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine itnesses against him; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence an unsigned statement of the Defendant; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (4) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The defendant, Brandon Jones, was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to sell, a Class E felony, and possession of a deadly weapon with intent to employ it in the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony. He was sentenced to mandatory consecutive sentences of two years and four years for the respective convictions. On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred by allowing evidence regarding the defendant’s custodial statements; (2) the trial court erred by allowing hearsay testimony regarding statements made by the passenger in the defendant’s car; (3) the trial court erred in allowing a police officer to testify as an expert and offer opinion testimony; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to support the two convictions. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiffs filed suit against their property insurer for breach of their homeowner’s insurance policy to recover for damages sustained to their home as a result of a tornado; Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendant violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). A jury found that Defendant’s actions violated the TCPA and awarded damages to Plaintiffs. Finding Defendant’s conduct to be willful, the trial court doubled the jury’s award; the court also awarded Plaintiffs attorneys fees and costs. Defendant appeals. We modify the award of costs to Plaintiffs; in all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on the grounds of abandonment, contending that any failure to support or visit her children was not willful.Mother argues that her failure to support her children was a result of poverty and that her failure to visit was caused by obstruction on the part of the children’s grandmother/guardian. We find that the children’s grandmother/guardian failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of at least one of the statutory grounds for termination. We therefore reverse the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

This appeal involves the interpretation of a marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”). Wife filed suit to clarify the terms of the MDA regarding the apportionment of Husband’s future military retirement.  The trial court held that the MDA granted Wife twenty-five percent of Husband’s retirement benefits at the rank of captain, his rank at the time of divorce, including cost-of-living adjustments that will be in effect when he elects to retire. Husband appeals and argues that the award of retirement benefits was intended to be alimony in solido and was ascertainable at the time of divorce rather than at the time he elects to retire. We agree with the trial court’s interpretation and affirm the trial court in all respects.

John Wayne McDonald (“Father”) and Jamie Rhea McDonald Bunnell (“Mother”) had two children during their marriage before divorcing in 2012. The permanent parenting plan entered with the divorce named Mother the primary residential parent. After Mother remarried and relocated with the children, Father filed a petition to modify the existing parenting plan and asked the court to designate him the children’s primary residential parent. Father argued that the behavior of Mother’s new husband (“Stepfather”) around the children constituted a material change in circumstance and that the modification would be in the children’s best interest. At a hearing, Father presented evidence that Stepfather used foul language around the children and had, in jest, referred to them using a racial slur.  The trial courtfound thatStepfather’sbehavior,though “distastefuland ill-advised,”did not constitute a material change in circumstance. Father appealed. After careful consideration, we conclude that the evidence in the record does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case involving three minor children. In April 2012, temporary custody of the children was granted to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), and the children were placed in foster care. DCS subsequently filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother and father on September 24, 2013. The petition alleged, as statutory grounds for termination, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, persistent conditions, and severe child abuse. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition as to the mother upon finding that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence the grounds of (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and (2) persistence of the conditions leading to removal. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The mother has appealed.1 Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a divorce case. After the trial court entered the final decree of divorce and awarded Wife/Appellee attorney’s fees associated with a motion to compel, Husband/Appellant filed this appeal. Although Husband did not formally file a motion to recuse either trial judge involved in this case, his appeal centers on alleged judicial and opposing counsel misconduct. Husband also seeks a new trial. We affirm.

The Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, and we therefore have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Consequently, this appeal is dismissed.

Appellant, Justin Andrew Jones, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty- ine days, suspended to probation after forty-eight hours of incarceration. As part of the plea agreement, appellant reserved a certified question of law in which he challenged the denial of his motion to suppress. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop appellant and because the officer was acting outside of his community caretaking function when he stopped appellant. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we dismiss appellant’s appeal.

The issue on this appeal is whether the parties’ prenuptial agreement (the agreement) is valid and enforceable. The trial court held that it was not. The court did so based upon its finding that Claude R. Ellis (Husband) failed to prove that he provided a full and fair disclosure of his assets to Melisa Jane Godfrey Ellis (Wife) before the agreement was executed. The trial court further found (1) that, given the date the draft agreement was furnished to wife, she did not have an opportunity to seek independent counsel for advice; (2) that the agreement was unfair; and (3) that Wife was under duress when the draft was presented to her. Applying the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Randolph v. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1996), and its progeny, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 2009, the Petitioner, Jeremy Shane Grooms, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued over $1,000 and aggravated burglary, and he was sentenced to eight years. One year of his sentence was to be served in jail, with the remainder to be served on community corrections. In December of 2009, a warrant was issued for the Petitioner’s arrest, alleging that he had violated his community corrections sentence by driving under the influence (“DUI”) and by attempting to break into and enter a vehicle. The warrant stated that the Petitioner had been sentenced to twelve years of community corrections for his original convictions. In 2014, the Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, contending that his sentence had expired. The trial court dismissed the Petitioner’s petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed his petition because “it met the qualifications for relief under the statute.” The State counters that the appeal is untimely and further that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of the Petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus relief.

The sole issue presented in this appeal concerns the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103, the ten-year statute of repose under the Tennessee Products Liability Act and the exceptions to the statute of repose for asbestos claims and silicone gel breast implant claims, but not for silica-related claims. After working as a sandblaster for thirty years, Plaintiff developed silica-related injuries. Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced a products liability action against several silica manufacturers and suppliers, which was filed outside the ten-year period. When the defendants moved for summary judgment contending the action was timebarred by the ten-year statute of repose, Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the statute of repose as applied to silica claimants on equal protection grounds. Utilizing a rational basis analysis, the trial court found that silica claims were not similarly situated by injury or class to asbestos claims, and, if they were similarly situated, a rational basis exists to distinguish between the two. The trial court also found that silica has no similarity to silicone gel breast implants. Thus, the trial court summarily dismissed the action as timebarred based on the ten-year statute of repose under the Tennessee Products Liability Act, specifically Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103(a). We affirm.

Department of Children’s Services filed petition to terminate mother and father’s parental rights to two minor children. Mother subsequently surrendered her parental rights, and the trial court found father abandoned the minor children by willful failure to support and willful failure to visit. The trial court also found termination of father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Father appeals. We affirm the trial court’s finding that father abandoned his children by willfully failing to support them;however,we have concluded that the evidence is insufficient to clearly and convincingly establish that father’s visitation with his children was merely token and that he willfully failed to visit his children. We affirm the trial court’s finding that termination of father’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children. Therefore, we affirm the termination of father’s parental rights.
 

In this termination of parental rights case, Father appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interests. Father was convicted of murdering the child’s mother and is imprisoned on a life sentence. We have reviewed the evidence and affirm the trial court in all respects.

The petitioner, Houston Isley, appeals pro se from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 2012 convictions of aggravated sexual battery, incest, and attempted rape of a child and which was styled as requesting deoxyribonucleic acid “DNA”) analysis. Because the petitioner failed to allege any basis to support an order for DNA analysis and because his petition for post-conviction relief is otherwise procedurally barred, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

An employee injured his head, neck, and back in a tractor-trailer accident while working for his employer. The employee was ultimately diagnosed with a nerve-entrapment condition, which the employer denied was caused by the accident. The trial court found in the employee’s favor and awarded benefits. The employer appeals asserting that the trial court erred in excluding the expert testimony of an accident reconstruction engineer on the issue of causation. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court erred by excluding portions of the expert’s testimony. Despite the error, the judgment of the trial court is supported by a preponderance of the evidence and is affirmed.

Petitioner, Mariet L. Patrick, was convicted of evading arrest in a motor vehicle, possession of .5 ounces or more of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, and possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver. For these crimes, he received an effective sentence of twenty years. Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief, finding that Petitioner failed to prove his claims by clear and convincing evidence. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Erice Dewayne Wallace, appeals the dismissal of his second petition for postconviction. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the postconviction court was correct in dismissing the petition for habeas corpus relief. We also find that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Haywood County jury convicted the Defendant, Shawn O’Neal Taliaferro, of second degree murder and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. The trial court sentenced the Defendant, as a Range II offender, to serve consecutive sentences of forty years for the second degree murder conviction and four years for the possession of a weapon by a convicted felon conviction, for a total effective sentence of forty-four years. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence; and (3) the trial court erred when it sentenced the Defendant as a Range II offender and imposed consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

In this divorce appeal, Wife appeals the trial court’s rulings with regard to the calculation of child support, the award of alimony, the requirement that she reimburse Husband for one-half of the mortgage payments on the marital home until the home is sold, and the trial court’s refusal to order an income assignment to secure Husband’s child support obligation. We vacate the trial court’s judgment with regard to child support and alimony, and remand for the entry of an order containing appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the trial court’s order requiring Wife to reimburse Husband for the mortgage payment. However, we reverse the trial court’s refusal to order an income assignment to secure the child support obligation. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed in part.

This is a termination of parental rights case brought by the guardian ad litem. The trial court terminated Mother/Appellant’s parental rights on the grounds of severe child abuse pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(4), and persistence of conditions under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(3). The trial court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Because there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support both the grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights and the trial court’s finding on best interest, we affirm and remand.

The trial court dismissed this detainer appeal for failure to post a bond in compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-18-130(b)(2). Because Appellant’s brief contains no argument regarding the applicability of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-18-130(b)(2), we affirm.

The petitioner, Tray D. Turner, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated robbery and resisting arrest, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.