APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The trial court found Mother to be in contempt for the willful failure to pay child support and awarded Father past due and retroactive child support. The trial court also denied Mother’s petition to modify custody and awarded Father his attorney’s fees. We affirm.

This is an appeal from a probate court’s order admitting a will in solemn form. The appellant filed a motion to alter or amend the order and a motion to set aside the order, contending in both that it initiated a will contest prior to the court’s order admitting the will. The probate court determined that the appellant lacked standing to contest the will and therefore denied the motions. We affirm.

This is an appeal from a probate court order denying an Estate’s request to enter a writ of scire facias to show cause why a bank acting as trustee of certain funds should not be divested of those funds. The probate court determined in a prior case that the Estate’s claim to the funds was barred by res judicata. The court of appeals affirmed the probate court’s order and remanded the case for the sole purpose of resolving issues related to an award of attorney’s fees to the bank. On remand, the Estate filed its request for a writ of scire facias before the court addressed the issue of attorney’s fees. The probate court denied the Estate’s motion, stating that it raised the same issues that multiple courts determined were barred by res judicata. The Estate appealed. We affirm the judgment of the probate court and award damages for frivolous appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122.

This appeal involves the ability of a hospital to use a hospital lien to recover from a third-party tortfeasor the unadjusted cost of the medical services it provided to a patient whose injuries were caused by the third party. Three patients were injured in separate, unrelated motor vehicle accidents in Memphis, Tennessee. All of them were treated at the Regional Medical Center at Memphis, and either their insurance company or TennCare paid the hospital the full amount of the adjusted charges for their care, in accordance with their contracts with the hospital. Despite receiving these payments, the hospital declined to release the lien it had perfected under the Tennessee Hospital Lien Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-22-101 to -107 (2012). The patients filed suit in the Circuit Court for Shelby County seeking to quash the liens and monetary damages. In response, the hospital asserted that its refusal to release the liens was consistent with the Tennessee Hospital Lien Act and was permitted by its contracts with the patients’ insurance companies. The trial court dismissed the suit on the merits, and the patients appealed to the Court of Appeals. The intermediate appellate court reversed the trial court, determining that the hospital could not maintain its lien because each of the patients’ debts had been extinguished when the hospital accepted payment from the patients’ insurance companies for the full amount of the hospital’s bill based on the adjusted charges it had agreed to with either the patient’s insurance company or TennCare. West v. Shelby Cnty. Healthcare Corp., No. W2012-00044-COA- R3-CV, 2013 WL 500777 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2013), reh’g denied (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2013). We granted two of the three patients’ Tenn. R. App. P. 11 applications for permission to appeal. We have determined that, except for the unpaid co-pays and deductibles which are a patient’s responsibility, neither the Tennessee Hospital Lien Act nor the hospital’s contracts with the patients’ insurance companies authorized the hospital to maintain its lien after the patients’ insurance company paid the adjusted bill. However, we have also determined that one of the patients who had not extinguished her debt to the hospital was not entitled to have the lien against her extinguished.

This is an appeal from a probate court order denying the request of an estate’s personal administrator to resign and be replaced by his attorney. This matter came to the probate court on remand from the court of appeals for the sole purpose of resolving issues related to an award of attorney’s fees. Before the probate court addressed the issue of attorney’s fees, the personal representative filed a motion seeking to resign as personal representative and have his attorney appointed in his place. The court entered an order denying the motion, and the Estate appealed. We find that the probate court’s denial of the personal representative’s motion to resign was within its discretion. We therefore affirm the judgment of the probate court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Kenneth Paul Colvett, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the jury erred by rejecting the defense of insanity; (2) that the trial court erred by not allowing defense counsel to take home prior written statements made by a witness and by not admitting extrinsic evidence of the statements of two witnesses during trial; (3) that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (4) that the trial court erred by refusing to provide the Defendant with a transcript of a prior hearing in this case; (5) that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during the cross-examination of the Defendant’s expert witness; (6) that the trial court erred by questioning the Defendant about his decision not to testify at trial; (7) that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument by commenting on the Defendant’s decision not to testify; and (8) that the Defendant is entitled to a new trial based upon cumulative error.¹ Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Clifton Swift, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of rape of a child, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting impeachment of the defendant by his prior conviction for attempting to violate the sexual offender registry act and by admitting into evidence the victim’s rape kit. In addition, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of rape of a child. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Rafael Antonio Bush, was convicted of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed his convictions and sentence.  State v. Rafael Antonio Bush, No. M2002-02390-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 794755 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, April 14, 2004), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed.  Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.  The trial court denied the petition after a hearing, and this Court affirmed the post-conviction court’s judgment denying relief.  Rafael Antonio Bush v. State, No. M2005-02967-CCA-R3-PC, 2006 WL 2682825 at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Sept. 7, 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 27, 2006).  On April 24, 2014, the Petitioner filed a motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief.  The post-conviction court denied the motion to reopen, and the Petitioner appeals that decision.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Secdrick L. Booker, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence.  The Petitioner contends that his convictions are void because he was sentenced in direct violation of Tennessee statutory law.  Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court properly denied the motion.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Gabriel Kimball, pleaded guilty to rape of a child in Bradley County Criminal Court, and the trial court sentenced him to serve fifteen years.  The Petitioner unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief.  Gabriel Kimball v. State, No. E2006-01562-CCA-R3-PC, 2007 WL 2757634, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 24, 2007), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 4, 2008).  The Petitioner then sought state habeas corpus relief alleging that the judgment of conviction entered was void and that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance.  The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition finding that the Petitioner had failed to raise a cognizable habeas corpus claim.  The Petitioner appeals this dismissal, maintaining that the judgment is void and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Oren Ray Johnson, pleaded guilty to simple assault, and the trial court ordered a probationary sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days.  Thereafter, the Defendant was arrested for aggravated domestic assault, an offense to which he pleaded guilty.  The trial court issued a probation violation warrant and, after a hearing, revoked the Defendant’s probation sentence.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court improperly ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement for violating the terms of his probation.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Tamir Clark, pleaded guilty to especially aggravated kidnapping, arson, especially aggravated robbery, and attempted robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to serve twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Corrections.  The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered.  The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition, maintaining that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we  affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The issue we address in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals properly granted the defendant a Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10 extraordinary appeal. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a waiver of the contiguous state requirement in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-115(b) as to an expert witness. The Court of Appeals granted the defendant’s Rule 10 appeal and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to waive the contiguous state requirement. We hold that the Court of Appeals improvidently granted the appeal because the trial court did not so far depart from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to require immediate review and because a review was not necessary for a complete determination of the action on appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 10(a). Accordingly, we remand this case to the Circuit Court for Hamilton County for further proceedings.

In 1999, Appellant, David A. Brimmer, pled guilty to aggravated kidnapping in relation to the October 1989 disappearance and death of the  victim, for which he had been previously found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to death. His death sentence was remanded by this Court. See Brimmer v. State, 29 S.W.3d 497 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). At resentencing, Appellant agreed to plead to aggravated kidnapping as a Class A felony with a sentence of 60 years to be served at 100%, consecutively to a life sentence for first degree murder, in exchange for the State not seeking the death penalty. Appellant subsequently filed a petition to correct an illegal sentence under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, alleging that his sentence for aggravated kidnapping is in contravention of the 1989 Sentencing Reform Act. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition for failing to state a colorable claim. Upon our review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the termination of a father’s parental rights.  Shortly after Matthew J.’s birth, his father pled guilty to twenty counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and one count of aggravated statutory rape.  The Department of Children’s Services ultimately filed a petition for the termination of parental rights against Matthew’s parents.  His mother surrendered her parental rights, and the matter proceeded to trial against the father only.  At the conclusion of the trial, the juvenile court also terminated the father’s parental rights.  The juvenile court concluded that grounds for termination existed because the father had been sentenced to more than ten years at a time when Matthew was under the age of eight.  The trial court also concluded that it was in Matthew’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

In February 2004, the Petitioner, Trish Wooley, pleaded guilty to three counts of theft of property valued under $500 and two counts of vandalism under $500, and further proceedings were deferred pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313. In September 2004, the trial court revoked judicial diversion, sentenced the Petitioner to concurrent terms of 11 months and 29 days on each conviction, and placed the Petitioner on supervised probation. In 2013, the Petitioner sought the expunction of her criminal convictions. The trial court granted the expunction. The State appealed. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court because the Petitioner was convicted of more than one offense in a multi-count indictment and therefore was not an “eligible petitioner” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-101(g)(1).

The appellant, Carlos Eaton, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis in which he challenged his 1995 guilty plea to first degree murder and his life sentence. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Leon Flannel, was convicted of murder in the perpetration of a theft and premeditated murder. In this appeal from the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, the Petitioner argues that the individual tests performed by the defense’s expert witness, along with their results, should have been introduced at trial to bolster the Petitioner’s diminished capacity defense. Upon review, we find that the petition for writ of error coram nobis is barred by the statute of limitations. Additionally, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied relief on the merits.

The petitioner, Sean William Lee, pled guilty in 2004 to attempted aggravated sexual battery and was sentenced to three years, which then was suspended to six years probation. In 2013, after a probation violation warrant was filed against him, he filed a pleading styled “Motion to Revoke Probation and Impose a Sentence in Absentia.” He followed this pleading by filing a petition for writ of error coram nobis, based upon what he saw as newly discovered evidence. The coram nobis court dismissed the petition without a hearing, concluding that the statute of limitations for such a pleading had expired eight years earlier and no issues were raised which could be the basis for coram nobis relief. Following our review, we affirm the order of the coram nobis court dismissing the petition, pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

This Court entered an order in September of 2014 directing ELM Children’s Educational Trust (“the Trust”) to show good cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the Notice of Appeal was signed by a non-attorney, non-party. The Trust failed to show good cause. We hold that a non-attorney trustee may not represent a purportedly pro se trust. As such, the Notice of Appeal signed by the non-attorney trustee was insufficient to initiate an appeal on behalf of the Trust. This appeal, therefore, is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The defendant, Terrance Wooden, also known as Terrence Wooten, was convicted of the rape of the victim, who was confined to a wheelchair, and sentenced to confinement for twelve years at 100%. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The petitioner, Tarrence Parham, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for attempted second degree murder and reckless aggravated assault. On appeal, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Michael Brandon Adams, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence.  The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed his motion without appointing counsel and without conducting an evidentiary hearing.  In his motion, the Petitioner asserts that his sentence is illegal on the grounds that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel.  Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court properly denied the motion.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Marshall County jury convicted the Petitioner, William Lance Walker, of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and the delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine.  The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court.  State v. William Lance Walker, No. M2012-01319-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 1799988, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, April 29, 2013), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 filed.  The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective on multiple grounds.  The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This is the second appeal before this Court involving the minor child at issue. In 2010, the child’s mother sought assistance in caring for the child after she lost her job. She signed a power of attorney and authorization of temporary guardianship stating that the child would reside with another couple for approximately six months. During thatperiod,the couple filed a petition alleging that the child was dependent and neglected and seeking temporary custody of her. The juvenile court found the child dependent and neglected and granted custody to the couple. The mother appealed to the circuit court, which found no clear and convincing evidence of dependency and neglect and ordered the juvenile court to reunify the child with the mother. On appeal, this Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court. Despite these holdings, the child was never reunified with the mother. The couple with the child filed a petition in the juvenile court to terminate the mother’s parental rights on four grounds. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence of abandonment and persistent conditions and determined that it was in the child’s best interest to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The mother appealed. We find no clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination of the mother’s parental rights and accordingly reverse and remand this matter to the juvenile court for the entry of an order that implements a plan to expeditiously reunite the child with her mother. Having found that the trial court erred in terminating Mother’s parental rights, we dismiss the termination petition, reinstate Mother’s parental rights, vacate the juvenile court orders concerning visitation and guardianship, and designate the current custody and guardianship orders as temporary in nature.