APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Howard G. Bruff, appeals the Cumberland County Criminal Court’s denial of his timely petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2005 convictions of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery on the grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective. Because the record supports the decision of the post-conviction court, we affirm that court’s order.

The defendant, David Patrick Armitage, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to twenty years in the Department of Correction. The sentence was to be served consecutively to a previous out-of-state sentence. On appeal, the defendant raises two issues for review: (1) whether there was sufficient corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony with regard to the defendant’s identity; and (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Following review of the record, we affirm the conviction and sentence as imposed.

This is a conservatorship case. Appellant, the only child of Appellee, sought a conservatorship over Appellee after Appellee suffered a stroke. Appellee filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss the petition. The trial court, in its memorandum opinion, denied the Appellee’s motion to dismiss, finding Appellant’s petition to appoint a conservator “legally sufficient.” In that same opinion, the trial court considered matters outside the pleadings, converted the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, and sua sponte granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee. Appellant appeals. Because Appellant was not, as required under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02, “given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to [the] motion by Rule 56,” we vacate and remand.

This appeal requires consideration of the interplay between the pre-suit notice requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121 and Tennessee’s savings statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-1-105. In the instant case, Plaintiff re-filed a medical malpractice action within one year of a previous voluntary non-suit. Defendants moved to dismiss the re-filed action on the basis that the pre-suit notice provided incident to the initial lawsuit was deficient. They argued that the failure to provide the required notice in the first lawsuit meant Plaintiff’s original action was not properly commenced and therefore failed to toll the statute of limitations. The trial court agreed, determined that the second lawsuit was filed outside of the applicable limitation period, and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims. We reverse.

The Petitioner, Rodney Braden, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief from his conviction for second degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty plea. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I write separately because I feel it is necessary to adequately address the federal grand jury issue as presented by the Defendant in her appellate brief. The majority notes that the Defendant moved to dismiss the presentment under Rule 6(j)(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that her subpoena to testify before the federal grand jury barred her state court prosecution. I do not disagree that Rule 6(j) 6) “applies only to proceedings in state grand juries within the State of Tennessee.” However, the Defendant’s argument both in her interlocutory appeal, and as presented in this direct appeal, is that the federal authorities were acting as agents of the Knox County District Attorney General’s office. Specifically, she notes that the charges against her arose from a joint investigation between State and federal authorities. She continues, by virtue of this joint investigation, the federal authorities were acting as agents of the Knox County District Attorney General when they subpoenaed her to testify before the federal grand jury regarding her knowledge and participation in the crimes against the victims, thereby, triggering the immunity protection afforded by Rule 6(j)(6). In my opinion, to ignore the agency issue, ignores the issue presented by the Defendant.

In this case both victims were sexually assaulted. Accordingly, we will identify them by their initials. Defendant, Vanessa Coleman, was one of four defendants charged by presentment for offenses which occurred in January 2007, involving the deaths of the victims, C.N. and C.C. In her first trial, Defendant was acquitted of all charges alleging the murder, kidnapping, and rape of victim C.N. She was convicted of several counts of the lesserincluded offense of facilitation of charges alleging the murder, kidnapping, and rape of victim C.C. Defendant was granted a new trial by the trial court based upon structural error in the proceedings of the first trial. Following the second trial, a jury found Defendant guilty of the following offenses against victim C.C.: three counts of facilitation of first degree murder, one count of facilitation of second degree murder, two counts of facilitation of aggravated kidnapping, six counts of facilitation of rape, and one count of facilitation of misdemeanor theft. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged Defendant’s convictions for facilitation of first degree murder and second degree murder into one conviction and imposed a sentence of 25 years for that conviction. The trial court also merged Defendant’s two convictions for facilitation of aggravated kidnapping and imposed a sentence of six years to be served consecutively to Defendant’s 25-year sentence. The trial court merged Defendant’s six convictions for facilitation of rape into three convictions and imposed a sentence of four years for each conviction, to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to Defendant’s remaining sentences. For Defendant’s facilitation of misdemeanor theft conviction, the trial court imposed a sentence of six months to be served concurrently with the remaining sentences. Thus, Defendant received a total effective sentence of 35 years for her convictions. In this appeal as of right, Defendant raises the following issues for our review: 1) whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain her convictions; 2) whether the trial court should have dismissed the presentment because Defendant was subpoenaed to testify before a federal grand jury before the filing of the presentment in this case; 3) whether the trial court erred by admitting testimony of Defendant’s statements made during unrecorded interviews; 4) whether the trial court should have excluded photographs of the victims’ bodies; 5) whether all of Defendant’s convictions for facilitation of rape should have been merged into one conviction; and 6) whether the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record before us, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Derrick Devon Campbell, pleaded guilty to second degree murder with an agreed sentence of thirty years at Range II to be served at one-hundred percent as a violent offender. Petitioner now appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly explain his plea agreement and the consequences of the plea.  Having reviewed the record before us, we affirm the judgment of trial court.

Landowners, whose properties abut a gravel road that  crosses over the land of another, claim the right to use that road for ingress and egress.  The trial court found the gravel road was formerly a public road, but that the road ceased being a public road at some point.  Once the road ceased being a public road, the trial court found the landowners whose land abutted the road had a permanent easement and right to use the road for ingress and egress purposes.  The landowners over whose property the road crosses appealed.  We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Rohman M. Harper, was found guilty by a Cheatham County Circuit Court jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2014).  Before the trial, the Defendant pleaded guilty to resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor, and to public intoxication, a Class C misdemeanor.  See id. §§ 39-16-602 (2014), 39-17-310 (2014).  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent terms of eight years at 100% service for aggravated sexual battery, six months for resisting arrest, and thirty days for public intoxication.  On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated sexual battery conviction.  Although we affirm the aggravated sexual battery conviction, we remand the case for entry of corrected judgments relative to the resisting arrest and public intoxication convictions.

This is an interlocutory appeal from the denial of Appellant insurer’s motion for summary judgment in an action on a homeowner’s policy that contained a contractual one-year statute of limitations. The Appellee insured filed suit eighteen months after the loss occurred. In the trial court, the Appellant insurer moved for summary judgment, arguing that the one-year statute of limitations in the Appellee insured’s policy was a bar to his action. The trial court agreed with the Appellee’s interpretation of the policy provisions and denied the motion for summary judgment. This court granted the Appellant’s application for interlocutory appeal. Following our review, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand the case for entry of summary judgment in favor of Appellant.

In this post-divorce proceeding, Wife appeals the denial of her motion to partially set aside the final decree of divorce, the denial of two civil contempt petitions, and the trial court’s ruling with regard to the parties’ competing motions for modification of the parties’ permanent parenting plan. Because the order in the record with regard to both the contempt and parenting plan issues contain insufficient findings of fact or conclusions of law, we vacate and remand those issues to the trial court for reconsideration. We, however, affirm as to the denial of Wife’s motion to partially set aside the final divorce decree.

Purchaser of real estate at a foreclosure sale filed a forcible entry and detainer action against the occupant of the real estate. The General Sessions Court of Shelby County awarded possession, despite the objection of an individual claiming she purchased the real estate prior to the foreclosure sale. On appeal, the Shelby County Circuit Court granted the foreclosure purchaser’s motion for summary judgment and affirmed the judgment of the general sessions court. The pre-foreclosure purchaser appeals. Finding that the pre-foreclosure purchaser lacks standing, we affirm the judgment of the Shelby County Circuit Court.

The Petitioner, William T. Johnson, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner claimed (1) he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel was absent during a portion of jury deliberation and when the jury returned its verdict, and (2) because the trial court failed to secure the Petitioner’s waiver of counsel’s presence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I fully concur in the majority opinion in this case. I only write separately to express a view that counsel’s absence from court – even during jury deliberations and verdict announcement – for reasons no more substantial than coaching a basketball game presents a closer question than our opinion may suggest. It may be that a certain casualness has permeated the practice of law, and courts and lawyers should be vigilant in maintaining standards of regularity and professionalism

The defendant, William Whitlow Davis, Jr., pleaded guilty to first offense driving under the influence of an intoxicant with a blood alcohol level of .08 percent or more and reserved as a certified question the propriety of the vehicle stop leading to his arrest. Determining that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings in its order denying the motion to suppress, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Jason Braden, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, false imprisonment, and assault in Blount County in May of 2011. In exchange for the guilty plea, Defendant received a five-year sentence to be served on supervised probation. In October of 2011, a warrant was filed alleging a robation violation. Simultaneously, Defendant was in state custody, facing a new charge and probation violation in Anderson County. The revocation hearing in Blount County did not take place until March 2014. After hearing the evidence, the trial court found a material violation and ordered Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Defendant appeals. After a review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence.

The Appellant, Donald Terrell, filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The trial court summarily dismissed the Appellant’s motion, and he appealed. Following our review of the record, we conclude that the Appellant’s motion presented a colorable claim that his sentences were illegal. We therefore reverse the trial court’s summary dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant, Lee Michael Gianaro, was indicted by the Hamilton County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated burglary, one count of theft of property valued over $1,000, and one count of vandalism. Defendant pled guilty to aggravated burglary in exchange for a sentence of three years, to be served on probation, and payment of $1,500 restitution to the victim. The remaining charges were dismissed. Defendant violated the terms of his probation. The trial court partially revoked probation, ordering Defendant to Community Corrections until restitution was paid in full before returning Defendant to supervised probation. A second probation violation report was filed alleging Defendant violated the terms of his probation. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking probation. After a review of the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supported the revocation of probation. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Petitioner, Jerry Rommell Gray, was convicted in Knox County of felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and attempted gravated robbery. Trial counsel filed a premature notice of appeal and failed to file a timely motion for new trial. On direct appeal, this Court reviewed Petitioner’s issues, other than sufficiency of the evidence, for plain error. State v. Jerry Rommell Gray, No. E2010-00637-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 2870264, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 13, 2012). Petitioner’s convictions were affirmed. Petitioner subsequently filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief in which he sought a delayed appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically alleging that trial counsel’s failure to file a timely motion for new trial was presumptively prejudicial. Without ruling on the timeliness of the petition, the post- onviction court determined Petitioner was entitled to a delayed appeal but instructed Petitioner that he was not permitted to file an additional motion for new trial. After a review of the record and authorities, we reverse the decision of the post-conviction court and remand the matter for a hearing, during which the post-conviction court should first determine whether the statute of limitations for postconviction petitions should be tolled. If the post-conviction court determines that the statute should be tolled for due process considerations, the court should then determine if Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel and is entitled to a delayed appeal under Tennessee Code annotated section 40-30-113, which authorizes the filing of a motion for new trial when no motion for new trial was filed in the original proceeding. Consequently, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed and remanded.

This appeal results from the trial court’s suggestion of additur to a jury verdict stemming from an automobile accident. Plaintiff sued for damage to her vehicle and physical injuries sustained when she was rear-ended by one of the defendants. Plaintiff’s husband also asserted a loss of consortium claim. The plaintiffs sued both the driver of the vehicle and the vehicle’s owner, also husband and wife. As the matter of liability was stipulated, the only issues submitted to the jury was the amount of damages, if any, suffered by the plaintiffs. The jury returned a verdict awarding plaintiff $3,577.00 for her medical expenses, but declined to award the plaintiffs any damages claimed for other injuries, including any pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, or loss of consortium. The trial court suggested an additur of $10,000.00 to the jury verdict. Defendants accepted the additur under protest and timely appealed to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Adrian Lamont Henry, pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony, and was sentenced to forty years in confinement.  The petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief.  On appeal, the petitioner argues that his constitutional rights were violated when he was not given proper Miranda warnings and when he was interviewed while under the influence of marijuana.  The petitioner also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel: (1) failed to communicate the defense strategy, defenses, or theory of the case with the petitioner; (2) failed to file a motion to suppress the petitioner’s statements to law enforcement; (3) failed to utilize important witnesses; and (4) pressured the petitioner into pleading guilty.  The petitioner argues that due to these errors, his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered.  After our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Travis Meadows, pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery, Class C felonies.  The trial court sentenced him to four years on each count, to be served consecutively, for an effective eight-year sentence.  The effective eight-year sentence was suspended, and appellant was placed on supervised probation.  As part of the plea agreement, appellant reserved a certified question of law challenging the denial of his motion to suppress.  On appeal, appellant argues that the State failed to include the certified question in the judgment form and filed the judgment form without notice to appellant; therefore, the State violated the terms of the plea agreement.  Appellant also argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statement to law enforcement due to the coercive and misleading nature of the interrogation.  Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we dismiss appellant’s appeal.

The Defendant, Jonathan Womack, pled guilty to possession of less than .5 grams of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver. He agreed to a sentence of six years, all of which was suspended after sixty days’ incarceration. As part of the plea agreement, the Defendant reserved a certified question of law challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the warrantless search of his residence, which was conducted following a “knock and talk” encounter and claimed exigent circumstances. After a thorough review of the applicable law, we conclude that the officers encroached upon the curtilage of the Defendant’s home to conduct the “knock and talk” at the backdoor of his residence and that they, thereafter, created any exigent circumstances. However, we further conclude that the evidence found on the Defendant’s person was obtained pursuant to an independent source—a valid warrant for his arrest. Therefore, the order of the trial court denying the motion to suppress is affirmed.

Defendant, Randall Wayne Cagle, appeals from the trial court’s judgment revoking his probation.  Defendant pled guilty in the Hickman County Circuit Court to four counts of sexual exploitation of a minor.  The judgments are not in the appellate record, but according to other documents and testimony at the probation violation hearing, the trial court imposed  an effective sentence of eight years to be served entirely on supervised probation.  Approximately five months later, a violation of probation warrant was filed and served on Defendant.  Following a hearing, the trial court concluded that Defendant had violated probation.  The trial court deemed its ruling as a “partial revocation” and ordered Defendant to serve sixty days in the Hickman County Jail and to thereafter be placed back on supervised probation.  Defendant has appealed the trial court’s revocation order.  The trial court erroneously allowed testimony of Defendant’s failure to pass a polygraph test. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for a new probation violation hearing in which the results of any polygraph test, any evidence of Defendant’s refusal (or willingness) to submit to a polygraph examination, and any statements made by Defendant as to why he would not submit to a polygraph examination are not to be admitted into evidence or otherwise relied upon by the trial court.