APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The principal issue in this appeal is whether the 2011 amendments to the Healthcare Liability Act (“HCLA”) extend the statute of limitations in Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) cases. The trial court concluded that the 2011 amendments did not extend the statute of limitations for healthcare liability claims against governmental entities and dismissed all claims against the governmental entities as time-barred. Plaintiff appealed. After this appeal was filed, this court ruled in Harper v. Bradley Cnty., No. E2014-00107COA-R9-CV, 2014 WL 5487788 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2014), that the 2011 amendments to the HCLA extend the GTLA’s one-year statute of limitations by 120 days when a plaintiff has complied with the pre-suit notice requirements of the HCLA, and we concur with the ruling in Harper. Because the plaintiff in this action complied with the pre-suit notice requirements of the HCLA and commenced this action against the governmental entities within the 120-day window, we have determined this action was commenced timely. Therefore, the plaintiff’s claims against the governmental entities should not have been dismissed as time-barred. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of these claims and remand for reinstatement of the claims and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant-Appellant, Lonta Montrell Burress, Jr., was convicted as charged by a Hamilton County jury of three counts of aggravated assault, one count of possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of an offense not defined as a dangerous offense, one count of theft of property, one count of felony evading arrest, and one count of misdemeanor evading arrest. The trial court sentenced Burress to an effective sentence 1 of six years. The other Defendant-Appellant, Darius Jerel Gustus, who was tried jointly with Burress, was convicted as harged of three counts of aggravated assault, one count of possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of an offense not defined as a dangerous offense, one count of felony reckless endangerment, and one count of misdemeanor evading arrest. The trial court also sentenced Gustus to an effective sentence of six years. On appeal, Burress argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his aggravated assault convictions and his theft conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying a mistrial based on the admission of gang testimony; (3) the trial court erred in denying a mistrial based on a Bruton violation; and (4) the trial court erred in determining that LaJuana Woods was an unavailable witness pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804 and erred in allowing the State to have Woods read her testimony from the juvenile court transfer hearing transcript at trial. On appeal, Gustus contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his aggravated assault conviction regarding victim Frederick Jones, Jr.; (2) the trial court erred in denying a mistrial based on the admission of gang testimony; and (3) the trial court erred in admitting two bandanas because there was an improper chain of custody. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Joshua Lee Steele, pleaded guilty to second degree murder, agreeing to allow the trial court to determine his sentence. The trial court sentenced him to serve twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him because it did not properly consider the mitigating factor that the Defendant assisted authorities in tecting or apprehending other persons who had committed the offenses. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The defendant, Latickia Tashay Burgins, through counsel, sought automatic review of the trial court’s revocation of bail pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 8. The defendant argues that the trial court’s reliance upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-141(b) to revoke and deny pretrial bail following her garnering additional charges violates Article I, section 15 of the Tennessee Constitution. Upon full consideration of the defendant’s motion for review and the State’s response, we conclude that Code section 40-11-141(b) violates the constitutional guarantee to pretrial bail by permitting a trial court to hold a defendant without bail pending trial. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court denying the appellant pretrial bail and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Devaughn Edwards, was convicted of three counts of facilitation of kidnapping, two of which subsequently were merged; two counts of facilitation of robbery, and one count of facilitation of aggravated burglary, for which he received an effective sentence of sixteen years. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the convictions for facilitation of kidnapping and that the court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments.

The defendant, Joe Travis Northern, Jr., was convicted by a Madison County Criminal Court jury of possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class E felony; possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony with a prior felony, a Class D felony; possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a Class E felony; tampering with evidence, a Class D felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective term of eighteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his convictions and argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff, a former employee of the Middle Tennessee Research and Education Center of the University of Tennessee, appeals the termination of his employment for gross misconduct in violation of the University’s Code of Conduct. He contends the statement he admittedly made to a female employee on university property did not justify termination of his employment. We affirm the termination of plaintiff’s employment.

We granted review in this interlocutory appeal to determine whether the analysis the Court of AppealsemployedinYoung v.Davis,No.E2008-01974-COA-R3-CV,2009 WL 3518162, at *6-7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2009), to conclude that Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”) claims against governmental entities must be tried without a jury in the manner prescribed bythe Governmental Tort LiabilityAct (“GTLA”), should be applied to determine whether a Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”) claim against a governmental entity is controlled by the GTLA. We reject the analysis Young applied and overrule it to the extent it may be interpreted as holding that the GTLA governs all statutory claims against governmental entities. The analysis used in Cruse v. City of Columbia, 922 S.W.2d 492 (Tenn. 1996), controls the determination of this issue. Applying Cruse, we hold that the THRA is an independent and specific statute, which removed governmental immunity and which controls the adjudication of THRA claims. We further hold that the provisions of the THRA clearly establish legislative intent to afford a right to trial by jury to persons who bring THRA claims against governmental entities in chancery court.  Accordingly, based on these holdings, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The trial court’s order transferring this case to circuit court is vacated, and this matter is remanded to the chancery court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

In a two-count indictment, appellant, Lucian Alan Green, was charged with burglary of a building other than a habitation and theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, both Class D felonies.  The jury found him guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him as a standard offender to concurrent terms of three years, six months at thirty percent release eligibility for each offense to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  Appellant now challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s sentencing decision.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Kenneth James Morris (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of manufacture of a Schedule II controlled substance within a drug-free zone and promotion of methamphetamine manufacture. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to 15 years. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and claims the jury improperly weighed certain testimony and incorrectly assessed the credibility of a witness. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Caleb Wayne DeHoog, was convicted by a Madison County Criminal Court jury of attempted aggravated burglary, a Class D felony; two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies; and one count of aggravated criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to three years for the attempted aggravated burglary, five years for each count of aggravated assault, and eleven months and twenty nine days for the aggravated criminal trespass. The court ordered that the sentences for the two aggravated assault convictions be served consecutively to each other but concurrently with the sentences on the other convictions, for an effective term of ten years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Tamekia Shantell Jones, was charged with Class A misdemeanor theft from Macy’s store in an indictment returned by the Madison County Grand Jury. Following a jury trial, she was found guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced her to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Madison County jail, to be served consecutively to a sentence for convictions in Hardeman County. In this appeal, Defendant’s sole issue is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

Phyllis Louise Bige, a former police officer with the City of Etowah, brought this retaliatory discharge action against the City, alleging that she was fired because of her failure to meet a quota for citations. Her claim was predicated on Tenn. Code Ann § 39-16-516 (2014). The trial court granted defendant summary judgment, finding that an earlier judgment of the United States District Court dismissing plaintiff’s federal claims – including a claim that her substantive due process rights were violated because defendant required her to commit an illegal act – collaterally estopped plaintiff from proceeding with her retaliatory discharge claim under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (2014). We affirm the summary judgment of the trial court, but on different grounds. We hold that defendant demonstrated plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to two essential elements of her claim – (1) that she refused to participate in an illegal activity, and (2) that defendant fired her solely because of her refusal to participate in an illegal activity. We affirm the grant of summary judgment.

S.R. (Mother) and D.M.S. (Father) challenge the order (1) terminating their parental rights with respect to their minor son, E.L.R. (the Child) and (2) approving the adoption of the Child by his legal custodian and maternal grandmother, E.W. (Grandmother) and her husband, T.C.W. Jr. (T.W.) (collectively, Grandparents). After a trial, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) grounds for termination exist as to both Mother and Father and (2) termination is in the best interest of the Child. The court further found, also by clear and convincing evidence, that the adoption of the Child by Grandparents is in the Child’s best interest. Mother and Father appeal. They contest the finding of grounds for termination as well as the trial court’s best interest determination. We affirm.

The primary issue in this divorce case is whether the trial court erred in failing to find that Sherry Juanita Carter Berkshire (Wife) was entitled to long-term alimony in futuro from Edwin Carl Berkshire, III (Husband). Instead, the court awarded four months of transitional alimony. Wife, who was sixty at the time of the divorce, has numerous health problems and is totally and permanently disabled. Husband, who is twenty years her junior, is able-bodied and works as an automobile mechanic, with an earning capacity of at least $62,000 per year. Taking into account the relevant statutory factors and the totality of the circumstances, we modify the trial court’s alimony judgment to make it an alimony in futuro award in the amount of $150 per week. We decline Wife’s request to increase the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to her, but we do award Wife a reasonable attorney’s fee for professional services rendered, plus expenses, in connection with this appeal, in an amount to be determined by the trial court on remand. Further, we modify the trial court’s decree requiring Wife to refinance the mortgage on the marital residence. As modified in the ways indicated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In this divorce action involving the dissolution of a thirty-six year marriage, the wife appeals the trial court’s distribution of the marital estate and the amount of alimony in futuro she was awarded by the court. She also contends that the trial court judge erred by denying multiple motions for his recusal. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The defendant was indicted for seven counts of rape of a child. Prior to trial, the State sought permission to offer as evidence a video-recorded statement made by the child victim to a forensic interviewer. At the conclusion of a pre-trial hearing, the trial court refused to allow the video-recorded statement as proof at trial. We granted the State an interlocutory appeal to determine whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-123 (Supp. 2014) violates the separation of powers,whether the video-recorded statement qualifies as inadmissible hear say evidence, and whether the use of the statement at trial would violate the defendant’s right to confront witnesses. Because section 24-7-123 does not unconstitutionally infringe upon the powers of the judiciary and is a valid legislative exception to the general rule against the admission of hearsay evidence, the ruling of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for trial. The State will be permitted to offer the video-recorded statement as evidence at trial, provided that the evidence is relevant and otherwise comports with the requirements of section 24-7-123 and the Tennessee Rules of Evidence.

A Madison County jury found the Petitioner, Timothy A. Baxter, guilty of aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced him to a twelve-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the conviction in State v. Timothy A. Baxter, No. W2012-00361-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 1197867 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, March 25, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 13, 2013). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, pro se, which he later amended with the assistance of counsel. The Petitioner subsequently filed a motion requesting that the post-conviction judge recuse himself. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to recuse and the petition for post-conviction relief, after which it denied both. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his post-conviction petition because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, and he further contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his motion to recuse because there was a reasonable basis for questioning the post-conviction judge’s impartiality. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgments.

A Madison County jury convicted Desmond Obrian Anderson of aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. The jury convicted Camillia Harrison of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery. The trial court ordered the defendants to serve effective sentences of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant Anderson asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court improperly denied his motion to sever after his codefendant had testified; and (3) the trial court erred when it failed to sentence him as an Especially Mitigated Offender. Defendant Harrison asserts that: (1) the trial court should have admitted the transcript of the preliminary hearing into evidence; and (2) the trial court should have severed the defendants’ charges in this case. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Joann P.F. (“Mother”) and Gary A.M. (“Father”) to the minor children, Paige A.F., Tristan J.A.M., and Gaige D.W.M. (“the Children”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court for Anderson County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Children after finding that clear and convincing evidence was proven of grounds to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights for substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2) and for persistent conditions pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3), and that clear and convincing evidence was proven that it was in the Children’s best interest for Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to be terminated. Mother and Father appeal the termination of their parental rights to this Court. We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s findings made by clear and convincing evidence, and we affirm.

In this delayed direct appeal, the defendant, James Tremelle Hunt, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 2011 Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of one count of aggravated rape, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of aggravated assault.  Because the defendant failed to file a timely petition for post-conviction relief, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the delayed appeal in this case.  As a result, the appeal must be dismissed.

Defendant, Billy D. Rapier, and two co-defendants, Cassandra Haynes and Leveris Keller, were charged with aggravated robbery. Mr. Keller was also charged with felony evading arrest, and Defendant was charged with evading arrest. Pursuant to a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the charges and received concurrent sentences of eight years for aggravated robbery and eleven months, twenty-nine days for evading arrest. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the defense of duress barred his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This matter arises from post-divorce proceedings regarding the parties’ minor child. Mother filed an application for extraordinary appeal after the trial court designated Father as Temporary Primary Residential Parent and ordered that Father could enroll the parties’ child in a school in his school district. Mother’s application submitted three issues for review, but we grant extraordinary review only as to the issue regarding the trial court’s order designating Father as Temporary Primary Residential Parent and ordering that Father could enroll the parties’ child in a school in his school district. We vacate and remand.

The petitioner, Carl Renee Brown, appeals pro se from the summary dismissal of his 2013 petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 1987 convictions of criminal attempt to sell cocaine pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-6-417 (1982) (repealed 1989). Because the petition was filed decades beyond the applicable statute of limitations and because the petitioner failed to either allege or prove a statutory exception to the timely filing or a due process tolling of the statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.