APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Erique Richardson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of being a felon in possession of a handgun, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-1307 (2010) (amended 2013). He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to three years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) the trial court denied his right to counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Andre De La Rey Rossouw, pleaded guilty in 2001 to stalking. On July 27, 2012, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis arguing that his guilty plea was constitutionally invalid. Following a hearing, the coram nobis court denied the petition, and the Petitioner timely appealed. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Petitioner, Antonio Dwayne Johnson, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of selling one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and resulting twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an appeal from a probate court order in a guardianship case. In a prior action involving the same parties, the circuit court established a trust to hold insurance proceeds due to Minor Children and appointed Mother trustee. Subsequently, the present case was initiated when Grandfather petitioned the probate court to be appointed guardian over separate pension funds due to Minor Children. Mother also sought to be appointed guardian over the pension funds initially, but she later withdrew her request. Despite Mother’s withdrawal, the probate court investigated Mother’s personal finances and became concerned with her management of the previously established trust. The probate court appointed a guardian ad litem to further investigate Mother’s management of the trust. We hold that the probate court acted beyond the scope of its jurisdiction in doing so and therefore vacate the court’s judgment in part and remand for further proceedings.

The appellant, Jimmie Lee Reeder, pled guilty in the Cheatham County Circuit Court to two counts of domestic assault and received consecutive sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served on supervised probation. Subsequently, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered that he serve the balance of his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court improperly combined his probation revocation hearing with a sentencing hearing for additional convictions and that the trial court should have dismissed the probation revocation proceeding because it violated his rights to due process and a speedy trial. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The plaintiff, a former state prison inmate, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his health care liability action against the defendants. The trial court granted the motions to dismiss filed by the defendants who are medical personnel based upon, inter alia, the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the requirements of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-26-115 to -122 (Supp. 2013). The trial court also granted the motions to dismiss filed by all of the defendants upon finding that the plaintiff’s complaint contained insufficient factual allegations under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and, therefore, failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6). The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no error regarding dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), we affirm.

In the October 2011 term, Appellant, Mohammed Rafiqul Islam, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated assault, one count of aggravated burglary, and four counts of violation of an order of protection. Appellant pled guilty to two counts of kidnapping, three counts of aggravated assault, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of violating an order of protection. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of fifteen years. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in setting the length of the sentence, in denying alternative sentencing, and in imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there was no abuse of discretion. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a medical malpractice action. Plaintiffs timely filed a complaint after properly sending pre-suit notices to Defendants. After voluntarily dismissing the initial complaint, Plaintiffs filed a second complaint pursuant to the saving statute with an attached certificate of good faith and a copy of the original pre-suit notices. Defendants moved to dismiss the second complaint for failure to comply with the notice requirements set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a). The trial court agreed and dismissed the action. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse the decision of the trial court.

Petitioner, David Neal Davis, was indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury on four counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery. The trial ended in a mistrial. Petitioner was subsequently charged in a superseding indictment with two counts of rape of a child, eight counts of aggravated sexual battery, solicitation of a minor, and attempted aggravated sexual battery. Petitioner was convicted of rape of a child, attempted rape of a child, seven counts of aggravated sexual battery, two counts of child abuse, and one count of attempted solicitation of a minor. See State v. David Neal Davis, No. M2009-00691-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 1631828 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 19, 2011), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Aug. 31, 2011). He was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty years. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal. Id. at *1. Among other things, Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a lengthy post-conviction hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, finding that Petitioner failed to show clear and convincing evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that he was otherwise entitled to post-conviction relief. Petitioner appeals, arguing that the post-conviction court improperly denied relief where trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) requesting a mistrial; (2) failing to adequately investigate the case, including failing to call certain witnesses at trial; (3) failing to request mental health records of the victim; (4) failing to use the prior recorded statement of the victim at trial; (5) failing to object to testimony regarding evidence of other crimes not charged in the indictment; (6) failing to properly cross-examine the mother of the victim; and (7) failing to object to the State’s usage of the video interview of Petitioner. Additionally, Petitioner complains that the post-conviction court improperly determined that one of Petitioner’s issues was not proper for post-conviction relief and that the cumulative effect of all the errors at trial did not violate Petitioner’s rights. After a thorough review of the record, we determine Petitioner failed to establish that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Consequently, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
 

Write-in candidate for election to the Council of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County appeals the dismissal of his challenge on constitutional grounds to the statute requiring that, fifty days before an election, write-in candidates for offices in the election submit a notice to the county election commission requesting that their votes be counted. Determining that the statute is constitutional as written and as applied, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Defendant, Laythaniel Haney, Jr., was convicted by a Cocke County Criminal Court jury of the delivery of a controlled substance and received a fifteen-year sentence as a career offender. In this delayed appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by finding that 1) he was not prejudiced by jurors’ falling asleep during the trial and 2) he was not prejudiced by his being under the influence of drugs at the trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, William Cole Comer, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of driving under the influence, failure to stop, and possession of drug paraphernalia, and his bench conviction of violating the implied consent law, claiming that the trial court erred by permitting the arresting officer to testify as an expert witness for purposes of admitting a cocaine field test. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner filed pro se a writ of error coram nobis seeking relief from his first degree murder and robbery convictions. The trial court summarily denied relief and this appeal followed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

This interlocutory appeal concerns the issue of whether the requirement of obtaining new process or recommencing an action in general sessions court is triggered for purposes of Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-710 by the failure to return unserved the prior process within 60 days as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-902. Eddie R. Gates (“Gates”), alleging damages sustained in an automobile accident, sued Andrew S. Perry (“Perry”) in the General Sessions Court for Bradley County (“the General Sessions Court”). Gates’ suit was dismissed. On Gates’ appeal to the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Circuit Court”), Perry moved to dismiss, again alleging that the statute of limitations had run during the long gap between issuance and reissuance of process in the General Sessions Court action. The Circuit Court denied Perry’s motion, holding that the time bar did not operate because process was not returned unserved and, therefore, the statute of limitations never ran. We granted permission for this interlocutory appeal. We reverse the Circuit Court.

The defendant, Michael Davis, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of second degree murder, challenging both the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on accident. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an employment discrimination case. The employment of the plaintiff employee was terminated in the course of a reduction in force. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant employer alleging that she was singled out for termination in the reduction in force based on her age and/or race. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. The trial court reasoned that the evidence submitted by the plaintiff was insufficient to create an issue of fact as to whether the employer singled her out for termination based on her age and/or race, and that the plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient to prove that the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason proffered by the employer for terminating the plaintiff’s employment was pretextual. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse. The standard for summary judgment applicable in this case is the standard set out in Hannan and Gossett. Under the very high standard in those cases, the employer cannot negate an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case merely by showing that the plaintiff did not submit sufficient evidence at the summary judgment stage; to obtain summary judgment under that standard, the employer must show that the plaintiff cannot establish this element of her claim at trial. Thus, we hold that the employer failed to meet this standard on any of the plaintiff’s claims of discrimination.

The petitioner, Loren Janosky, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which challenged his 2003 convictions of aggravated rape and especially aggravated kidnapping. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Carlos Rice, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. After reviewing the record in this case, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the motion and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 2011, the Maury County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Michael Wiss, for harassment by the electronic phone communication of text messaging. A jury convicted Appellant of harassment. He was then sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days and ordered to pay a $2500 fine. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence presented by the State at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction.
 

Plaintiff brought suit against defendants alleging the unlawful use of his image and likeness and asserting statutory claims for violation of the Tennessee Personal Rights Protection Act and the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and common law claims for unjust enrichment, accounting, and conversion. Upon defendants’ motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on complete preemption by the Copyright Act. We affirm.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Donald King, of sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a drug free school zone. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it limited the scope of cross-examination of two witnesses, and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we discern no error in the judgment of the trial court. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
 

The Defendant, Chavis Ricardo Douglas, pled guilty to possession of 300 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, possession of between one-half ounce and ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, felon in possession of a weapon, and two counts of possession or casual exchange of marijuana. After the entry of his guilty plea, but before sentencing, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied after a hearing. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of forty-two years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it did not find a "fair and just reason" to allow the Defendant to withdraw his plea. After a thorough review of the applicable law and the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In this child support enforcement action, the trial court granted the State, on behalf of the minor child’s mother, an arrearage award of $16,753.49 against the child’s father. The trial court found that the father’s sole source of income was his federal Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and ordered the father to pay his entire lump-sum SSI payment to Child Support Enforcement. Father appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment only as to the amount of the arrearage. We reverse the portion of the trial court’s judgment attaching the father’s SSI benefits and remand for correction of the judgment.

This negligence action arose from an automobile accident occurring on October 8, 2009, in Knox County. The plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit on September 7, 2010, alleging that the defendant was negligent in the operation of her vehicle, causing the rear-end collision. A jury trial was held November 8-13, 2012, at the conclusion of which the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff filed a motion for new trial and a supplemental motion for new trial. The trial court denied these motions, determining that the evidence preponderated in favor of the jury’s verdict. The plaintiff timely appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The appellant, David Wayne Richards, pled guilty in the Hawkins County Criminal Court to possession of a Schedule III controlled substance with intent to deliver. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years, one day with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court ordered that the appellant serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion or alternative sentencing. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.