APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, William Creggar Snodgrass, was convicted of attempted rape, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced appellant to eight years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant argues that: (1) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury regarding flight; (2) the trial court erred in allowing testimony from an unsequestered witness; and (3) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Charles Deon Calhoun, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery. He then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition for failing to state a colorable claim for relief. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the court erred in dismissing his petition without holding an evidentiary hearing and without appointing counsel to assist in presenting his claim. Upon review of the record, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition.
 

The appellant, Jacqueline M. Hiyama, was indicted on alternative counts of driving under the influence (DUI) pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-401(a)(1) and (a)(2). She filed a pretrial motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of her arrest, asserting that the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle. The trial court denied the appellant’s motion. The appellant pled guilty to the indicted offense reserving a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) concerning whether the stop of the appellant’s vehicle by law enforcement was lawful. After review, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the appellant’s motion to suppress and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his two children. The juvenile court found the Department of Children’s Services established four grounds for termination of father’s parental rights: 1) parent sentenced to ten or more years for any criminal act and the children are under eight years of age pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6); 2) parent sentenced to more than two years for conduct against a child or sibling/half-sibling of the child who is the subject of the petition pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(5);
3) abandonment by wanton disregard pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv); and 4) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2). The juvenile court also found that termination of Father’s rights was in the children’s best interest. Father appealed. We affirm.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found four grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights: substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan, failure to support financially, failure to provide a suitable home, and persistence of conditions; the court also determined that termination was in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals arguing the evidence is insufficient to establish any of the grounds and that termination was in the child’s best interest. We have determined that the evidence clearly and convincingly supported two of the grounds, that of substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan and persistence of conditions. We have also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. Therefore, we affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

This case arose out of a contract for the sale of real estate. The contract included a provision requiring the buyer to make “commercially reasonable efforts” to sell the property, and to split any profits with the seller if the property was resold within 36 months. The buyer did not sell the property, and the seller brought suit, raising numerous claims, including breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, violations of the Real Estate Settlement Practices Act (RESPA), the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act, the Consumer Protection Act, RICO, wrongful foreclosure, promissory fraud, civil conspiracy, collusion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, constructive trust, conversion and unjust enrichment. After a hearing, the trial court granted the buyer’s motion to dismiss thirteen of the seller’s claims, denied the motion to dismiss another six of his claims, and certified its order as final for the purposes of appeal under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. We affirm the trial court.
 

The Defendant, David Frazier, appeals as of right from the Polk County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his motion without a hearing. The State concedes that the trial court erred. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a hearing on the Defendant’s motion.

Appellant, Glenn Climer, Jr., was indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury with attempted second degree murder, attempted aggravated child abuse, child abuse, assault, and resisting arrest. Appellant was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter, attempted aggravated child abuse, child abuse, assault, and resisting arrest. As a result, he was sentenced to a total effective sentence of twenty-six years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant sought this appeal. On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support Appellant’s convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter, attempted aggravated child abuse, and child abuse; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing counsel for the State to present an improper argument; (3) whether Appellant’s conviction for child abuse violates double jeopardy; and (4) whether the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. After a review of the issues raised on appeal, this Court determines that the evidence was sufficient to support the offenses; Appellant waived any issue with regard to improper argument by failing to object at trial; Appellant’s convictions do not violate double jeopardy; and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
 

This appeal arises from the dismissal of a tenured teacher. The Union County Board of Education (“the Board”) dismissed Tina Wilder (“Wilder”) following an incident involving underage drinking at Wilder’s lake cabin. Wilder, contesting her dismissal, filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Union County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court concluded that the evidence sustained Wilder’s dismissal. Wilder raises several issues on appeal. We hold, inter alia, that Wilder was afforded due process, that the Trial Court applied the correct standard of review, and that the evidence supported the Trial Court’s decision. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The petitioner, Terry R. Whitefield, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2012 Davidson County Criminal Court
guilty-pleaded convictions of aggravated sexual battery, for which he received a sentence of 16 years’ incarceration. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Christopher Lee Richardson, appeals his Bedford County Circuit Court jury convictions of attempted theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000; disorderly conduct; simple possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance; resisting arrest; simple possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance; and attempted promotion of the manufacture of methamphetamine, claiming that the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion to sever the counts of the indictment; that the trial court erred by refusing to disqualify a juror; that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of attempted theft of property and attempted promotion of the manufacture of methamphetamine; and that the sentence is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Paul Epps, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original two-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the record does not contain substantial evidence to show that a violation of probation occurred and that the trial court erred in failing to consider a disposition other than incarceration after revoking his probation. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Guy Graves, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Madison County Circuit Court. He was convicted of two counts of burglary and received an effective sentence of twenty-four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant-Appellant, Billy Joe Harris, was convicted in the Obion County Circuit Court of violation of the sexual offender registry, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. § 40-39-208 (2012). The trial court imposed a one-year sentence with ninety days to be served in the county jail and the balance to be served on community corrections. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Former employee brought an action for retaliatory discharge and intentional interference with employment. The trial court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). Having determined the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, we affirm the dismissal.

Robert D. Ewing (“Defendant Robert”) and Anthony T. Ewing (“Defendant Anthony”) (collectively “the Defendants”) each pleaded guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor. The Defendants reserved a certified question of law as to whether information received several months prior to obtaining and executing a search warrant was too stale to support probable cause. Pursuant to plea agreements, the trial court sentenced each of the Defendants to two years, suspended to supervised probation. This Court consolidated the Defendants’ appeals. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reject the Defendants’ challenges to the search warrant and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Cornelius O. Williams, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his guilty plea was unlawfully induced and involuntarily made. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the petitioner entered a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Shawn Thompson, was convicted after a jury trial of three counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony; one count of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony; and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. The trial court ordered the defendant’s attempted voluntary manslaughter convictions to run concurrently with one another, but ordered the reckless endangerment conviction to run consecutively to the first three counts and the weapons conviction to run consecutively to all counts. On appeal, the defendant asserts error in the trial court’s failure to dismiss the weapons charge in light of what he asserts is a material variance; in the trial court’s failure to charge the jury on the issue of self-defense; in the State’s improper argument to the jury; and in the trial court’s allegedly erroneous consideration of non-statutory factors in imposing a consecutive sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Jeffrey Wayne Rowe, pleaded guilty to four counts of aggravated burglary, one count of attempted aggravated burglary, one count of vandalism, and two counts of misdemeanor theft, and the Marshall County Circuit Court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to a term of 10 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant challenges the manner of service of his sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The plaintiff in this case brought suit to recover uninsured motorist benefits. The insurance company moved for summary judgment contending that the plaintiff was not entitled to coverage because he was not “upon” the insured vehicle so as to “occupy” it. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company and we affirm.

The trial court approved and affirmed the final accounting of a trust held in a conservatorship estate and closed the conservatorship following the death of the Ward. We affirm.

The petitioner, Andre Kimbrough, was convicted of second degree murder, a Class A felony. He now appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that the statute of limitations for filing a petition for post-conviction relief should be tolled because trial counsel did not give the petitioner adequate notice that his direct appeal was denied or notice that trial counsel did not apply for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. After reviewing the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

A registered nurse sustained a compensable injury to her neck. The trial court found that she was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the injury. Her employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by failing to cap the award at oneand- one-half times the impairment rating pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). In the alternative, the employer asserts that the trial court erred by awarding permanent total disability benefits. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Mitchell Ford, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. At trial, the petitioner was convicted of arson and aggravated burglary, Class C felonies, and was sentenced to two fifteen-year terms to be served concurrently. On appeal, he argues that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to challenge the identification of the petitioner by the State’s witnesses and failed to challenge a juror who knew the victim and the petitioner and his family. Following a review of the record, we conclude that the petition was properly denied and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Kevin Harding, was convicted of one count of facilitation of possession of marijuana, a Schedule VI drug, with the intent to sell, a Class A misdemeanor, one count of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to a four-year sentence for facilitation of possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, a seventeen-year sentence for possession of cocaine for resale, a sentence of 11 months and 29 days for possession of drug paraphernalia, and an eight-year sentence for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The court ordered the possession of cocaine for resale and possession of drug paraphernalia sentences to be served concurrently, and the sentence for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony to run consecutively to the sentence for possession of cocaine for resale, for an effective sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred when it failed to define the charge of simple possession of cocaine for the jury; that the trial court committed plain error in sentencing the defendant to serve four years for facilitation of possession of marijuana with the intent to sell; and that the trial court committed plain error in failing to require the State to elect the felony to serve as the underlying felony for possession of a firearm and failing to define “dangerous felony” for the jury. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court for possession with the intent to sell cocaine, reverse the judgment for facilitation because the sentence was outside the appropriate class range, and reverse the judgment for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The case is remanded for resentencing on the facilitation conviction and for a new trial on the possession of a firearm charge.