APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A painting contractor filed a complaint against Nashville’s Metropolitan Housing and Development Agency (MDHA) alleging that the agency had violated its own rules by failing to choose him as the lowest bidder on a painting contract. The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because an administrative decision, such as the award of a painting contract, can only be challenged through a petition for writ of certiorari, and the contractor had filed his complaint after the sixty day time limit for filing the writ had passed. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102. We affirm.

The plaintiff, an attorney representing himself, filed this action against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, the Metro Clerk in her official capacity, and the Director of the Metro Department of Parks and Recreation Services in his official capacity. He asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that arises from him being prohibited from speaking on behalf of his clients at two separate meetings of the Board of the Metro Department of Parks and Recreation, because he failed to give timely notice to the Board. He alleges the defendants deprived him of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 8 of the Tennessee constitution and seeks nominal damages for the alleged deprivation of his rights. He also seeks a declaratory judgment that the Parks’ Board rule requiring fourteen days’ notice to be heard at a Board meeting is invalid. We have determined, as the trial court did, that the plaintiff’s claims related to the first Board meeting are time-barred. As for the claims related to the second Board meeting, we have determined that the plaintiff’s rights were not violated because the plaintiff had actual notice of the Board policy requiring fourteen days’ notice well in advance of the second meeting. Finally, we have determined the plaintiff is not entitled to a declaratory judgment because he failed to demonstrate that he is seeking to vindicate an existing right under presently existing facts. The trial court summarily dismissed the claims. We affirm.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee alleged that she sustained permanent disability from a work-related injury to her right shoulder. Her employer denied that the injury caused a permanent disability. The trial court found that the employee was permanently and totally disabled as a result of her work injury and entered a judgment to that effect. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding permanent and total disability. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Hamblen County jury convicted the Defendant, Tracy H. Graves, of driving under the influence (“DUI”) second offense, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his DUI conviction because his vehicle was not in a location named in the indictment. After a thorough review of the record and the relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Martha Patlan-Cano, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her convictions of first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse and resulting effective sentence of life plus twenty years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Upton Dabney, Jr., pleaded guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-1003 (2010). Although the Defendant agreed to a six-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court, the court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to one year’s confinement and ten years on community corrections. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) his ten-year community corrections sentence is excessive and (2) the trial court erred by ordering one year’s confinement. We reverse the ten-year community corrections sentence and remand the case for the trial court to enter a judgment reflecting a sentence of one year’s confinement and five years on community corrections.

The Defendant, Forrest Melvin Moore, Jr., was convicted at a bench trial of second offense driving under the influence (DUI) and second offense DUI while his blood alcohol concentration was .20% or more, Class A misdemeanors. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2012). He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with forty-five days to be served. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress and that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. We affirm the Defendant’s convictions but vacate the judgments and remand the case for entry of a single judgment noting merger of the two offenses.

The Defendant, James A. Adkins, entered a best-interest plea of guilt to driving while declared a motor vehicle habitual offender, failing to obey a traffic-control device, violation of the financial responsibility law, and reckless aggravated assault. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court erred when it denied his request for alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

In an indictment returned by the Hamilton County Grand Jury, Petitioner, Harold Holloway, Jr., was charged in count 1 with felony murder during the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, a theft. He was also charged in count 2 with felony murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate robbery. Additional counts alleged offenses which are not pertinent to this case on appeal. Following a jury trial, he was found guilty of second degree murder in both counts which charged felony murder. The conviction in count 2 was merged with the conviction in count 1. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the murder conviction. State v. Harold Holloway, Jr., No. E2004-00882-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 1981791 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 16, 2005). Petitioner now appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing his petition for habeas corpus relief without an evidentiary hearing. The habeas corpus petition alleged that Petitioner was entitled to relief because (1) each count of the indictment that charged felony murder was invalid, and therefore led to a void judgment because it failed “to include the statutory element of specific ‘intent’ for the underlying offense;” and (2) the convicting criminal court erroneously amended the felony murder counts of the indictment with its jury charge. After review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in this case.

Petitioner, Jeffery Miller, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. After reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the denial of Appellant’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion for relief from a default judgment. Appellee’s original complaint was filed against the Appellant’s company for breach of a commercial lease agreement. Appellee was granted leave to amend the complaint to add Appellant, individually, as a party-defendant. Appellant failed to file any responsive pleadings in the case and a default judgment was entered against him. Several months later, Appellant filed a Rule 60.02 motion to set aside the default judgment against him. We conclude that the trial court did not err in piercing the corporate veil to add Appellant as a defendant, or in the amount of damages awarded in the default judgment. Because Appellant failed to meet his burden of proof on the Rule 60.02 motion, we also conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the motion. Affirmed and remanded.

The State obtained a probation revocation warrant seeking to revoke the probation of appellant, Freda Darlene Garrett, for committing new criminal offenses, failing to report, and failing to pay court-ordered restitution. Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked appellant’s probation in the case listed on the warrant (case number 08-028) and also on a case not listed on the warrant (case number 01-359). On appeal, appellant argues that she did not have notice of the probation revocation in the latter case and that her probationary sentence in that case had expired and was not subject to revocation. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court revoking appellant’s probation in case number 01-359 and affirm the judgment of the trial court revoking appellant’s probation in case number 08-028.

Upon her indictment for six counts of aggravated child abuse and six counts of aggravated child neglect, the defendant, Latonya Deon Dalton, pled guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated child abuse, a Class B felony. In exchange for her pleas, the defendant received concurrent, ten-year sentences as a Range III offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the court ordered that the defendant serve one year in confinement, followed by probation for the remaining balance of the agreed-upon sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court failed to “give due consideration” to the principles of sentencing and also failed to give her nearly four months of jail credit. Following our review, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court. However, we remand for the trial court to determine the amount of jail credit to which the defendant is entitled and apply that toward the one-year portion of her sentence to be served in confinement.

The Defendant, Dallas Jay Stewart, was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of nine counts of rape of a child, Class A felonies; fourteen counts of aggravated sexual battery, Class B felonies; and one count of exhibition of harmful material to a minor, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522; 39-13-504; 39-17-911 (2010). The trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to twenty-five-years’ confinement for each count of rape of a child, twelve-years’ confinement for each count of aggravated sexual battery, and eleven-months, twenty-nine-days’ confinement for exhibition of harmful material to a minor. The counts against each victim were ordered to be served consecutively for an effective fifty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions, (2) the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress, (3) the trial court erred in failing to merge some of his aggravated sexual battery convictions, and (4) his sentence was excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court for exhibition of harmful material (Count 1), five counts of aggravated sexual battery (Counts 10, 13, 23, 24, and 25), and one count of rape of a child (Count 2). We vacate the aggravated sexual battery judgment for Count 26 and dismiss the charge. Because the trial court failed to merge the convictions for eight counts of aggravated sexual battery (Counts 4, 6, 8, 12, 15, 17, 19 and 21) and eight counts of rape of a child (Counts 3, 5, 7, 11, 14, 16, 18, and 20), we vacate the convictions and order the trial court to enter judgments reflecting merger of these aggravated sexual battery convictions into the rape of a child convictions.

Petitioner, Michael Jermaine Harris, was convicted of aggravated arson in 2009 and was sentenced to nineteen years. He unsuccessfully appealed his conviction and sentence. See State v. Michael Jermaine Harris, No. E2009-01383-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3155196, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 10, 2010). Petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to prepare adequately for trial, failed to obtain an expert witness, failed to procure an alibi witness, and failed to adequately cross-examine one of the police officers involved. Following our review of the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Jeremy Young, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He contends (1) that his guilty plea to first-degree murder was not knowingly and voluntarily entered and (2) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorneys allowed their hired agents to unduly influence him into pleading guilty, failed to seek a change of venue, and led him to believe that he could get his conviction overturned on post-conviction relief. After consideration of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I am writing separately to express my disagreement with the majority opinion's assertion that a trial judge's ruling with regard to hearsay is subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard. I am persuaded that the analysis of State v. Gilley, 297 S.W.3d 739 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Feb. 17, 2009), is the appropriate method for reviewing issues involving hearsay.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Kenny Kimble, was found guilty of rape of a child. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-five years. In his only issue raised on appeal, Defendant asserts that the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay testimony. The State argues that this issue is waived because the motion for new trial was untimely filed, having been filed more than thirty days after entry of the judgment of conviction. We reject the State’s argument concerning the timeliness of the motion for new trial. The judgment of conviction was not stamp-filed by the clerk, and thus there is nothing in the record to show that the motion for new trial was filed late. However, after review of the issue on its merits, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a divorce action in which the trial court denied Mother’s motion to correct a clerical mistake in the permanent parenting plan pursuant to Rule 60.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Mother appeals. Vacated and Remanded.

Petitioner, Antonio Wyatt, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the court wherein he was convicted. Upon motion of the State, the trial court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing based upon Petitioner’s failure to show in the petition “that his judgments are either void or that his sentence has expired.” Petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal. Petitioner asserts the judgments are void because the trial court ordered Petitioner to serve the one-year portion of incarceration of a split confinement sentence “day for day 100%” and because the trial court refused to allow Petitioner statutorily mandated pre-trial jail credits. While some of the documents in the record presented by Petitioner indicate irregularities in the judgments which could lead to a determination that the sentencing portions are void, we conclude that Petitioner is not entitled to relief because he is no longer “restrained of his liberty” by the challenged convictions. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Upon remand by our supreme court, see State v. Cooper, 321 S.W.3d 501 (Tenn. 2010), Defendant Ralph Byrd Cooper, Jr., was resentenced by the trial court to serve sixty (60) years as a career offender for his conviction of aggravated rape, a Class A felony. Defendant appeals his sentence, asserting as his sole issue that the trial court erred by determining he was a “career offender.” After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

An attorney disciplined by the Board of Professional Responsibility brought suit against the Board hearing panel that decided his case. The attorney asserts that the hearing panel violated the Open Meetings Act. We have concluded that the trial court properly determined that the Open Meetings Act does not apply to the Board’s hearing panels.

Petition to modify child support obligation was filed by Father; Mother filed a counter-petition requesting that the court make a determination as to where their child would attend school. The trial court dismissed Father’s petition when he did not provide information to support his assertion that he no longer received a portion of the income upon which his child support obligation was based and therefore he failed to show a change of circumstance relative to his income. The court found that it would be in the child’s best interest to attend school in the school for which Mother’s residence was zoned and granted Mother’s counter-petition; the court also awarded attorney fees to Mother. We affirm the court’s decision relative to the child’s school enrollment. We reverse the order dismissing Father’s petition for modification and remand the case for reconsideration; we reverse the award of attorney fees.

Teacher who brought action against Rutherford County, the Rutherford County Board of Education, and two employees of the Board appeals the grant of defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissal of her claim that defendants violated the Education Truth in Reporting and Employee Protection Act of 1989, as well as her claims for invasion of privacy, abuse of process, misrepresentation, and harassment. We affirm the trial court’s holding that there is no general cause of action under the Education Truth in Reporting and Employee Act of 1989. Finding that there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation which preclude summary judgment, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the remaining claims.

Petitioner, Reginald D. Hughes, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of the pro se third petition for habeas corpus relief filed by Petitioner. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus trial court.