APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A jury convicted the defendant, Clifton Williams, Jr., of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony. The defendant also pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a Range II offender to eight years’ confinement for the manslaughter conviction and four years’ confinement for the felon in possession of a firearm conviction, to be served consecutively. The defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for manslaughter. The defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in failing to include the definition of curtilage in the self-defense instruction, in enhancing the defendant’s sentences, and in imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court

On April 10, 2008, the petitioner entered a no contest plea to twenty-nine Class A misdemeanors consisting of one count of aggravated criminal trespass, one count of stalking, thirteen counts of harassment, and fourteen counts of violation of an order of protection. State v. Winfrey (Winfrey II), No. M2009-02480-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 4540288, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2010). The petitioner was ultimately sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days for each conviction, with ten of the sentences to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of just under ten years. The trial court ordered three of the consecutive sentences to be served in confinement and the remaining seven to be served on probation. The petitioner was arrested on December 8, 2010, during the pendency of his appeal; and after a hearing held in April 2011, the trial court revoked the petitioner’s probation and ordered him to serve his remaining seven consecutive eleven-month-twenty-nine-day sentences in confinement. The petitioner did not file a direct appeal. Instead, on March 15, 2012, the petitioner filed a motion to serve the balance of his sentence on probation. In the alternative, the petitioner sought to have the court set aside the probation revocation pursuant to the writ of error coram nobis based on the expunction of the record of his December 2010 arrest due to a stay of probation in effect at the time. The trial court denied both the motion to serve the remaining sentence on probation and the petition for the writ of error coram nobis, as well as an oral motion for the judge’s recusal. The petitioner appeals. After a thorough review of the record, we find no error and accordingly affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, James A. Johnson Jr., pleaded guilty in the Criminal Court for Knox County to possession with the intent to sell marijuana within 1000 feet of a school, a Class E felony, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony, possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving on a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor. The Defendant was sentenced to three years for possession with the intent to sell marijuana with two years of the sentence to be served at 100% and the remaining year to be served at 30%, three years for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony to be served consecutively to the marijuana sentence, eleven months and twenty-nine days for possession of drug paraphernalia to be served concurrently with the marijuana sentence, and six months for driving on a suspended license to be served concurrently with the marijuana sentence. On appeal, the Defendant presents a certified question of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop and subsequent arrest and searches that led to his convictions. Because the certified question was not properly reserved, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This appeal arises from a dispute over the calculation of jail time credits. Henry J. Nagorny (“Nagorny”), an incarcerated individual, filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Circuit Court for Grainger County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to compel Sheriff Scott Layel to award him jail behavior credits that allegedly were due him. The Trial Court dismissed Nagorny’s petition sua sponte, stating that the calculation of credits is an administrative matter. Nagorny filed this appeal. We hold that the Trial Court, stating no compelling substantive basis for its decision, erred in dismissing Nagorny’s petition sua sponte. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for proceedings consistent with our Opinion.

The Defendant, Terry Marcum, appeals the Sevier County Circuit Court’s revoking his probation for two counts of domestic assault and ordering him to serve his consecutive sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Matthew B. Graham, pled guilty to attempted abuse of a child, under 8 years of age, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated, section 39-15-401, a Class E felony. On the same day, he pled guilty to three informations, each charging him with possession of a controlled substance in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated, section 53-11-402. Appellant received a two-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the attempted child abuse and each of the possession of a controlled substance pleas. Appellant’s total effective sentence was 8 years, to be suspended on state supervised probation. Appellant violated his probation and was ordered to serve the remainder of his 8 year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant filed a motion to modify sentence to allow him to go back on probation. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to modify the sentence.

In this divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s classification of property, specifically the appreciation in value of farm property he owned in his own name prior to the marriage as marital property and of a life insurance policy owned by Wife as her separate property. Finding that the court erred in its classification of the increase in value of the farm property, we reverse the judgment in part and remand for further proceedings.
 

Vario Talley (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated robbery and carjacking. In his petition, he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that his counsel at trial was ineffective in failing to object to the admissibility of video surveillance evidence. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against a hospital in which she asserted claims for medical malpractice and wrongful death. She later amended her complaint to add a party and did not contemporaneously file a certificate of good faith. The trial court dismissed the second complaint with prejudice based upon the court’s determination that plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122. We affirm the trial court.
 

Wife was awarded rehabilitative alimony in 2004 that was to terminate in 2012. In 2009 Wife filed a petition to increase the duration and amount of her alimony, or, in the alternative, for an award of alimony in futuro. The trial court found Wife was in need of support, but it denied Wife’s petition, finding Wife had not used all reasonable efforts to rehabilitate herself. On appeal we find Wife’s inability to be rehabilitated as that term has been defined by the legislature warrants a modification of Wife’s alimony award. We reverse the trial court’s judgment denying Wife’s petition for alimony and conclude Wife is entitled to alimony in futuro but in a lesser amount. We affirm the trial court’s judgment denying Wife’s request for attorney’s fees.
 

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on several grounds and determined that the termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of the children. We affirm.
 

Lessor and Lessee executed a lease agreement that gave Lessee an option to purchase the rented property during a two-year period. A purchase and sale agreement was executed the same day outlining the terms of the sale if the option were exercised. Lessee did not exercise the option during the period specified, and Lessor sued the Lessee for breaching the purchase and sale agreement. Lessee filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court granted. Lessor appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the complaint. Because Lessee did not exercise the option to purchase the property, the purchase and sale agreement did not become operative.
 

The Department of Children’s Services filed two petitions to terminate the parental rights of a mother to each of her two children after they were found to be dependent and neglected. The mother was served with both petitions, but she failed to appear at the proceedings where the court heard evidence about her persistent drug use and the Department’s attempts to help her overcome the problems that prevented her from safely parenting her children. The trial court found that the Department had established two grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence that applied to both petitions: persistence of conditions and substantial failure to comply with parenting plans. The court also found that it was in the best interest of the children that the mother’s parental rights be terminated. Mother appealed. We affirm.

The Department of Children’s Services filed two petitions to terminate the parental rights of a mother to each of her two children after they were found to be dependent and neglected. The mother was served with both petitions, but she failed to appear at the proceedings where the court heard evidence about her persistent drug use and the Department’s attempts to help her overcome the problems that prevented her from safely parenting her children. The trial court found that the Department had established two grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence that applied to both petitions: persistence of conditions and substantial failure to comply with parenting plans. The court also found that it was in the best interest of the children that the mother’s parental rights be terminated. Mother appealed. We affirm.

Mother appeals the designation of Father as the primary residential parent of the parties’ two minor children and the parenting schedule which gave Father substantially more parenting time. We affirm the trial court’s designation of Father as the primary residential parent finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision which was primarily based on the importance of continuity in the children’s lives. As for the parenting schedule, which awards Father 245 days and Mother only 120 days a year, we find that the evidence preponderates against such a disparity of parenting time; therefore, we reverse the parenting schedule and remand this issue for the trial court to adopt a revised parenting schedule that permits each parent to enjoy the maximum participation possible in the children’s lives that is consistent with the factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106(a).

In this dispute concerning a real estate sale contract, we have concluded that the gravamen of the action is for injury to property and that, under the applicable legal principles, the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding as to when the statute of limitations began to run. Because the action is barred by the statute of limitations, we reverse the decision of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of an inmate’s petition for common law writ of certiorari. Because the inmate did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.

Following a trial where Plaintiffs were awarded compensatory and punitive damages, Defendants filed a motion seeking a new trial based on juror misconduct. Defendants alleged the jurors arrived at the punitive damages amount using a quotient, or gambling, verdict. The trial court denied Defendants’ motion for a new trial and Defendants appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment because the jurors’ affidavits indicate that not all jurors agreed in advance to be bound by the mathematical process involved in arriving at a quotient verdict.

We granted Robert Ledford Funeral Home, Inc.’s (“the Funeral Home”) application for extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 10 to consider the issue of whether the Funeral Home was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law if the undisputed material facts demonstrate that its “on call” employee, Johnny Tipton, was not acting within the course and scope of his employment with the Funeral Home when the vehicle accident causing injuries to the plaintiffs occurred. We find and hold that the undisputed material facts demonstrate that Mr. Tipton was not acting within the course and scope of his employment with the Funeral Home, and that the Funeral Home is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Andrew Spencer (“Plaintiff”) sued Norfolk Southern Railway Company (“Railroad”) for negligence under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. After a jury trial, the Trial Court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict finding and holding, inter alia, that the Railroad was not at fault for Plaintiff’s injury. Plaintiff appeals raising an issue regarding jury instructions concerning foreseeability and notice. We find that the jury instruction regarding foreseeability and notice was misleading, and we vacate and remand for a new trial.

Petitioner, Michael Gibbs, Jr., filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Morgan County Circuit Court, claiming that his sentence was expired and that he was being illegally restrained. The State filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements governing petitions for writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court granted the State’s motion and summarily dismissed the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Sherry Sulfridge, appeals the summary dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. The petitioner pled guilty to aggravated child neglect and reckless homicide, and she is currently serving an effective eighteen-year sentence in the Department of Correction. Almost four years after the judgments were entered, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely. Following review, we affirm the dismissal.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee sustained multiple injuries in a work-related incident in April 2005, when approximately 1,500 pounds of stockade gates fell on him. The employee later returned to work for the employer in his previous position as a truck driver. The parties settled the employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits based upon a 34.5% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, plus future medical benefits. The employee continued having bilateral shoulder pain as a result of his injuries and in August 2008 had surgery on his left shoulder to repair a torn rotator cuff. After the surgery, however, he developed an infection and required a second surgery, which revealed the failure of the rotator cuff repair. Because of the poor result of those surgeries, the employee declined the recommended surgery on his right shoulder. In February 2011, the employee filed a complaint seeking reconsideration of his previous award, alleging that he had ceased working for the employer in January 2010 because he could no longer physically perform his duties due to his earlier compensable injuries. The trial court found that the employee was entitled to reconsideration and awarded additional permanent partial disability benefits (with credit for the benefits previously paid). The employer has appealed. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the employee is entitled to reconsideration but reverse its finding as to permanent partial disability.

The Defendant, Jody Candace Seaman, pleaded guilty to identity theft, a Class D felony, second offense driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor, and fifth offense driving on a revoked license, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-150 (2010), 55- 10-401 (2012), 55-50-504 (2012). The trial court sentenced her as a Range I, standard offender to four years for identity theft, eleven months, twenty-nine days for second offense DUI, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for fifth offense driving on a revoked license. The court ordered partial consecutive sentences, for an effective sentence of four years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, she contends that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Father in child custody and support proceeding appeals the trial court’s findings: (1) that he was in criminal contempt of court; (2) that he was in civil contempt of court and setting the amount necessary to purge himself of contempt; (3) in suspending his parenting time; (4) modifying his child support obligation; and (5) ordering him to pay Mother’s attorney fees. We have determined that the finding of criminal contempt, the order modifying his child support obligation, and the order that Father pay Mother’s attorney fees should be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings in connection therewith. In all other respects we affirm the trial court’s judgment.