APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Malcolm J. Coble, contends that his right to a speedy trial was violated when the trial court revoked his community corrections sentence on the basis of a 2010 violation warrant, later amended in 2012, because the warrants were not executed and an evidentiary hearing held until 2012. After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Property owners submitted a subdivision plat to the local planning commission for approval. The planning commission denied the proposed plan because the property lies in the path of a planned highway extension. The property owners filed a complaint alleging the planning commission’s denial constitutes a regulatory taking that is prohibited by the Tennessee Constitution, Article I, Section 21, and, also, inverse condemnation that is compensable pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-123. The trial court denied the government’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as to the claim based on inverse condemnation, but reverse the judgment refusing to dismiss the regulatory taking claim.

This divorce appeal involves the classification of the appreciation in value of separate property. During the marriage, the wife’s family gave her ownership interests in two family companies. The parties used marital funds to pay their tax liabilities arising out of income from the companies that was attributed to them for tax purposes but retained by the companies. The trial court held that the appreciation in value of the wife’s ownership interests in the family companies were her separate property. We hold that, under the circumstances of this case, the parties substantially contributed to the preservation and appreciation in value of the wife’s separate assets, and so reverse the trial court’s classification of the appreciation in value as her separate property.

This appeal involves the Full Faith and Credit Clause and firearm rights. The petitioner was convicted of felony drug offenses in Georgia. The State of Georgia granted the petitioner a full pardon for his crimes; his Georgia pardon expressly restored his right to possess a firearm. The petitioner now resides in Tennessee. A Tennessee statute provides that it is a felony for a person who has been convicted of a felony drug offense to possess a firearm, and it does not make an exception for persons who have been pardoned for their crime. The petitioner filed this declaratory judgment action against the State of Tennessee, seeking a declaration that, because he received a pardon for his drug offenses in Georgia, he can purchase or possess a firearm in Tennessee without violating the Tennessee statute. The trial court held in favor of the petitioner, concluding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution requires Tennessee to recognize Georgia’s pardon in full and to permit the petitioner to carry a firearm in Tennessee. The State of Tennessee now appeals. On appeal, we consider the public-policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. We hold that Tennessee’s public policy on the restoration of firearm rights for a convicted non-violent drug felon is not entirely inconsistent with Georgia’s public policy, so the public-policy exception to full faith and credit is not applicable in that situation. However, Tennessee public policy proscribes the restoration of firearm rights for a convicted violent drug felon, contrary to Georgia’s public policy allowing the restoration of firearm rights for all felons, violent or not. This Tennessee policy implicates public safety so as to warrant application of the public-policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause under the appropriate circumstances. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this divorce case, the trial court divided property which had not been previously divided by agreement of the parties and awarded Wife alimony in solido. Wife appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in failing to classify the property as marital or separate prior to division, and in failing to award her alimony in futuro, rehabilitative alimony, transitional alimony, or attorney’s fees. Finding no error we affirm.

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that a trial court may impose both a period of partial confinement for a misdemeanor domestic assault conviction and a two-year probationary period. I write separately, however, to explain more fully the reasoning supporting my conclusion.

Oscar Thomas (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded convictions for carjacking and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his plea was constitutionally invalid due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. He also contends that his employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction violates Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(c). Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from a prolonged dispute among business associates which they have come to refer to as a “business divorce.” The parties in this matter, each doctors, formed a limited liability company for the purpose of acquiring property and constructing a medical office building on the property. In order to acquire the property from the current owner, the doctors executed an assumption and modification agreement whereby the LLC and the doctors each individually agreed to be jointly and severally liable to the current owner for its obligations on a promissory note. Subsequently, one of the doctors, the Appellee, withdrew membership from the LLC and executed an indemnity agreement with the remaining LLC members whereby the Appellee would be held harmless from any liability of the LLC, including the note. Thereafter, the LLC and its remaining members defaulted on the note, and the holder of the note filed a complaint against the Appellee, the LLC, and the individual LLC members, seeking to collect the balance due under the note. In order to avoid having a judgment entered against him, the Appellee purchased the note and pursued a claim against the LLC and its individual members for indemnification and breach of the note. Ultimately, the trial court granted the Appellee’s motion for summary judgment on his indemnification claim, awarded him attorney’s fees, costs, and prejudgment interest, and dismissed the Appellant’s cross-claims against the Appellee. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Appellee, Charles Ewing Kennedy, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury for driving under the influence, second offense; speeding; and violation of the implied consent law. Appellee moved to suppress the evidence against him regarding the driving under the influence count. The trial court granted his motion to suppress. This court granted the State’s application for permission to appeal. On appeal, the State argues that the trial court incorrectly applied a sufficiency of the evidence standard when granting appellee’s motion to suppress rather than making a probable cause determination. The State urges this court to reverse the trial court’s ruling and to conclude that the police had probable cause to arrest appellee for driving under the influence. Following our review, we reverse the ruling of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

After a trial by jury the defendant, Curtis Keller, was convicted of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping (against Tamika Jones and M.B.), Class A felonies; one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery (against Andrew Morrow), a Class B felony; one count of especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony; three counts of aggravated assault (against Andrew Morrow, Tamika Jones, and M.B.), Class C felonies; and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a “dangerous felony,” a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of two hundred and forty years. On appeal, the defendant claims that: (1) the jury instructions concerning the especially aggravated kidnapping charges were inadequate in light of State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), (2) the jury instructions concerning the employment of a firearm during the commission of a “dangerous felony” were erroneous, and (3) his eight separate convictions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because his crime spree “was one continuous act.” After careful review, we conclude that: (1) the jury instructions were inadequate in light of White, but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) the jury instructions concerning the employment of a firearm during the commission of a “dangerous felony” were erroneous because they did not foreclose the possibility that the jury used one of the especially aggravated kidnappings—which, as stated in the indictment, were based on the defendant’s use of a firearm—as predicate felonies. As the State concedes, the statute prohibiting an individual’s use of a firearm during the commission of a “dangerous felony” expressly forbids charging a defendant for a violation of that statute “if possessing or employing a firearm is an essential element of the underlying dangerous felony as charged.” T.C.A. § 39-17-1324(c). Accordingly, the defendant’s conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony is reversed. In addition, it was plain error for the defendant to be convicted of both especially aggravated burglary and attempted especially aggravated robbery based on the same act of causing serious bodily injury to victim Andrew Morrow. The defendant’s conviction for especially aggravated burglary is reduced to a conviction of aggravated burglary, and a new sentence of fifteen years is imposed on this count. With respect to his other claims, the defendant has failed to establish any entitlement to relief, and his convictions of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery, and three counts of aggravated assault are affirmed.

The Petitioner, Leonard Jasper Young, appeals from the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief as it relates to the guilt phase of his trial. The post-conviction court granted the Petitioner relief as to the sentencing phase, and the State did not appeal this ruling. A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner of premeditated first degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and theft over $1,000. He received an effective sentence of death plus seventy-two years. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that trial counsel were ineffective during the guilt phase of his trial. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the Petitioner post-conviction relief.

After his discharge as the Chief of Police for Red Bank, Tennessee, Larry Sneed filed suit against Red Bank pursuant to the Tennessee Human Rights Act and the Tennessee Public Protection Act. He requested a jury trial on both claims. Red Bank filed a motion to transfer to circuit court and to proceed without a jury pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial court transferred the case and ordered the case to proceed without a jury on the Tennessee Public Protection Act claim. Relying on University of Tennessee of Chattanooga v. Farrow, E2000-02386-COA-R9-CV, 2001 WL 935467 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2001), the court held that the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act did not preclude a jury trial on the remaining claim. Red Bank pursued this interlocutory appeal. We reverse the decision of the trial court and hold that the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act applies to claims brought against a municipality pursuant to the Tennessee Human Rights Act; therefore, that claim must also be tried without a jury.

The defendant, James Scott O’Brien, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s order that he serve in confinement nine months of the 30-month sentence imposed for his conviction of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. Because the record supports the sentencing order, we affirm.

This appeal involves a claim for damages filed with the Tennessee Claims Commission, arising out of the death of an inmate while he was housed in a state penitentiary. The Claims Commission denied the claimant’s motion for a default judgment. Thereafter, the Claims Commission determined that the gravamen of the complaint was for medical malpractice, and consequently, it granted the State’s motion to dismiss based upon the claimant’s failure to comply with various provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act. The claimant appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.

This appeal involves post-divorce proceedings arising out of numerous disputes between the parties. The only rulings that are challenged on appeal are the trial court’s conclusions that: (1) Father was required to pay uncovered medical expenses for the children’s counseling, pursuant to the divorce decree; and (2) Father must pay $14,000 of Mother’s attorney’s fees. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision on both issues.

Edward Thomas Kendrick, III (“the Petitioner”) was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction on direct appeal. The Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we are constrained to conclude that the Petitioner established that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, because it is reasonably likely that a jury would have convicted him of a lesser degree of homicide absent the deficiencies in his trial counsel’s performance. Accordingly, we must reverse the Petitioner’s conviction and remand this matter for further proceedings.

Convicted of felony murder, three counts of aggravated assault, and setting fire to personal property, petitioner, Edgar Bailey, Jr., filed the instant petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that the indictment under which he was tried and convicted for felony murder was defective in that it did not bear a return date from the grand jury and that the State withheld it from him prior to trial. He further claims that the allegedly defective indictment constitutes newly discovered evidence for the purpose of error coram nobis proceedings. The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

In June 1998, petitioner, Larry Keith Huddle, entered a “no contest” plea to one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received an eight-year sentence, with thirty-five percent release eligibility, to be served in community corrections. His sentence expired in 2004, but he remained under community supervision for life. In 2011, petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he pleaded guilty without knowing that he would be subject to community supervision for life. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that the petition was not timely. On appeal, petitioner contends that Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461 (Tenn.2010), announced a new rule of constitutional law that should be applied retroactively, which would toll the statute of limitations and render his petition for post-conviction relief timely. He further argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the State now carries the burden of proving that the failure to advise him of the condition of community supervision for life was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Following our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a bench trial, a Montgomery County Circuit Court convicted the Petitioner, Gregory G. Kilgore, of aggravated robbery and possession with the intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to twelve years for each conviction to be served concurrently, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, and this Court affirmed the conviction. State v. George C. Kilgore, No. M2009-01539-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2483546, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 21, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. October 20, 2010). The Petitioner timely filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. The Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s denial, claiming that his attorney’s failure to adequately cross-examine a witness and to procure a surveillance video constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This is a health care liability case. Samuel E. Foster and his wife, Mary Foster, timely filed a complaint after properly sending pre-suit notices to the potential defendants as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a) (2012). After nonsuiting their first lawsuit, they timely filed a second complaint in which they alleged the same cause of action against the same defendants. The second complaint alleged compliance with section 121(a), citing the notices already properly sent before the first complaint was filed. The trial court dismissed the second complaint with prejudice based upon the court’s determination that plaintiffs failed to satisfy the notice requirement of section 121(a). We hold that plaintiffs complied with section 121(a)’s notice requirement by giving a written notice of their potential health care liability claim to each defendant at least 60 days prior to the filing of their second complaint. We further hold that section 121 does not mandate dismissal with prejudice for noncompliance with its terms, and that plaintiffs’ inadvertent failure to file – with the second complaint – proof of their service of the subject notices does not warrant dismissal with prejudice. We vacate the trial court’s order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Warren Hildred, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of second degree murder, challenging both the exclusion of certain evidence and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, William T. Bryant, filed a petition to test DNA evidence pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Jerry Louis Fitzgerald, Jr., was indicted in March of 2008 by the Gibson County Grand Jury for possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, unlawful sale of over .5 grams of cocaine, and unlawful delivery of over .5 grams of cocaine. Petitioner ultimately entered guilty pleas to three counts of selling over .5 grams of cocaine. As a result of the guilty pleas, he was sentenced to twenty years for each count, to be served concurrently, for a total effective sentence of twenty years. Following the entry of judgment, Petitioner filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied without a hearing. Petitioner appealed. See State v. Louis Fitzgerald, Jr., No. W2009-02520-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 703, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Aug. 20, 2010). This Court remanded the case for a hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. On remand, the trial court held a hearing and again denied the motion. There was no direct appeal from this denial. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in November of 2011, seeking a delayed appeal from the denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. In June of 2012, a consent order was entered allowing a delayed appeal from the denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. On appeal, Petitioner challenges the trial court’s denial of the motion to withdraw his guilty pleas because the trial court failed to determine: (1) whether Petitioner was denied effective counsel; (2) whether the plea was knowingly and involuntarily made; and (3) whether manifest injustice exists as a ground for withdrawal of the pleas. After a review of the record, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas where there was substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s conclusion. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The trial court decreed a resulting trust in a house paid for by the decedent on property owned by her son. We have concluded that the trial court erred.

The ex-husband of the defendant filed a petition to terminate alimony. The parties’ 2010 marital dissolution agreement provides that the petitioner shall pay alimony to his ex-wife for a specified period or upon her cohabitating with another man, and petitioner alleges that the defendant has been cohabitating with another man. The trial court made findings that, although the defendant had an intimate relationship with another man, she was not cohabitating as that term is defined; thus, the trial court denied the petition and awarded the defendant an arrearage judgment for alimony the petitioner failed to pay. Finding the trial court applied the correct legal standard and the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm.