APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this procedurally complex case, the Defendant, Duvale Vashawn Pruitt, pled nolo contendere to multiple drug-related charges, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of ten years of probation. The Defendant’s probation officer filed two probation violation warrants, one in September and another in October of 2007. After a hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve ninety days in jail and then start his probationary sentence again. In February 2011, the Defendant’s probation officer filed a third probation violation warrant based upon the Defendant’s possession of a switchblade knife at a courthouse, and the trial court issued a warrant for the Defendant’s arrest. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his ten-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This Court affirmed the trial court’s revocation of the Defendant’s sentence on appeal. State v. Duvale  Vashawn Pruitt, No. E2011-01995-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 4762115, at *1, 6 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 8, 2012), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. On December 11, 2012, after our opinion was filed, the Defendant filed a “Motion seeking recall of the previously adjudicated probation violation warrants in which [the trial court] sentenced and ordered Petitioner on May 27, 2011, to serve the balance of his sentence, or ten years at thirty percent, in confinement.” The trial court dismissed the motion, and the Defendant filed a notice of appeal. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed his motion because the capias and detainer lodged against him for a probation violation should have been recalled because he had satisfied his sentence by serving time in federal custody. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude the Defendant has no right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion. As such, the Defendant’s appeal is dismissed.

The trial court appointed a receiver for the appellant nonprofit corporation and held its president in contempt for repeated failures to comply with the court’s previous orders. The nonprofit corporation appeals. We affirm.

The appellant, Christopher Lee Davis, was convicted of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; carjacking, a Class B felony; and attempted especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony. On direct appeal, our supreme court affirmed the appellant’s convictions but remanded for resentencing on the issue of consecutive sentencing. See State v. Davis, 354 S.W.3d 718, 721-22 (Tenn. 2011). On remand, the trial court again ordered partial consecutive sentencing, which resulted in an overall effective sentence of forty-nine years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the imposition of consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, James Harding Dalton, pleaded guilty to especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-14-404 (2010). The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to eleven years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred in sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant pled guilty to fourteen counts of aggravated burglary, Class C felonies; one count of burglary of an automobile, a Class E felony; four counts of theft of property with a value in excess of $10,000 but less than $60,000, Class C felonies; seven counts of theft of property with a value in excess of $1,000 but less than $10,000, Class D felonies; one count of theft of property with a value in excess of $500 but less than $1,000, a Class E felony; and five counts of theft of property with a value less than $500, Class A misdemeanors. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six years for each aggravated burglary, two years for the burglary of the automobile, six years for each Class C felony theft of property, four years for each Class D felony theft of property, two years for each Class E felony theft of property, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor theft of property. The trial court ordered partial consecutive sentencing, resulting in an overall effective sentence of twenty-two years. The defendant now appeals the trial court’s sentencing decision, urging that the trial court erred in its application of certain enhancement and mitigation factors. Because a trial court’s mere error in the application of statutory enhancing and mitigating factors no longer provides any basis for reversing a defendant’s sentence, and because the defendant’s sentences are generally consistent with the principles and purposes of the Sentencing Act, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a parental termination case. The child at issue was removed from the mother as a result of the mother’s drug abuse. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to support the grounds for termination of the mother’s parental rights and clear and convincing evidence that such termination was in the child’s best interest. The trial court further allowed the non-relative petitioners to adopt the child. The mother appeals. We affirm.

Appellant, Jay Earl Haynes, was indicted by the Dyer County Grand Jury in August 2009, for two counts of rape in connection with the anal rape of the two mentally-incapacitated grandsons of Appellant’s live-in girlfriend. Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because he could not have known that the victims were mentally incapacitated and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there is ample evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could find that Appellant knew of the victims’ mental incapacity and that his criminal activity was so extensive as to support the imposition of consecutive sentences. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Christopher Scott Chapman, pled guilty to aggravated assault in Davidson County in 2005. As a result, he was sentenced to four years in incarceration. The sentence was suspended, and Petitioner was ordered to probation. In 2008, Petitioner was indicted by the Sumner County Grand Jury for attempted first degree murder. After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of the lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Petitioner was sentenced to six years in incarceration to be served consecutively to the Davidson County sentence. Petitioner filed two petitions for writ of habeas corpus in August and September of 2012 in the Lake County Circuit Court challenging the Sumner County conviction. The petitions were denied because they were unverified and did not present proper grounds for habeas corpus relief. Petitioner filed two additional petitions for habeas corpus relief in Lake County, again challenging the Sumner County conviction for aggravated assault. The habeas corpus court denied the petitions, determining that the claims were not cognizable in a petition for habeas corpus relief. Petitioner appeals, arguing that the habeas corpus court improperly denied habeas corpus relief. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that the habeas corpus court properly denied habeas corpus relief where Petitioner failed to show that his judgment was void.

Michael L. McMahan (“the Petitioner”) entered a guilty plea to one count of aggravated burglary, five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and two counts of aggravated robbery. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of twenty-five years. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that his plea was constitutionally invalid and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his plea submission hearing. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Jaron Lee Goodson, entered an open plea agreement to one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of twelve years, at 100%, in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in determining the length of the sentence. Following review of the record, we affirm the sentence as imposed.

Appellant, Stephen Dewayne Baker, was indicted by the Putnam County Grand Jury in January of 2010 for one count of first degree murder, one count of felony murder, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of arson, and one count of tampering with evidence. Appellant was convicted by a jury of all offenses as charged in the indictment. At a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the first degree murder conviction with the felony murder conviction and imposed a life sentence. Appellant was also ordered to serve twelve years for the aggravated robbery conviction, six years for the arson conviction, and six years for the tampering with evidence conviction. The trial court ordered the arson and tampering with the evidence convictions to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to the life sentence and sentence for aggravated robbery, for a total effective sentence of life imprisonment plus eighteen years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant initiated this appeal. On appeal, Appellant contends: (1) the trial court erred by denying a change of venue; (2) the trial court erred by denying Appellant’s motion to suppress; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; (4) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of Appellant’s prior bad acts; (5) the trial court erred in admitting the dying declarations of the victim; (6) the trial court erred in admitting testimony of Harold Harp about Appellant’s behavior; and (7) the trial court erred in admitting a photograph of the victim’s body. After a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court: (1) did not err in denying a change of venue where there was no proof that the jury pool was tainted from exposure to information about the incident; (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress where consent for the search was valid and the search warrant was properly procured; (3) properly admitted evidence of Appellant’s drug use and past violent behavior; (4) properly admitted the dying declaration and excited utterances of the victim; (5) properly admitted the testimony of Mr. Harp; and (6) properly admitted photographs of the victim’s body. Additionally, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The pro se petitioner, Leon Barnett Collier, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the court erred in summarily dismissing the petition because the State failed to comply with the statutory requirement of attaching to its response its authority for detaining him. Because the petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Appellant, Leman E. Russell, pled guilty to one count of possession of over .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver in Dyer County in January 2006. He received a sentence of ten years with six months incarceration and nine and a half years on Community Corrections. Because of various violations and adjudications, Appellant was placed on probation on February 3, 2011. On September 27, 2011, a probation violation warrant was filed alleging that Appellant violated the terms of his probation. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve his original ten-year sentence in confinement. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. After a review of the record and authorities, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant’s probation and imposing his original sentence because there was evidence to support the conclusion of the trial court that a violation of the conditions of probation occurred. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

James Daniel Vaughn (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of one count of second degree murder and three counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions.

Visitor to a nursing home who was injured when a door swung into her brought suit against the nursing home, alleging that the door constituted a dangerous and defective condition and that the nursing home failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid injuries to visitors. The nursing home filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted on the basis that the door did not constitute a dangerous or defective condition. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

In this action for damages related to a motor vehicle collision, Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant. Plaintiff contests Defendant’s compliance with summary judgment requirements and the trial court’s consideration of extraneous evidence in reaching its decision. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises out of disciplinary proceedings against a physician before the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners. The proceedings were instituted after the New York State Board for Professional Medical Conduct disciplined the physician. The Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners revoked the physician’s medical license and the physician appealed to the chancery court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322. The chancery court reversed and vacated the order revoking the physician’s medical license. The Tennessee Department of Health and the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners appealed. For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand for reconsideration.

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on the five minor children (“the Children”) of Tineaka P. (“Mother”) and Shannon P., Sr. (“Father”). The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents on June 14, 2011. The petition alleged several grounds for termination, including severe child abuse, abandonment based on willful failure to support the Children, persistent conditions, and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. Following a bench trial, which concluded in February 2012, the trial court granted the petition as to Mother after finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had committed severe child abuse, that she had abandoned the Children due to her willful failure to pay child support, that she had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plan, and that the conditions leading to removal persisted. Father was granted an additional ninety days to attempt to improve his situation, and a hearing date was set for May 10, 2012, regarding the termination of his parental rights. At the conclusion of the bench trial on May 10, the court also terminated Father’s parental rights after finding by clear and convincing evidence that Father had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plan and that the conditions leading to removal persisted. The trial court also found that termination of both parents’ parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother and Father have appealed. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Ashad RA Muhammad Ali, appeals the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of his petition for relief. He contends that the habeas corpus court erroneously concluded that his petition failed to state a cognizable claim for relief, noting (1) that this court has held that the trial court’s failure to include pre-trial jail credits on the judgment of conviction is a proper basis for habeas corpus relief and (2) that his judgment of conviction on “count three contains a facial error [because] count three cannot be ordered to run both consecutively and concurrently to the same sentence.” Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Appellant, Joseph Beasley Seay, was indicted by the Wilson County Grand Jury for one count of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine; one count of driving on a canceled, suspended, or revoked license; and one count of driving on a canceled, suspended, or revoked license, second offense. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the cocaine discovered during the search of a pill fob on his key ring. He subsequently pled guilty to one count of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine and reserved a certified question for appeal. The remaining counts were dismissed. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Appellant was sentenced to eight years as a Range I, standard offender. After a review of the record on appeal, we have concluded that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In a prior appeal of this matter, we affirmed the trial court’s determination that a road in dispute was private rather than public. Ten months after our decision, the defendants, the Brewers, filed a Rule 60.02 motion to vacate with the trial court based upon newly discovered evidence. The trial court overruled the motion. The defendants appeal. We affirm.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s final order modifying the visitation schedule as required upon remand from a prior appeal. See In re Iyana R.W., No. E2010-00114-COAR3- JV, 2011 WL 2348458 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011). The trial court denied the father’s attempt to modify custody of the minor child and ordered the case transferred to the Davidson County Juvenile Court as the more convenient forum for any further proceedings. The father appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

This appeal involves the enrollment of a foreign judgment. The plaintiff creditor sought to enroll in Tennessee a deficiency judgment obtained in Arkansas. The defendant debtors contended that the Arkansas judgment should not be given full faith and credit in Tennessee, alleging inter alia the fraud exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the constitution. The trial court enrolled the Arkansas judgment, and the debtors appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This post-divorce appeal involves the termination of a parent’s obligation to pay support for his two college-age children. The parties were divorced in Hawaii. Under the Hawaii divorce decree, the father was obligated to pay child support for the parties’ two children until they finished their post-high school education or until they reached age 23, whichever was earlier. Subsequently, both parties and their children all moved to Tennessee. Years later, disputes arose and the parties eventually resolved them by agreement. The trial court entered an agreed order assuming jurisdiction over the matter, enrolling the Hawaii divorce decree, and adopting the parties’ agreed permanent parenting plan. The agreed parenting plan was silent on the duration of the father’s child support obligation. Later, after both children reached age 18, the father filed a motion to terminate his child support obligation, arguing that he is not obligated to support his children beyond the age of majority under Tennessee law. The trial court granted the father’s motion and terminated his child support obligation. The mother now appeals. We hold that, by consenting to the prior agreed order enrolling the Hawaii divorce decree without modification of the duration of child support, the father agreed to assume the obligation to pay child support until age 23. This agreement, incorporated into the Tennessee court’s order, is enforceable. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s termination of the father’s child support obligation.

The buyers of a house sued their real estate agent, the seller’s real estate agent, and others, alleging that the defendants concealed the fact that their home’s garage violated the neighborhood restrictive covenants. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding, as a matter of law, their garage did satisfy the requirement of the restrictive covenants, i.e., that the garage be large enough to accommodate at least two cars. Because the undisputed material facts establish that the plaintiffs’ home is in compliance, we affirm.