APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This termination of parental rights case concerns Joshua P. and Quinn W. (“the Children”), the children of G.W. (“Mother”). The Children were placed in the protective custody of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) after both parents were arrested. Later, DCS petitioned the court to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Following a bench trial, the court found that multiple grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the Children’s best interest, both findings said to be made by clear and convincing evidence. Mother appeals. We affirm.

An Anderson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jerry Orlando Weaver, of two counts of facilitation of less than one-half gram of cocaine for sale or delivery, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years for each conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively for a total effective sentence of twenty-four years. The Petitioner appealed, contending that the trial court erred when it sentenced him as a career offender and when it ordered consecutive sentences. State v. Jerry Orlando Weaver, No. E2009-01767-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2490762, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, April 28, 2010), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. This Court dismissed the appeal based upon the Petitioner’s failure to timely file his notice of appeal and because none of the Petitioner’s issues warranted consideration in the “interest of justice.” The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. As a result of the petition, the post-conviction court granted the Petitioner a delayed appeal. Accordingly, the Petitioner proceeds with his appeal to this Court. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the Petitioner’s delayed appeal lacks merit  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Demario Darnell Thompson, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony, possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, a Class E felony, possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver, a Class E felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1324, 39-17-417, and 39-17-425 (2010). The trial court merged the two convictions for possession of marijuana into a single count of possession of marijuana with the intent to sell. The court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to four years’ confinement for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, two years’ confinement for possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, and eleven months, twenty-nine days’ confinement for possession of drug paraphernalia and ordered partial consecutive sentencing for an effective six-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Michael L. Smith, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of the pro se petition for habeas corpus relief filed by Petitioner. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus trial court.

The Defendant, Dalton Lister, was convicted of first degree felony murder; two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony; and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-101, -12-103, -13-202(a)(2), -13- 402. The Defendant received an effective sentence of life with the possibility of parole. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s convictions; (2) that the trial court erred by admitting recorded statements made by the Defendant; (3) that the trial court erred by not requiring the State to produce statements made by an investigator pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.2; and (4) that the trial court erred by not allowing the Defendant to cross-examine a co-defendant regarding the co-defendant’s pending charges. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this action, a creditor brought a claim against the decedent’s estate for the value of cattle and equipment. With the personal representative for the estate filing an exception to the claim, the creditor filed an amended claim, seeking to enforce an attached handwritten contract. The trial court dismissed the amended claim as both untimely and asserting a new and different cause of action. On appeal, the creditor raises two issues: whether the trial court erred (1) by finding that the claimant was not entitled to actual notice of the probate proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 30-2-306(d) (2010) and (2) by dismissing the amended claim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 30-2-307(e)(2) (2010). Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case involves an automobile accident wherein a refrigerator being hauled by Defendants fell from a truck and collided with Plaintiffs’ vehicle. Plaintiff, Lori K. Wilhoit, was driving the vehicle and filed suit regarding her personal injuries and the property damage to her vehicle. Her husband, Jeffrey Wilhoit, also asserted claims regarding property damage to the vehicle and loss of consortium with and services of his wife. A jury trial was held in November and December 2011. As the matter of liability was stipulated, the only issues submitted to the jury related to the amount of damages, if any, suffered by Plaintiffs. The jury returned a verdict awarding Plaintiffs $3,200 for property damage and zero damages for all other claimed injuries. Plaintiffs have appealed. We affirm the jury’s verdict regarding property damage and Mr. Wilhoit’s claims, but we reverse in part the jury’s verdict regarding a portion of Ms. Wilhoit’s injuries and medical expenses. We remand this case for further proceedings regarding Ms. Wilhoit’s damages.

The defendant, Michael Smith, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a multiple offender to concurrent terms of eleven months, twenty-nine days and seven years, respectively, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this pro se appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in constructively amending the indictments in its charge to the jury; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (3) the State failed to provide sufficient notice in the indictment regarding the charge of aggravated burglary; (4) the trial court erred in failing to recuse itself prior to trial; (5) the trial court erred in failing to apply the appropriate standard to adjudicate the non-structural constitutional errors he raised in the motion for new trial; (6) he was denied a fair trial by the trial court impermissibly restricting his cross-examination of the victim; (7) he was denied a fair trial because the State did not give advanced notice that Officer Michael Garner would testify at trial; (8) the State knowingly introduced false testimony and evidence; (9) he was denied a fair trial because the trial court failed to make a determination regarding the admissibility of his prior convictions before he chose not to testify; (10) the State violated the Jencks Act by failing to provide a recording of a conversation between Kimberly Chrestman and the prosecutor; (11) he was denied a fair trial by Kimberly Chrestman’s testifying about his prior bad acts; (12) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument; (13) the trial court failed to give appropriate jury instructions; (14) the trial court erred in its sentencing determination; and (15) the trial court erred in revoking his bond. After review, we conclude that the trial court erred in constructively amending the indictment in its charge to the jury and that the defendant’s convictions must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. In the event of further appellate review, we have assessed the defendant’s remaining issues and discern no additional error.

In May 2010, the Defendant, Richie P. Hawkins, pled guilty to promotion of the manufacture of methamphetamine, and the trial court sentenced him, as a Range III offender, to serve twelve years on community corrections. The Defendant’s community corrections officer filed an affidavit, alleging that he had violated his community corrections sentence by being convicted of burglarizing an automobile and domestic assault. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s community corrections sentence and ordered the Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement rather than reinstating his community corrections sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Sullivan County jury found the Defendant, Michael David Fields, guilty of reckless homicide, felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated burglary. The trial court merged the reckless homicide conviction with the felony murder conviction and imposed a mandatory life sentence for felony murder. The Defendant appeals, claiming he was denied his right to a speedy trial. After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we conclude that the trial court properly found there was no violation of the Defendant’s right to a speedy trial. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A Davidson County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Trinidad Martinez Flores, and six co-defendants. In Count One, Defendant and all co-defendants were charged with conspiracy to sell more than three hundred pounds of marijuana in a school zone. In Count Two, he and two co-defendants were charged with conspiracy to commit money laundering. In Count Five, Defendant and four co-defendants were charged with possession with intent to deliver three hundred pounds or more of marijuana in a school zone. In Counts Six through Sixteen, Defendant and one co-defendant were charged with money laundering. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of the offenses. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty years for conspiracy to sell three hundred pounds of marijuana in Count One; eight years for conspiracy to commit money laundering in Count Two; twenty years for possession with intent to deliver three hundred pound of marijuana in Count Five; and eight years for each count of using proceeds from the sale of marijuana to conduct financial transactions with the intent to promote the sale of marijuana in Counts Six through Sixteen. The sentence in Count Two was ordered to be served consecutively to the sentence in Count One; the sentence in Count Five was ordered to be served consecutively to the sentence in Count Two; the sentence in Count Six was ordered to be served consecutively to the sentence in Count Five; and the sentences in Counts Seven through Sixteen were ordered to be served concurrently with the sentence in Count Six for an effective fifty-six-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for possession of marijuana, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and money laundering; (2) the trial judge committed plain error by failing to recuse himself; and (3) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Anton Carlton, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 2005 Rutherford County Circuit Court conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping for which he received a 25-year Department of Correction sentence. Upon our review, we affirm the order of the Hardeman County Circuit Court.

The defendant, Ronnie Paul Trusty, appeals his Tipton County Circuit Court jury conviction of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. We affirm the conviction and sentence. In addition, we remand for correction of clerical errors in the judgments.

The Defendant-Appellant, Paresh J. Patel, entered guilty pleas to two counts of distributing a synthetic cannabinoid, Class A misdemeanors, for which he received consecutive terms of eleven months and twenty-nine days on supervised probation. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred in denying him judicial diversion. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur in the results reached in Judge McMullen’s opinion, but I respectfully depart from the conclusion that State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2012), and State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273 (Tenn. 2012), changed the methodology for reviewing judicial diversion determinations.

The defendant, Derrick Lamar Cole, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s ordering that his sentences be served consecutively, rather than concurrently, upon the revocation of his probation, a position with which the State concurs. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court erred; therefore, we reverse the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences and remand for entry of an order that the sentences be served concurrently.

This appeal concerns whether certain exclusions in a coverage document are permissible. Dennis Michael Harris (“Harris”), then a patrolman with the Anderson County Sheriff’s Department, was injured when he was struck by a vehicle driven by Mickey Deanne Haynes (“Haynes”). Harris and his wife, Judy A. Harris, (collectively, “the Plaintiffs”) sued Haynes and the alleged owner of the vehicle, Richard H. Furrow, in the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”). The Plaintiffs also raised claims against Anderson County’s motor vehicle liability coverage provider, Tennessee Risk Management Trust (“TRMT”), for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage. TRMT filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that under the relevant coverage document (“the Coverage Document”), Harris was excluded from uninsured coverage as he was an employee of Anderson County who had received workers compensation. The Trial Court granted TRMT’s motion. The Plaintiffs appeal. We hold that Anderson County was self-insured through TRMT, and, therefore, the uninsured/underinsured motorist statutes do not apply. The Coverage Document excluded employees such as Harris from uninsured coverage. We affirm.

Petitioner, Guadalupe Arroyo, pleaded guilty to two counts of vehicular homicide and received an effective sentence of twenty-four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He appealed his sentence twice, and this court remanded his case to the trial court both times. See State v. Guadalupe Arroyo, No. E2002- 0639-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 1563209, at *1(Tenn. Crim. App. March 27, 2003); State v. Guadalupe Arroyo, No. E2003-02355-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1924033, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 30, 2004). After the second remand, the trial court again sentenced petitioner to twenty-four years. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that he was unconstitutionally denied the right to appeal the trial court’s last sentencing order. The post- onviction court dismissed the petition twice, and petitioner successfully appealed both times. See Guadalupe Arroyo v. State, No. E2006-01037- CA-R3-PC, 2007 WL 3144999, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 29, 2007); Guadalupe Arroyo v. State, No. E2008-01220-CCA-R3-PC, 2009 WL 2503152, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 2009). Eventually, the post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing and denied post-conviction relief. Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and requesting a delayed appeal. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post- conviction court.

I concur with the majority opinion’s conclusion that the trial court did not err by denying judicial diversion because it properly considered and weighed all the appropriate factors. See State v. Electroplating, Inc., 990 S.W.2d 211, 229 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998); State v. Parker, 932 S.W.2d 945, 958 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). I respectfully disagree, though, with the conclusion that the standard of review announced in State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2012), and State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273 (Tenn. 2012), is applicable to judicial diversion.

This appeal involves various financial issues related to a divorce. The trial court: (1) calculated both parents’ incomes for purposes of child support; (2) required Father to pay a portion of the children’s private school tuition; (3) entered a permanent parenting plan giving Mother final authority over major decisions regarding the children; (4) divided the marital property; (5) denied Father’s request for transitional alimony; (6) awarded Father alimony in solido; and (7) denied both parties’ requests for attorneys fees. We: (1) reverse the trial court’s determination that Father is willfully and voluntarily underemployed; (2) vacate the trial court’s calculation of Mother’s income; (3) vacate the trial court’s ruling requiring Father to pay a portion of the children’s private school tuition; and (4) remand for appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm as to the remainder of the issues presented. Vacated in part, reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

In this case arising out of a car accident, the defendant challenges the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs on several bases, including comments and arguments of plaintiffs’ counsel and the evidence regarding loss of earning capacity. We find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court in accordance with the jury’s verdict.

The employee, a truck driver for McMinn County, suffered injuries in a job-related accident. Later, he filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits claiming that he had been permanently and totally disabled as a result of his injuries. The employer acknowledged that the employee’s shoulder and leg injuries were compensable but argued that his spinal injuries were not work related. Because a physician who performed two spinal surgeries on the employee was not listed on the employer’s panel of medical providers, the employer denied responsibility for the associated medical costs. While ordering that all of the employee’s injuries were compensable and granting permanent total disability benefits, the trial court did not require the employer to pay the medical costs incident to the second surgery. In this appeal, the employer maintains that the trial court erred by holding that the employee was entitled to recover either benefits or the cost of medical treatment for his spinal injuries. In response, the employee argues that the trial court erred by failing to award payment of the medical costs incident to the second surgery. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of facts and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. The judgment is affirmed, but modified to require the employer to pay the medical costs incident to the second surgery. The cause is remanded for an assessment of the medical expenses related to the second surgery.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the denial of a motion to recuse the Trial Court Judge from presiding over post-divorce contempt proceedings initiated by Susan W. Phillips (“Former Wife”) against Samuel B. Phillips (“Former Husband”). Having reviewed Former Husband’s Petition for Recusal Appeal pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court, and upon consideration of Former Wife’s motion to dismiss the appeal, we deny Former Wife’s motion to dismiss this appeal and affirm the Trial Court’s denial of Former Husband’s motion to recuse.

This appeal involves disestablishment of paternity. The putative father allegedly signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity and the child’s birth certificate when the child at issue was born. The mother did not tell him at the time that she had had sexual relations with another man during the time period in which the child was conceived. The State of Tennessee, on behalf of the mother, obtained an order against the putative father, establishing parentage and setting child support. After a private DNA test showed that the putative father was not the biological father of the child, he filed a petition in juvenile court to disestablish paternity and set aside under Tenn. R. Civ P. 60. The juvenile court denied the petition, holding that the putative father did not offer proof of fraud in the procurement of his signature on the alleged voluntary acknowledgment of paternity. The putative father now appeals. On appeal, we find no voluntary acknowledgment of paternity in the record, and no evidence regarding the alleged voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, and so cannot consider it in the appeal. We reverse the trial court’s denial of the putative father’s petition to set aside the order establishing parentage and child support under Rule 60.02, and remand for further proceedings.

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Linda J.M.A. (“Mother”) to the minor child Alicia K.A. (“the Child”) . After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered its Termination of Parental Rights and Final Decree of Guardianship finding and holding, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence had been proven that grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), (g)(3), and (g)(8), and that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to this Court. We affirm.