APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I join Judge Page’s opinion in full. I write separately solely to express my conclusion that trial counsel cannot be found to render ineffective assistance of counsel when the record of the post-conviction proceedings reflects that trial counsel would not have had the time and/or the resources to provide the investigation performed by post-conviction counsel after the trial.

The appellant, William Carter King, appeals the Fentress County Criminal Court’s revoking the alternative sentences he received for guilty pleas to possession of a controlled substance in a penal institution, a Class C felony; burglary, a Class D felony; and theft of property valued more than five hundred dollars but less than one thousand dollars, a Class E felony. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Property owners sued utility district for damages and an injunction as a result of the excessive use of an easement across the property owners’ land by the district’s assignees. The utility district denied any wrongdoing and moved the trial court to dismiss the complaint. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failing to state a cause of action for which relief can be granted. The property owners appealed. We conclude the trial court erred in dismissing the property owners’ complaint because the property owners have stated a cause of action for which relief can be granted. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.
 

This case involves a dispute between the administrators of the estate of a man who died intestate and the decedent’s’s former wife over the legal ownership of funds that were held in jointly titled accounts at two banking institutions. After the man’s death, his former wife withdrew almost all the funds from the accounts. The administrators asked for a declaratory judgment that the funds belonged to the estate on the basis that the husband and wife had entered into a Marital Dissolution Agreement (MDA) before their divorce which designated those funds as belonging solely to the husband. However, the husband never changed the titles on those accounts, and the ex-wife insisted that the unaltered designation of joint ownership conclusively established her right to the funds after her ex-husband’s death. After a hearing, the trial court ruled that the bank accounts were the sole property of the estate, and the former wife was obligated to return the funds. The trial court reasoned that because the MDA was approved by the court and was binding on the parties, it amounted to an amendment to the contract that the parties had created when the accounts were established. We affirm.

The Defendant, Jonathan Kyle Hulse, w as found guilty by a Washington County Criminal Court jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; and unauthorized use of a vehicle, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13- 502 (2010) (aggravated rape), 39-13-305 (2010) (especially aggravated kidnapping), 39-14-106 (2010) (unauthorized use of a vehicle). He was sentenced as a violent offender to twenty-nine years for each of the Class A felonies and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor. The trial court ordered that the felony convictions be served consecutively, for an effective fifty-eight-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, (2) his dual convictions for aggravated rape and especially aggravated kidnapping violate due process principles, and (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the deceased victim’s statements about the crimes as excited utterances. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Appellant, Larry Lee Robertson, pled guilty to selling oxycodone in Sumner County in October of 2010. He received a sentence of six years on probation. In May of 2012, a probation violation warrant was filed alleging that Appellant violated the terms of his probation by using intoxicants to excess and pleading guilty to a public intoxication charge. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. After a review of the record and authorities, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant’s probation as there was evidence to support the conclusion of the trial court that a violation of the conditions of probation occurred. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, John Doe, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to challenge his guilty-pleaded, 1995 attempted aggravated sexual battery conviction arising in that same court. Specifically, the petitioner, whose three-year sentence was suspended, challenged his conviction based upon sanctions imposed upon him by 2004 and 2007 changes to the sexual offender registration law. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appeals. We affirm the order of the habeas corpus court.

This appeal involves a dispute over an attorney’s fee involving two law firms and their client. The parties originally entered into a contract whereby both law firms would jointly represent the client as a plaintiff in a personal injury suit. Two years later, the client discharged one of the law firms. The other firm continued to represent the client, and when the case settled over a year later, the remaining firm retained the entire contingency fee. The discharged firm sued the client and the other firm, alleging that it was entitled to a share of the contingency fee and asserting numerous causes of  action. The defendants claimed that the discharged firm was limited to quantum meruit. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The plaintiff law firm appeals. We affirm.

The South Cordova Area was annexed in November 2001. In December 2001, Plaintiffs timely filed a complaint challenging the South Cordova Area annexation. In 2011, however, the complaint was dismissed “without prejudice” for failure to prosecute. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a second complaint challenging annexation, but the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. We affirm.

The employee alleged that his pre-existing heart failure was permanently worsened by an accidental inhalation of cement dust on the job. The workers’ compensation insurer for the employer asserted that the worsening of the heart failure was a natural progression of the condition and that the inhalation event had no permanent effect on the employee. Cardiologists testified in support of each side’s theory. The trial court found for the employee and awarded permanent total disability benefits. The insurer has appealed that decision. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On October 5, 2005, a Davidson County jury convicted petitioner of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and theft over $500 but less than $1,000. The trial court sentenced him to an effective term of seventeen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This court affirmed his convictions and sentences on direct appeal. State v. Robert Lamont Moss, Jr., No. M2006-00890-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 4245082, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 4, 2007), perm. app. denied (Tenn. April 7, 2008). Subsequently, petitioner filed petitions for post-conviction relief and writ of error coram nobis. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the post-conviction petition on the merits and the coram nobis petition as time-barred. On appeal, petitioner argues that (1) trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance; (2) his right to due process was denied by the trial court’s denial of funds for the defense to hire experts in eyewitness reliability and shoe print identification; and (3) he is entitled to a writ of error coram nobis. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Christopher Burress, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for his two convictions for facilitation of aggravated robbery and ordering him to serve his effective six-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a search of his person, (2) finding that he violated his probation by resisting arrest, (3) revoking his probation, and (4) ordering him to serve the sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a dispute involving custody of a child. David D. Clark, Jr. (“Father”) and Ashlyn Cooper (“Mother”) voluntarily gave custody of their minor child (“the Child”) to the Child’s paternal grandparents. Mother later sought to alter custody of the Child through the Juvenile Court for Jefferson County (“the Juvenile Court”). The Juvenile Court denied Mother’s motions. Mother filed a motion for a new hearing, which also was denied. The Juvenile Court, when denying Mother’s motion for a new hearing, described the matter as a dependency case despite earlier classifying it as a custody case. Mother appealed to the Circuit Court for Jefferson County (“the Trial Court”), which denied Mother’s appeal. The Trial Court held that the action was, in fact, a custody matter, and therefore, Mother’s appeal from Juvenile Court, if any, should have been to the Tennessee Court of Appeals. Mother appeals. We hold that, while the Trial Court correctly held that this was a custody matter and that it therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Mother’s appeal, it should have transferred her appeal to this Court rather than simply deny the appeal.

The Defendant, Kristin M. Myers, was convicted by a Loudon County jury of first degree premeditated murder and received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress her statements made to authorities because she did not execute a knowing, voluntary wavier of her Miranda rights. The Defendant also contends that the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to support her conviction. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress her statements and that the evidence produced at trial is sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Billy Ray Irick, filed a motion to reopen his error coram nobis proceedings or, in the alternative, a second petition for writ of error coram nobis. In his pleading, he reasserted the grounds underlying his first petition for the writ and added claims of judicial misconduct pertaining to the judge in his first coram nobis proceedings. The coram nobis court in the instant case denied relief, and this appeal follows. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Juvenile Court of Putnam County terminated the parental rights of both parents to their
three children on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans and
persistence of conditions, and upon the determination that termination of both parents’ rights
was in the best interests of their children. Both parents appeal. Finding the evidence clear and
convincing, we affirm.

Certiorari proceeding in which an inmate sought review of disciplinary board proceeding finding him guilty of possession/use of a cell phone. The trial court granted motion to dismiss the proceeding on the ground that it sought to challenge the correctness of the disciplinary board’s decision. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
 

Daniel Humphrey ("the Defendant") pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary and, pursuant to his plea agreement, was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to three years on community corrections. Upon the subsequent filing of a violation warrant, the Defendant was taken into custody, and the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s community corrections sentence and ordered him to serve the remainder of his original sentence in confinement. The Defendant appealed the trial court’s ruling. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant was found guilty after a trial by jury of aggravated arson, a Class A felony, aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, theft of property over $1000.00, a Class D felony. He was sentenced to twenty years for aggravated arson, six years for aggravated burglary, and four years for theft over $1,000.00, with all sentences to run concurrently, for a total effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that one of the State’s witnesses was an accomplice as a matter of law. Upon review, we determine that the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions and that the trial court properly instructed the jury with respect to the legal status of the State’s witness. The judgments from the trial court are affirmed.

The Petitioner, Gary K. Thomas, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief attacking his January 2005 conviction for simple assault. The Petitioner’s August 2012 petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his plea was not voluntary, was dismissed as untimely. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file an appeal after he requested such action. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The plaintiff, an employee of a real estate and auction company, sustained serious injuries while assisting the managing broker of the company to move cattle panels on the managing broker’s personal farm.The plaintiff filed a claim for workers’compensation benefits against the real estate and auction company and its insurer. The plaintiff also filed a common law tort action against the managing broker and the broker’s son, who was called to assist after the injury occurred. The workers’ compensation action was settled. Pursuant to the court approved settlement agreement, the employee released and discharged the real estate and auction company and its insurer, as well as their subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, employees, agents and representatives “from any and all further liability and indemnity, under the terms and provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law of the State of Tennessee, at common law or otherwise . . . .” After the workers’ compensation action was settled, the managing broker and his son filed a joint motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff’s tort claims on the grounds they were afforded immunity under the Workers’ Compensation Law, specifically Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-108(a), and that the plaintiff gave the defendants a full release in the workers’ compensation settlement agreement. The trial court summarily dismissed all claims against the defendants on both the statutory ground and the release. We affirm the dismissal of the tort claims against the employer’s managing broker. However, we reverse the dismissal of the claims against the managing broker’s son because the son was not an affiliate,officer,director,employee,agent or representative of the employer when the plaintiff sustained his injuries and he does not come within the terms of the release. Therefore, the plaintiff’s claims against the son are reinstated and remanded for further proceedings.

In this action to terminate the parental rights of both parents to their three minor children, the trial court found that the petitioners, the paternal grandmother and her husband, had proven the grounds of persistence of conditions, abandonment for failure to visit, and abandonment for failure to support the children, and that termination of both parents’ rights was in the children’s best interests. Mother appealed the termination of her parental rights; Father did not. Finding no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Sue Ann Christopher, was convicted by a Hancock County Criminal Court jury of first offense driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor, DUI accompanied by a child under the age of eighteen, a Class A misdemeanor, unlawful possession of prescription drugs, a Class C misdemeanor, and violating the implied consent law. See T.C.A. §§ 55-10-401, 53-10-105, 55-10-406(3) (2012). The trial court merged the DUI conviction with the DUI accompanied by a child under the age of eighteen conviction. The court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with 120 days to be served in confinement for the DUI conviction and thirty days’ confinement for the drug-related conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that her sentence for the DUI accompanied by a child conviction is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Williamson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Timothy W. Sparrow, of two counts of second degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. After merging the second degree murder convictions, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by failing to suppress a suggestive pretrial identification of the appellant as the perpetrator; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions; (3) whether the trial court erred by not upholding the appellant’s Batson challenge after the State peremptorily challenged a black juror; (4) whether the trial court erred by admitting a statement made by a State’s witness; (5) whether the trial court erred by admitting a photograph of the murder victim that was taken while he was alive; (6) whether the trial court erred by admitting a black t-shirt that was alleged to belong to the appellant; (7) whether the trial court erred in its communications with jurors; (8) whether the trial court erred in sentencing; and (9) whether the principles of double jeopardy were violated. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case has been remanded by the Tennessee Supreme Court for reconsideration of sentencing in light of State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273 (Tenn. 2012). On direct appeal, this court concluded that the Defendant waived review of his sentence by failing to include a transcript of the guilty plea hearing. In light of Caudle, we conclude that the record, which contains transcripts of the motion to suppress hearing and the sentencing hearing, exhibits from each hearing, and the presentence report, is sufficient to determine whether the trial court recited a proper basis for the sentence. 388 S.W.3d 273. The Defendant, Brett Joseph Price, pleaded guilty to robbery, a Class C felony, and conspiracy to commit robbery, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-401, 39-12-103 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to five years for robbery and to three years for conspiracy, to be served concurrently. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to suppress his post-arrest statements and by admitting his statement at the sentencing hearing; (2) denying judicial diversion; (3) imposing excessive sentences; and (4) denying probation. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.