APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

James Richardson Reece, the defendant, was arrested for an aggravated assault which occurred in a workshop underneath his apartment. Immediately after his arrest, the defendant began to challenge the actions of the Sumner County court system, filing numerous documents with this Court and the Tennessee Supreme Court and suing various persons and entities in federal court. The lower courts appointed four separate attorneys to represent the defendant, but each moved to withdraw. At the defendant’s urging, the trial court allowed the defendant to waive his right to counsel. When the defendant subsequently requested counsel on the eve of trial, the trial court refused to appoint an attorney. A jury convicted the defendant of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. On appeal, the defendant asserts he was denied the right to counsel and challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Although the evidence supported the conviction, we conclude that the defendant did not waive or forfeit his right to counsel and reverse and remand for a new trial.

Jereco Tynes (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of one count of first degree felony murder; one count of attempted aggravated robbery; one count of aggravated robbery; and one count of theft of property between $10,000 and $60,000. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment for the murder and, after a hearing, to a consecutive term of five years for the attempted aggravated robbery; a consecutive term of eight years for the aggravated robbery; and a concurrent term of four years for the theft, for an effective sentence of life plus thirteen years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) admitting into evidence proof that the Defendant had been in a homosexual relationship; (2) prohibiting defense counsel from cross-examining two co-defendants about their sentence exposure; (3) instructing the jury that evidence of a confession had been admitted; (4) failing to instruct the jury as to certain lesser-included offenses; and (5) imposing consecutive sentences. The Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to all of his convictions. We have determined that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense of theft of property over $10,000. Accordingly, we must reverse the Defendant’s conviction of theft over $10,000 and remand that charge for a new trial. As to the Defendant’s remaining issues, we find no reversible error. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgments are otherwise affirmed.

Petitioner, Marcus Norwood, entered an Alford plea to second degree murder in Shelby County in October of 2010, with an agreed sentence of twenty-five years. Subsequently, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel which adversely affected his decision to enter a guilty plea. The post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appealed. After a review of the evidence, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to establish that counsel’s performance was deficient or that the voluntariness of the guilty plea was affected by the actions of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Michael Love, of aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm with intent to commit a felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-four1 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to suppress a photographic lineup of the Defendant, which he asserts was unnecessarily suggestive; and (2) the trial court erred when it enhanced the Defendant’s sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and sentence. Having noticed, however, that there are clerical errors in the judgments of conviction for the aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm with intent to commit a felony convictions, we remand this case to the trial court for entry of corrected judgments.

Defendant, Christopher Scott Chapman, was indicted by the Sumner County Grand Jury for attempted first degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, charged to the jury as a lesser included offense of attempted first degree murder, and the second count of the indictment was dismissed by the trial court. Defendant was sentenced by the trial court to serve six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence and asserts: 1) that the trial court erred by instructing the jury as to the offense of aggravated assault as a lesser included offense of attempted first degree murder; 2) that the trial court erred by not recusing itself; 3) that the trial court erred by sentencing Defendant to the maximum sentence within the range; and 4) that the trial court erred by ordering Defendant’s sentence to run consecutively to a prior sentence for aggravated assault for which Defendant was on probation at the time he committed the offense in this case. After a careful review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Rashii Brisbon, was charged with aggravated child abuse and first degree (felony) murder after the death of a toddler in his care. A jury convicted him of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony, but was unable to reach a verdict on the felony murder charge. The trial court sentenced the defendant to serve twenty years in prison. The defendant appeals, asserting that the State did not present evidence sufficient to support the verdict, particularly the mens rea element, and that the trial court relied on inapplicable enhancement factors during sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The employee, a surgical technician, worked full-time for the employer at a hospital. In addition to her regular hours, the employee worked on-call shifts on a rotating basis subject to specific rules and restrictions. During an on-call shift, the employee was required to return to the hospital during the early morning hours for emergency surgery. After leaving the hospital to drive home but while still subject to call, the employee was seriously injured in an automobile accident. The employee filed suit for workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court denied recovery, and the employee appealed. In accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because the evidence establishes that the employee falls within an exception to the “coming and going rule,” the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for an award of benefits.

The Defendant, Brandon Lee Laferty, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s revoking his probation for solicitation of aggravated sexual battery, a Class D felony, and ordering his ten-year sentence into execution. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In a prior appeal in this case, we reversed the termination of Father’s parental rights and remanded to the trial court for a new hearing on Mother and Stepfather’s amended petition. Following the hearing on remand, the trial court declined to terminate Father’s parental rights, finding that Mother and Stepfather had not proven either proffered ground for abandonment by clear and convincing evidence. Mother and Stepfather appealed. In a divided opinion, a majority of the Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence clearly and convincingly established abandonment by both willful failure to visit and willful failure to support. We hold that Mother and Stepfather established by clear and convincing evidence abandonment by willful failure to visit but failed to establish willful failure to support. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Because Mother and Stepfather have demonstrated one ground for termination of Father’s parental rights, we remand the case to the trial court to consider whether termination is in the best interests of the children.
 

Appellant, Adrian Chaney, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury in September of 2009 for one count of aggravated robbery and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the offenses as charged in the indictment. The trial court sentenced Appellant as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years for the conviction for aggravated robbery, and as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years for attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty-two years. Appellant did not file a motion for new trial. On appeal, he contends: (1) that the evidence was insufficient; (2) the trial court made several errors with regard to the admission of evidence; and (3) that his sentence is illegal and excessive. After a review of the record, we determine that Appellant waived the consideration of any issues with exception of sufficiency of the evidence and sentencing by failing to file a motion for new trial or show plain error on the part of the trial court. Additionally, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to establish Appellant’s identity as the perpetrator of the crimes and Appellant failed to provide this Court with an adequate record to review the trial court’s determination of his status as a Range II, Multiple Offender with regard to the conviction in Count II. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Petitioner, Adrain Keith Washington, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to serve twelve years in prison. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied. On appeal, he claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to argue the "rule of cancellation" and by failing to object to certain prejudicial testimony. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Donald Mickens, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. Petitioner was convicted of multiple drug offenses. As a result of the convictions, Petitioner was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-five years. The convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal. See State v. Donald Mickens, No. W2009-00586-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2697164 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jul. 8, 2010). Petitioner sought pro se post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel was appointed and an amended petition was filed. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner initiated this appeal. After a review, we determine the evidence does not preponderate against the judgment of the post-conviction court. Petitioner failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that the performance of counsel was prejudicial. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

This appeal involves the termination of parental rights and adoption. In August 2007, the Department of Children’s Services visited the home of the respondent mother and her 11month-old son based on a referral. After it determined that the mother’s husband had engaged in domestic abuse and that the mother was using illegal drugs, the Department told the mother that her son would be taken into state custody if she did not immediately find someone to care for him. The mother’s neighbor, the petitioner in this case, agreed to take temporary custody of the mother’s son. Even though the child was not actually taken into state custody, but was “safety-placed” with the petitioner neighbor, the Department developed a Family Services Plan, assigning certain tasks to the mother for her to regain custody of her son. After about ten months, before the mother had completed the assigned tasks, the Department closed the mother’s case and ceased any involvement with the child or the mother. The child remained in the custody of the petitioner neighbor and her husband, and the mother visited the child each week. The mother brought the child items such as diapers, milk, and food, but made no monetary payments to the neighbor. When the child was three years old, the petitioner and her husband filed this petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights and adopt the child. After a trial, the trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights based on failure to comply with the FamilyServices Plan and failure to support. The mother now appeals. We reverse the termination of the mother’s parental rights.
 

Byron Becton (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of six counts of aggravated rape. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged each alternative count, entering three judgments of conviction for aggravated rape by use of force or coercion while armed with a weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim reasonably to believe it to be a weapon. The trial court also imposed an effective sentence of sixty-five years. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions and that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The State appeals the post-conviction court’s grant of relief to the Petitioner, Kenneth Bartley, contending that (1) the court erred in admitting the affidavit of Dr. James Murray; (2) the Petitioner failed to establish that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance; and (3) the Petitioner is entitled to no relief on his previously determined claim that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Ronald McKnight, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated burglary. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted as charged and sentenced to fifteen years as a career offender. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

Petitioner, Duane M. Coleman, was convicted by a Davidson County Jury of second degree murder. He was sentenced to thirty-two years as a Range II, multiple offender. State v. Duane Coleman, No. M1998-00663-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 31858, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jan. 18, 2000). He unsuccessfully appealed his conviction. Id. at *14. Petitioner also unsuccessfully filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Duane Coleman v. State, No. M2008-02180-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2890676, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jul. 23, 2010). Petitioner subsequently filed a "Motion for Relief From Judgement" based upon Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, on March 5, 2012. In this motion, Petitioner argued that his constitutional rights were violated by the imposition of enhancement factors and the imposition of 100% release eligibility without being found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. His argument was based upon the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). The habeas corpus court determined that the motion under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure was uncognizable and treated the motion as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court then summarily dismissed the petition. We have reviewed the record on appeal. We agree with the habeas corpus court’s determination that the motion should be treated as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Additionally, we conclude that prior case law has determined that a Blakely violation does not apply retroactively and renders a judgment voidable instead of void. See Timothy R. Bowles v. State, No. M2006-01685-CCA-R3-HC, 2007 WL 1266594, at *2-3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 1, 2007) Therefore, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

In June 2003, John E. Allen, Jr. ("the Petitioner") pleaded nolo contendere to one count of criminal attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery and received a six-year sentence. More than eight years later, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The State sought dismissal on statute of limitations grounds. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the Petitioner’s claim for relief, and this appeal followed. The Petitioner’s sole argument on appeal is that our supreme court’s decision in Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461 (Tenn. 2010), should be applied retroactively. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Christopher Scott Mayberry, was indicted by the Humphreys County Grand Jury in June of 2010 for two counts of possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell and one count of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine. After a bench trial, Appellant was found guilty of two counts of the sale of methamphetamine. The trial court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to the sale of cocaine. After a sentencing hearing, Appellant was sentenced to ten years for each conviction, to be served concurrently. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. After a review of the record and authorities, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions for the sale of methamphetamine. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The trial court dismissed this case on the ground that the plaintiff credit card company failed to timely respond to discovery requests. We reverse, concluding that the trial court erred in dismissing the case without sufficient evidence of contumacious conduct on behalf of the plaintiff.

After a 2006 divorce, both parties petitioned the trial court in 2009 for a modification of the parenting plan and to hold the other parent in contempt. The trial court slightly modified the parent visitation schedule and held the father in contempt for violating the parenting plan’s provisions on spring break and medical expense reimbursement. On appeal the father asserts that the trial court erred in the contempt rulings, in not giving him primary custody or substantially equal parenting time and in not holding the mother in contempt. We reverse the father’s contempt for his actions during spring break. In all other respects we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Joseph R. Bledsoe, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s order declaring him a Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender, claiming that the convictions used to support the designation were not valid. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Robert L. Conley, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his 2006 convictions for sale of less than one-half gram of cocaine, possession with the intent to sell or deliver one-half gram of cocaine, and possession with the intent to use drug paraphernalia and his effective fourteen-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by finding that his petition was barred by the statute of limitations and by dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Frances Kaylanicole Grech, pled guilty to one count of facilitation of aggravated robbery and one count of robbery. As a result of these convictions she was sentenced to ten years and ordered to serve 180 days with the remainder to be served on probation. Appellant was charged with assault while in jail and felony escape shortly after her release. A probation violation warrant was filed based on the two charges. She subsequently pled guilty to assault and an amended charge of resisting arrest. The trial court held a probation revocation hearing and at the conclusion determined that she had violated the rules of her probation and imposed her original sentence. On appeal, she argues that the trial court did not use conscientious judgment. We conclude that Appellant clearly violated the rules of her probation and we find no abuse of discretion. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Appellant, Zacheriah Holden, was indicted by the Warren County Grand Jury for over thirty offenses as a result of a drunk driving accident in which two people were killed. He pled guilty to several offenses before trial and was found guilty of the remaining charges. After the proper merger of offenses, Appellant’s convictions were two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide, one count of reckless endangerment, driving on a revoked license, evading arrest, resisting arrest, leaving the scene of the accident, five counts of failure to render aid, failure to obey a traffic device and violation of the financial responsibility law. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of thirty years and eight months. Appellant appeals his convictions and his sentences. Appellant raises several issues on appeal. He argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his request for change of venue; (2) the trial court erred in denying his request for sequestration of the jury; (3) the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s various motions to suppress his statements to law enforcement and his seizure in a car; (4)the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude the testimony of the State’s accident reconstructionist as an expert witness; (5) the trial court erred in allowing the State to present a photograph of the victims’ car; (6) the trial court erred in failing to sever DUI, fourth offense from aggravated vehicular homicide; (7) the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Travis Battles who was going to testify to updates to the traffic light since the accident; (8) the State did not sufficiently prove the chain of custody of Appellant’s blood sample submitted for blood alcohol testing; (9) the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions; (10) the sentencing scheme for aggravated vehicular homicide is unconstitutional; (11) the trial court erred in imposing the length of his sentences, as well as imposing consecutive sentences; and (12) the trial court erred in its evidentiary rulings on various pieces of evidence. We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that the issues raised do not warrant reversal of the judgments below. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.