APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Shundell Lynn Dickerson, appealed the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief, and this court affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction court. Shundell Lynn Dickerson v. State of Tennessee, No. M2011-00644-CCA-R3-PC, 2012 WL 2564376 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, filed July 3, 2012). In that opinion, Petitioner raised the issue of whether his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence on direct appeal. We acknowledged that pursuant to our supreme court’s decision in State v. Parker, 350 S.W.3d 883 (Tenn. 2011), appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence must be undertaken with respect to the offense for which a defendant was convicted rather than the greater offense with which he or she was charged. We were precluded, however, from fully considering the issue because the summary of the facts contained in our opinion in the direct appeal was not adequate to allow for review of the issue, and, through no fault of Petitioner, the appellate record in the direct appeal was destroyed in the historic Nashville flood in May, 2010. Therefore, this court could not determine from the record whether Petitioner suffered prejudice by appellate counsel’s deficient performance in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence on appeal. Since the filing of that opinion, this court has granted Petitioner’s petition to rehear the issue of the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, and Petitioner has supplemented the record with copies of the trial transcript. Both parties have filed supplemental briefs. After a review of the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant pled guilty to eleven counts of observation without consent, Class A misdemeanors, two counts of stalking, Class A misdemeanors, one count of phone harassment, a Class A misdemeanor, one count of theft of property worth less than $500, a Class A misdemeanor, and ten counts of criminal trespass, Class C misdemeanors. The defendant was sentenced to the maximum sentence on all counts—eleven months and twenty-nine days on each of the Class A misdemeanors and thirty days on each of the Class C misdemeanors. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve all sentences consecutively, for a total effective sentence of almost sixteen years. In addition, the trial court placed a special condition on each judgment that "further ordered that the defendant shall not receive good time credit or work release" on any of his sentences. On appeal, the defendant claims the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences and ordering that he not receive "good time" credit. After careful review of the record, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering the defendant to serve all of his sentences consecutively. However, the trial court was without authority to order the denial of the defendant’s statutory "good time" credit. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgments with respect to the special condition directing that the defendant be denied "good time" credit and remand the case for entry of judgments deleting this special condition. We otherwise affirm the judgments.

The Petitioner, Christopher Turner, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his 2008 conviction for attempted aggravated robbery and his effective nine-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that counsel provided the ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to investigate and interview witnesses adequately and by failing to request that his case be severed from his codefendant’s case. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Post-conviction petitioner, Demario Johnson, challenges his 2008 conviction of first degree murder and resulting sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, he alleges the following claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) failure to investigate and present evidence of his mental health history; and (2) failure to challenge the medical examiner’s opinion regarding the victim’s cause of death. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Wesley Jones, appeals his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. On appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court abused its discretion in allowing a witness to be recalled to testify, and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is a dependency and neglect case focusing on Jaycee W. (“the Child”), the minor daughter of Ellie H. (“Mother”) and Jerry W. (“Father”). At age five weeks, the Child suffered a suspicious broken leg. Further examination revealed multiple other broken bones. The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) immediately took the Child into protective custody and filed a dependency and neglect petition alleging that the Child was severely abused in the custody of her parents. Following an adjudicatory hearing, the juvenile court found that the Child was dependent and neglected and that both parents had committed severe child abuse. Both appealed to the trial court. Following a trial de novo, the trial court made the same findings. Mother appeals the trial court’s finding that she is guilty of severe child abuse. We affirm.

The mother of the minor child at issue appeals the termination of her parental rights. The juvenile court found several grounds for terminating the mother’s parental rights and that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

A subcontractor on a large project in Texas sued the general contractor claiming the general contractor breached an agreement the parties made regarding claims both had against the owner of the Texas project. The parties agreed the subcontractor would be entitled to a pro rata share of the settlement or judgment amount if the subcontractor’s claims were not itemized. The settlement agreement between the general contractor and the owner did not include an itemization of the subcontractor’s claims. The subcontractor had been given a prepayment of its claim against the owner in the amount of $300,000, and applying this to the subcontractor’s pro rata share, the general contractor determined the subcontractor was not entitled to anything more. The trial court deducted the $300,000 from the subcontractor’s claim and awarded the subcontractor its pro rata share of the difference. Both the subcontractor and general contractor appealed, the subcontractor claiming it was not awarded enough and the general contractor claiming the subcontractor was awarded too much. We reverse the trial court’s award and hold the $300,000 the subcontractor received as a prepayment was more than it was entitled to pursuant to the terms of the parties’ agreement. Accordingly, the contractor did not breach its agreement, and the subcontractor was not entitled to any damages.
 

Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her complaint to recover for personal injuries sustained in a fall at the Davidson County Correctional Development Center. Finding no error, we affirm.

The Appellant, Lindsey Brooke Lowe, petitions this Court for an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, Section 2. The Appellant seeks review of the trial court’s order denying her motion to recuse. After a thorough review of the petition, this Court concludes that the trial court properly denied the Appellant’s motion for recusal. The order of the trial court is affirmed.

In this workers’ compensation appeal, it is undisputed that the employee sustained a compensable injury, that the employer was providing medical care as required by the workers’ compensation statute, and that the employee sought and received a spinal fusion treatment without informing or consulting with his employer. The trial court ordered the employer to pay for the unauthorized treatment, and the employer has appealed from that decision. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Donald R.S., Jr. (“Father”) to the minor children Dacia S., Aerial W. , and Teagan W. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children after finding and holding, inter alia, that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 102(1)(A)(iv) and that the termination was in the Children’s best interest. Father appeals to this Court. We affirm.

This case involves a dispute over the ownership of a parcel of real property to which the appellees obtained title in May 2010. The appellant argued that the property belonged to her through the doctrine of adverse possession because she and her mother had used the property exclusively since 1937. The appellees proved at trial that the appellant had not paid taxes on the land for more than 22 years and moved for a directed verdict at the close of the appellant’s case-in chief. The trial court granted the motion based upon the statutory bar imposed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-2-110. The appellant appeals. We affirm.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The primary issue we address in this appeal is whether certain evidence was erroneously admitted at trial and if so, whether it more probably than not affected the jury’s verdict. This case arose out of the death of Raymond Smallman and the ensuing dispute between his two sons from a previous marriage and Linda Caraway, whom he married two weeks before his death. Mr. Smallman’s sons challenged the validity of their father’s marriage to Ms. Caraway and the validity of the lost will that Ms. Caraway sought to have established. Ms. Caraway claimed to be Mr. Smallman’s surviving spouse and the sole beneficiary of his estate pursuant to the terms of his will. The case went to trial, and the jury was allowed to hear evidence about Ms. Caraway’s real estate holdings and her late mother’s will. The jury found in favor of Mr. Smallman’s sons. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted Ms. Caraway permission to appeal to address whether Mr. Smallman’s sons had standing to contest the validity of their father’s second marriage and whether the introduction of evidence regarding Ms. Caraway’s late mother’s will and her real estate holdings was error and if so, whether it more probably than not affected the jury’s verdict. We hold that Ms. Caraway waived her argument that Mr. Smallman’s sons lacked standing to contest the validity of her marriage to their father. We further hold that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence testimony regarding Ms. Caraway’s real property holdings and her late mother’s will. Because this evidence more probably than not affected the jury’s verdict, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

I concur with the Court’s decision to remand this case for a new trial because the trial court erred by admitting into evidence testimony regarding Ms. Caraway’s real estate holdings and regarding the execution and substance of Ms. Caraway’s late mother’s will. However, I disagree with the Court’s refusal to address Ms. Caraway’s challenge to the standing of Mr. Smallman’s sons to contest the validity of her marriage to their father and with the Court’s decision that Ms. Caraway may not raise the standing issue on remand.
 

The petitioner, Christopher Martin, was convicted in 1997 for rape of a child and received a twenty-five-year sentence. He was also convicted in Georgia of similar offenses and received a twenty-year sentence. The Georgia and Tennessee sentences were to be served concurrently. The petitioner filed a motion in the trial court, seeking to remove a Tennessee detainer against him. He asserted that the detainer prevented him from being eligible for parole in Georgia. The trial court denied the motion, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we conclude that the appellant does not have an appeal as of right from the order. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.

The Defendant, Eddie Leroy Rowlett, was convicted by a Stewart County jury of aggravated assault and resisting arrest. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective six-year sentence. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges (1) the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the entry into his home and his subsequent detention and arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions; (3) several evidentiary rulings, including the admission of certain photographs and limitations on establishing a "criminal trespass" defense; and (4) the jury instructions, arguing that a special instruction should have been given for the State’s failure to disclose the deputy’s telephone records, and that instructions on self-defense and defense of others should have been included in the final charge to the jury. Because the evidence of serious bodily injury was insufficient, the Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault is reversed and modified to a conviction for Class A misdemeanor assault. The judgment for resisting arrest is affirmed. The case is remanded for resentencing.

The Petitioner, Melissa Barnett, appeals the Polk County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for a writ of error coram nobis regarding her convictions for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder, for which she is serving a life sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying her relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Wade P. Tucker, appeals the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the court erred in failing to consider his motion for appointment of counsel and that the indictment was defective so as to deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. After review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

Appellant, Eric Pernell Taylor, was on probation after entering guilty plea in the Montgomery County Circuit Court on January 7, 2011. On July 13, 2011, a probation violation warrant was issued alleging that Appellant had failed to report his arrest, failed to report to his probation officer, failed to pay litigation taxes, and tested positive for cocaine. He also admitted to the cocaine usage in writing. After holding a probation revocation hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in incarceration. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the probation or ordering the service of the sentence in incarceration. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The appellant, Scott McLain, pled guilty to driving under the influence (DUI) and received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days with seven days to be served in confinement. As a condition of his plea, he reserved certified questions of law concerning the suppression of the results of his blood alcohol test. This court affirmed the judgment of the trial court; however, our supreme court subsequently remanded to this court for reconsideration in light of State v. Harrison, 270 S.W.3d 21 (Tenn. 2008). Upon reconsideration, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for dismissal of the indictment.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of the Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault. The majority concludes that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of serious bodily injury to Deputy Saltkill. Nowhere in the Defendant’s brief does he even mention the issue of the sufficiency of the proof as to serious bodily injury. As the majority points out, the "crux of the Defendant’s sufficiency argument is that the State failed to prove that he did not act in self-defense." Indeed, I submit that, not only is it the "crux" of his argument, it is his only argument. The Defendant’s entire argument on the sufficiency issue is comprised of only one paragraph that consumes less than one-half of a page of the Defendant’s brief. The only citation in the paragraph is to the seminal case Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), regarding the general standard of appellate review on sufficiency issues. Moreover, the only reference to the proof was with regard to the issue of self defense. Under these circumstances, the Defendant clearly has failed to support any argument on the sufficiency of the evidence as to the issue of serious bodily injury "with argument, citation to relevant authorities, or any references to the appellate record." See Tenn. R. App. P. 27. Accordingly, I would find that the Defendant has waived any sufficiency argument with regard to the issue of serious bodily injury. 

The Tennessee Supreme Court remanded this case to us for consideration in light of its opinion in Shipley v. Williams. In the original appeal of this medical malpractice case, this court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the basis that the plaintiff’s only expert witness was not competent to testify pursuant to the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115. On remand we conclude the trial court erred in ruling that the plaintiffs’ expert was not competent to testify and consequently, the plaintiffs created genuine issues of material fact, making summary judgment for defendants inappropriate. We reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.
 

The issue presented is whether the jury verdict against the management company of an assisted living facility for negligence based on understaffing is supported by material evidence. Mable Farrar’s physician prescribed Ms.Farrara daily dose of an over-the-counter medicine for constipation. The nursing staff at the assisted living facility where Ms. Farrar lived did not give the medicine to her as often as prescribed. As a result, Ms. Farrar became constipated and returned to see her doctor. Ms. Farrar’s doctor notified the nursing staff at the assisted living facility to give Ms. Farrar three to four enemas each day beginning on May 27, 2004. A facility nurse gave Ms. Farrar one enema on the evening of May 27, none on May 28, and one enema on the evening of May 29. Very soon after receiving the last enema on May 29, Ms. Farrar died from a perforated colon. Her daughters filed a wrongful death action against the nurse who gave the enema, the director of nursing at the assisted living facility, the owner of the facility, and its management company. The suit alleged that the negligence of the staff, the owner, and its management company caused Ms. Farrar’s death. The jury returned a verdict finding the nurse thirty percent at fault, the director of nursing twenty percent at fault, and the management company fifty percent at fault based on its failure to provide sufficient personnel at the facility. The management company appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict against the management company, finding that there was no material evidence that staffing deficiencies proximately caused Ms. Farrar’s death. We hold that the jury’s verdict was supported by material evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for review of the award of punitive damages.