APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Employer terminated employee shortly after discovering she was pregnant. Thereafter, employee filed a complaint against her former employer asserting claims of sex and pregnancy discrimination, retaliation, and misrepresentation. Following a period of discovery, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on each of the employee’s claims. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Petitioner, Derek Alton Badger, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery after a jury trial in Bedford County. Petitioner’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was unsuccessful on appeal. See State v. Derek Alton Badger, No. M2009-01295-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3489173, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Aug. 25, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2011). Subsequently, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court failed to advise him regarding sex offender registration and community supervision. After a hearing on the post-conviction petition, at which Petitioner presented several witnesses, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal and seeks our review of the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court because Petitioner has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Alvin Donell Davis, appeals the revocation of his probation by the Hamilton County Criminal Court. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court was without authority to revoke his probation because his sentences had expired. After a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the Defendant’s probation on Count 2 of his convictions and affirm the trial court’s order of probation revocation and incarceration on that count. However, because the sentences in Counts 1 and 3 expired prior to the filing of the revocation warrant, the trial court lacked the authority to revoke the Defendant’s sentence on those counts; therefore, the orders of revocation and incarceration on Counts 1 and 3 are reversed and vacated.

This is a termination of parental rights case pertaining to two minor children (collectively “the Children”) of the defendant, Valtrella C. (“Mother”). The Children were placed in the custody of the petitioners, Jason C. and Edana B., in November 2009. The Children had been removed from Mother by the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) because of Mother’s substance abuse problems. Jason C. and Edana B. filed a petition in June 2011 seeking to terminate the parental rights of Mother. They alleged that grounds for termination existed due to abandonment based on Mother’s willful failure to visit or pay more than token support. Following a bench trial, the court granted the petition after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother had willfully failed to visit the Children. The court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was in the best interest of the Children. Mother appeals. We affirm.

Joseph E. Smith (“Employee”) alleged that he injured his back in the course and scope of his employment with Electric Research & Manufacturing Cooperative, Inc. (“Employer”). Employee’s evaluation physician assigned a 12% permanent impairment rating to the body as a whole as a result of the injury. A physician selected through the Medical Impairment Registry (“MIR”) process assigned a 3% permanent impairment rating to the body as a whole. The trial court found that Employee rebutted the statutory presumption of accuracy afforded the MIR physician’s rating by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(d)(5) (2008) and awarded 40% permanent partial disability to the body. Employer has appealed. After reviewing the record as we are required to do, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Following a four-day trial in this divorce case, the trial court entered an order naming the Mother primary residential parent and permitting her to relocate to Arkansas with the parties’ minor child. The Father appeals. Because the trial court failed to provide any reason for its decision, we are unable to perform a meaningful review on appeal. Therefore, we remand this matter to the trial court to enter an order that contains the findings and conclusions mandated by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01.

The Petitioner, Denzel Wallace, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of second degree murder and resulting sentence of twenty years to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he did not enter his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Otis Maclin ("the Petitioner") filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions based upon guilty pleas to the offenses of kidnapping, sexual battery, and aggravated assault. In accordance with the plea agreement, the Petitioner received an effective ten-year sentence. In his petition, he argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his guilty plea and that his plea was constitutionally infirm. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from a dispute concerning a contract for employment. Roy W. Keith (“Keith”) sued Michael J. Jackson, Sr. and Nata M. Jackson (“the Jacksons”) in the Circuit Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”), alleging that he was not paid separation payments due to him under an employment agreement. The Jacksons answered the complaint, arguing essentially that Keith waived these payments when he accepted a job in the new corporation. Keith filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. The Jacksons appeal to this Court. We hold that the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment as there remained a material controversy regarding whether Keith waived his right to payment under the employment agreement. We vacate the judgment of the Trial Court.

This interlocutory appeal involves the question of whether the arbitration provisions contained in Tenn. Code Ann. §56-7-1206(f)-(k)(2008), a part of the Tennessee uninsured motorist (“UM”) statutory scheme, apply to policies with UM coverage that were issued and delivered in Texas. The trial court held that the arbitration provisions do apply. The UM carriers, brought into this action pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. §56-7- 1206(a), appealed that decision. We reverse the trial court’s judgment.

This case focuses, in the context of the parties’ divorce, on the distribution of their marital assets and debts. Gwendolyn Ann Cradic (“Wife”) filed a complaint for divorce against Kenneth Wayne Cradic (“Husband”) on October 24, 2008. The parties went to trial in October 2011 on the issues of fault and division of property. The court awarded Wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. It then divided the parties’ assets and debts. Husband appeals the trial court’s classification of one asset and its division of marital property. We affirm.

Petitioner, Chanda Langston, pleaded guilty without a recommended sentence to six counts of forgery and one count of theft of property valued at $60,000 or more. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twelve years in confinement. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, petitioner now claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

We accepted review of this appeal to determine whether, when a workers’ compensation settlement involving an employee represented by counsel is approved by the Department of Labor and the SD-1 form is submitted contemporaneously with the settlement agreement, a court may set the settlement aside as non-final based on the court’s determination that the SD-1 form was not “fully completed.” We hold that when the Department of Labor approves a settlement, it implicitly approves the accompanying SD-1 form, and a court has no authority to set the settlement aside based on its independent finding that the SD-1 form was not “fully completed.”  We therefore reverse the judgments of the Panel and of the trial court and dismiss the employee’s petition.

The defendant, David Lamont Simpson, was convicted of one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. Thereafter, he was sentenced to a term of fifteen years, to be served at 100%, in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Because the defendant failed to file a transcript of the evidence on appeal, he is entitled to no relief, and the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

This case involves the status of a road as public or private, as well as Plaintiff’s right to access such. We find that the roadway was a public road prior to 1960, but that it has since been abandoned. Finding no necessity, we further conclude that Plaintiff is not entitled to a private easement over the road to access her property. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint.

This is one of three cases consolidated for oral argument. In each case, the following happened: (1) the borrower defaulted on his or her home loan and the lender foreclosed by non-judicial action, a procedure authorized by the deed of trust; (2) the purchaser at the trustee’s sale sought possession through an unlawful detainer action; (3) the borrower filed a counterclaim asserting that the non-judicial foreclosure process violates the Tennessee Constitution and is against public policy; and (4) the trial court dismissed the counterclaim and granted possession to the purchaser. The present case went off on summary judgment. The borrower appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.

This is one of three cases consolidated for oral argument. In each case, the following happened: (1) the borrower defaulted on his or her home loan and the lender foreclosed by non-judicial action, a procedure authorized by the deed of trust; (2) the purchaser at the trustee’s sale sought possession through an unlawful detainer action; (3) the borrower filed a counterclaim asserting that the non-judicial foreclosure process violates the Tennessee Constitution and is against public policy; and (4) the trial court dismissed the counterclaim and granted possession to the purchaser following a bench trial. The borrower appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.

This is one of three cases consolidated for oral argument. In each case, the following happened: (1) the borrower defaulted on his or her home loan and the lender foreclosed by non-judicial action, a procedure authorized by the deed of trust; (2) the purchaser at the trustee’s sale sought possession through an unlawful detainer action; (3) the borrower filed a counterclaim asserting that the non-judicial foreclosure process violates the Tennessee Constitution and is against public policy; and (4) the trial court dismissed the counterclaim and granted possession to the purchaser. The present case went off on summary judgment. The borrower appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.

This appeal involves a petition for post-conviction relief based on multiple ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The petitioner was convicted in the Criminal Court for Knox County of two counts of premeditated firstdegree murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of setting fire to personal property. His convictions were affirmed and his sentences were modified on direct appeal. State v. Mobley, No. E2006-00469-CCAR3-CD, 2007 WL 1670195 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 11, 2007), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 24, 2007). Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief based on numerous instances of his trial counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance and on several instances of alleged trial court errors. Following a two-day hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the petitioner’s convictions and remanded the case for a new trial after determining that the petitioner’s trial counsel had been ineffective with regard to limitations placed on the ability of a defense expert to testify that the petitioner’s mental condition rendered him unable to premeditate. Mobley v. State, No. E2010-00379-CCA-R3-PC, 2011 WL 3652535 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2011). We granted the State’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal. We have determined that the petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief based on the manner in which his trial counsel dealt with the limitations placed on the defense’s expert witness. However, we have also determined that the record does not permit the reviewing courts to determine whether the performance of the petitioner’s trial counsel was deficient with regard to the requirement that the petitioner wear a stun belt during the trial. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the lower courts denying post-conviction relief based on the alleged errors of the trial court and on all the ineffective assistance of counsel claims except the claims based on the testimony of the defense’s mental health expert and the use of the stun belt during the trial. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court with regard to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel’s failure to elicit a specific opinion from the defense’s mental health expert. We also reverse the judgment of the lower courts denying the ineffective assistance of counsel claim relating to trial counsel’s failure to object to the use of a stun belt during the trial and remand that issue alone to the post-conviction court for a new hearing.
 

The Criminal Court for Campbell County sentenced the Defendant, Kevin C. Potter, to fifteen years of probation for multiple offenses that occurred between 2009 and 2011. In late 2011, the Defendant’s probation officer filed an affidavit seeking a probation violation warrant for the Defendant’s arrest. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered that he serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends he was denied a fair hearing on the probation violation warrant and that the trial court erred because it failed to make specific findings of fact. The State agrees, and it asks us to reverse the case and remand it to the trial court for an order containing specific factual findings based upon the proof adduced at the revocation hearing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we agree with the parties. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of an order that sets forth specific factual findings for the revocation of probation.

Mother and Father entered into a marital dissolution agreement and a parenting plan for their two minor children. Mother subsequently injected Father with a chemical used to euthanize animals. She pleaded guilty to the attempted second degree murder of Father and was sentenced to twelve years incarceration. Mother and Father entered into an amended parenting plan that provided for the children’s visitation with their maternal grandmother and with Mother in prison. The amended parenting plan also provided for the resumption of the original parenting plan after Mother’s release from prison. Father remarried while Mother was incarcerated. Father and Stepmother filed a petition for termination of Mother’s parental rights and a petition for adoption by Stepmother. The trial court found that there was a statutory ground for termination of Mother’s parental rights and that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The trial court subsequently amended its order, concluding that termination of Mother’s parental rights was not in the best interests of the children and denying the petition for termination of Mother’s parental rights. Father and Stepmother appealed, and the Court of Appeals reinstated the original order. We conclude that Father and Stepmother failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the amended order of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Harvey Taylor, pled guilty to rape, a Class B felony, and, pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced him to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition.

A Macon County jury convicted the Defendant, Kevin Gross, of criminal responsibility for facilitation of burglary and theft of property. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a persistent offender to concurrent terms of four years and eight years, respectively, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ruling that, if the Defendant chose to testify, the State could use his prior conviction for burglary of an automobile to impeach his testimony under Rule 609 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we find that the trial court did not err when it ruled that the State could impeach the Defendant with his prior conviction for burglary of an automobile. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The appellant, Bobby Lee Johnson, pled guilty to one count of possession of morphine with intent to sell, a Class B felony; one count of driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor; and one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417, 55-10-401, 39-14-403. Following a sentencing hearing, appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of eight years to be served in confinement. In this appeal as of right, appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing. We affirm the trial court’s sentence.

The defendant, Antwain Green, was convicted of two counts of attempted second degree murder of Anthony Fizer and Carrie Searcy, Class B felonies, and three counts of aggravated assaults on, Fizer, Searcy and Laura Dykes, Class C felonies. The aggravated assault convictions of Fizer and Searcy merged with the two attempted second degree murder convictions. The defendant was sentenced as a Range II offender to eighteen- year terms for each attempted murder conviction and a nine- year term for the aggravated assault conviction of Dykes, to be served consecutively to each other for an effective sentence of forty-five years. The defendant appeals his convictions and sentences, asserting that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to sustain the convictions, that a witness was improperly permitted to testify regarding one victim’s identification of the defendant, and that his sentences are improper and excessive. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions, that the error in admitting the testimony regarding identification was harmless, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of convictions and sentences of the trial court.