APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Rocky Joe Houston, was convicted on April 1, 2010, of reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor, and evading arrest, a Class E felony, for which he was sentenced, respectively, to eleven months, twenty-nine days and one year, as a standard offender. In his notice of appeal, he asserted that the trial court erred in denying the judgment of acquittal and asked that this court order the lawyer in his 2008 trial to return the sum of $65,000, which was a portion of the amount the defendant asserts he paid to the lawyer. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Terrence Hill, of second degree murder. The trial court imposed an eighteen-year and six-month sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; and (2) the trial court erred when it discharged a prospective juror based upon her inability to be impartial. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we find that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction and that the trial court did not err in discharging the prospective juror. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of Appellants’ motion to quash Appellee’s hospital liens, which were filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-22-101 et seq. In each Appellant’s case, the hospital filed a lien and then recovered adjusted amounts for services rendered pursuant to the hospital’s agreements with the Appellant’s respective insurance providers. Despite having received payment, the hospital argues that it may return these adjusted payments to the insurance provider and may, instead, seek to recover its full, unadjusted bill from the Appellants’ third-party tortfeasors by foreclosing its liens. We conclude that: (1) a lien, under the HLA, presupposes the existence of a debt; (2) Appellants are third-party beneficiaries of their respective insurer’s service contract with the Appellee hospital; (3) having chosen to accept a price certain for services as “payment in full” and having, in fact, accepted payment from Appellants’ insurance providers, the underlying debt is extinguished; (4) in the absence of an underlying debt, the hospital may not maintain its lien; (5) the right to subrogate belongs to the insurance provider and a hospital lien does not create a subrogation right in the hospital. Reversed and remanded.

This case involves a post-trial dispute between one party to a personal injury case and their former counsel. After a jury verdict was entered in favor of Appellants, their former law firm filed an attorney lien and a motion to recover its attorney fees in the trial court. Appellants asserted that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the former firm’s motion. The trial court disagreed and awarded the former firm its full requested fee. Appellants appeal both the award of attorney fees to its former law firm, and also the trial court’s denial of Appellants’ request to release funds held by the clerk. We conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the post-trial dispute and reverse the award of attorneys fees in this case. However, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to release funds. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

Roy L. McAlister ("the Defendant") pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated statutory rape and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of three years, to be suspended to supervised probation after service of 219 days in confinement. Upon the filing of a probation violation warrant, the Defendant was taken into custody, and a probation violation hearing was held. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Defendant appealed the trial court’s ruling. Based upon the record before us, we are compelled to vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand this action to the Robertson County Circuit Court for further findings consistent with this opinion.

The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff on claims that a mortgage company and a title company erroneously encumbered a tract of his property. On appeal, the plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in declining to award more than nominal damages. Because there is no appellate record for this court to review on the issue of damages, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The defendant, Terrance Holliday, was found guilty of first degree (premeditated) murder of the victim, Michael Woods, and sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. The defendant also claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress a photographic identification and by denying his motion in limine with respect to certain statements made by a deceased co-defendant, which were introduced into evidence though another witness. After careful review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction and that the trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motions. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted of selling more than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony, and selling more than 0.5 grams of cocaine within a school zone, a Class A felony. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of the latter charge. The defendant also claims that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury with respect to lesser included offenses and by permitting the State to ask questions concerning prior drug transactions between the defendant and a confidential informant. After review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions and that his remaining claims have been waived. We affirm the judgments of the trial court accordingly.

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to his son on the ground that Father engaged in conduct prior to incarceration exhibiting a wanton disregard for the child’s welfare. On appeal, Father contends that the petition to terminate parental rights did not allege wanton disregard as a ground upon which termination was sought. Because we conclude that the petitioner did not plead wanton disregard as a ground for termination, we reverse the termination of Father’s parental rights based upon that ground.

The petitioner, Larry Payne, was convicted by a jury of four counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies, against two victims. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals merged the four convictions into two, one for each victim, and otherwise affirmed the judgments. The Tennessee Supreme Court declined discretionary review. The petitioner then brought this timely post-conviction petition, asserting various claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner’s sole issue on appeal is whether he was denied the effective assistance of counsel due to his trial counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of theft. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any prejudice resulting from his counsel’s failure to request a jury charge on the lesser included offense of theft. The petitioner’s failure to establish prejudice is fatal to his ineffective assistance claim. The judgment of the court below is affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted petitioner, Marlos Shields, of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced him to an effective eighteen-year sentence. Following his direct appeal, petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief, and petitioner now appeals. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Mahlon Johnson, of one count of aggravated assault and two counts of sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for sexual battery; (2) the trial court erred when it failed to merge the sexual battery convictions; (3) the Defendant’s convictions for sexual battery and aggravated assault violate double jeopardy protections; and (4) the trial court improperly sentenced him. The State agrees that there is insufficient evidence to support the Defendant’s sexual battery convictions, and it asks us to reverse those convictions and dismiss the indictments. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists in the record sufficient evidence to support the Defendant’s convictions and that the trial court did not err when it did not merge those convictions. We further conclude that the trial court did not err when it sentenced the Defendant. We, therefore, affirm the Defendant’s convictions and sentence.

In this child support dispute, the trial court erred in dismissing father’s petition to reduce child support and in finding him to be in criminal contempt.
 

In this appeal from a divorce decree, husband asserts that the trial court erred in its property division and award of alimony. We have determined that the trial court erred in awarding almost all of the marital property to wife and, therefore, modify the property division to award the 401k to husband. We further modify the trial court’s decision in order to change the alimony in futuro to transitional alimony and to reduce the monthly amount.

On December 12, 2011, the petitioner, Gary S. Mayes, filed a pro se petition for a writ of error coram nobis alleging newly discovered evidence related to the Knox County Criminal Court’s 2008 denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The coram nobis court summarily denied relief. We affirm the denial of relief.

The Dickson County Circuit Court denied the Petitioner, Jerry Ray Davidson, post-conviction relief from his convictions of first degree premeditated murder and aggravated kidnapping and his sentence of death. The Petitioner appeals. Having discerned no error, we affirm the post conviction court’s denial of relief.

The appellant (“Mother”) appeals from an order of the trial court entered on November 27, 2012, which granted the counter-petition to alter or amend the parties’ Permanent Parenting Plan and to relocate to Indiana filed by the appellee (“Father”). The November 27, 2012 order stated that “[a]ll other issues raised” in Mother’s response in opposition to the petition to relocate and counter-petition to modify custody as well as Mother’s initial Motion for Contempt were “reserved for further hearing.” It is clear that the order appealed from does not resolve all issues raised in the proceedings below. As such, the order is not a final order and this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Knox County Criminal Court denied Defendant Darrick Eugene McAllister’s motion to suppress all evidence seized in a warrantless search. Subsequently, Defendant entered a guilty plea, and according to the amended judgment in the record, Defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to sell less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, and received a sentence of eight (8) years as a Range II multiple offender. The amended judgment and the negotiated plea agreement documents show that Defendant reserved a certified question of law for appeal. The transcript of the guilty plea hearing is not in the record. After a review of the record, we affirm the amended judgment of the trial court. We note, however, that the negotiated plea agreement documents reflect that Defendant was going to plead guilty to the Class C felony offense of attempted possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a drug free zone (a park). However, we did not have jurisdiction in this case to do anything but affirm the amended judgment (which we do) or reverse the amended judgment and dismiss the charges. The trial court, however, may review the entire record and take appropriate measures, if any, to correct the amended judgment.

The defendant, Larry R. Porterfield, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, and the Grundy County Circuit Court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to a term of four years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant challenges the manner of service of his sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, James Ryan Stephenson, was convicted by a Rhea County jury of reckless homicide, a Class D felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to his sentence in a burglary case for which he was on probation at the time of the homicide. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by: (1) granting the State’s request to remove a juror on the second day of trial; (2) allowing the State to impeach his credibility with his prior convictions for theft and burglary; (3) issuing a jury instruction on the impeachment of a witness after the testimony of a defense witness but not after the testimony of a State witness; and (4) failing to apply any mitigating factors in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Frederick Alexander Avery, was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of aggravated robbery, especially aggravated robbery, reckless endangerment, and attempted second degree murder. As a violent offender, he received a total effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for severance and a motion for a speedy trial and for advising the petitioner to not testify at trial. The post-conviction court denied relief, holding that the petitioner failed to establish that counsel was ineffective. However, because trial counsel had miscalculated the date for filing an appeal to the supreme court, the post-conviction court granted the petitioner a Rule 11 delayed appeal. See Tenn. S. Ct. R. 28, § 9(D)(1)(b). The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief based on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Upon review, we conclude that the post-conviction court properly granted the petitioner a delayed appeal. However, the post-conviction court erred by not staying the post-conviction proceeding pending the disposition of the delayed appeal.

The appellant, Arthur Lee Jamison, Jr., was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of selling less than .5 grams of a substance containing cocaine within 1,000 feet of a drug-free school zone, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Bobby Duane Parker, pled guilty in the Williamson County Circuit Court to four counts of theft, two counts of unlawful possession of a weapon, one count of resisting arrest, and one count of evading arrest. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty-seven years. On appeal, the appellant challenges imposition of consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Justin Gray, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment and fifteen years, respectively. On appeal, he argues that: (1) it was error for his case to be transferred to circuit court; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (3) the trial court’s jury instruction on criminal responsibility was erroneous. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises out of a boundary line dispute. On appeal, the landowners argue that the trial court erred in finding that the disputed property was owned by their adjoining landowner. The landowners further argue that the trial court erred in dismissing their thirdparty complaint against the individuals that sold them the property, and for refusing to award them an abatement in the purchase price based on the deficiency in acreage. After throughly reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.