APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves post-trial motions in a divorce case. Several years after the divorce decree was entered, the father filed a petition to modify the parenting plan to seek more parenting time, and he filed a petition for contempt, alleging that the mother had prevented him from exercising his parenting time. The father later filed a motion asking the trial court to alter or amend the original divorce decree’s child support provision in order to reduce his child support obligation retroactive to the date of the decree, and the arrearage that he had accrued over the years. The trial court modified the parenting plan, found the mother in contempt, and altered the portion of the original divorce decree pertaining to child support, thereby reducing the father’s child support arrearage. The mother appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.

Decedent’s spouse brought an action to recover HHL benefits for the death of her firefighter husband. The City of Memphis denied her claim and decedent’s spouse appealed to an ALJ. The ALJ, likewise, denied the claim for benefits finding that the City of Memphis had rebutted the statutory presumption of causation and that decedent’s spouse had then failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that decedent’s cardiac condition was caused by his employment. The chancery court affirmed the decision of the ALJ, and we affirm the decision of the chancery court.

Mother and Father appeal the termination of their parental rights. Mother and Father’s rights were terminated on grounds of substantial non-compliance with the permanency plans and persistence of conditions. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Plaintiff was awarded a $100,000 judgment against Defendant in the trial court. In a prior appeal, this Court reversed the damage award, and remanded for a new trial. On remand, the parties entered into an Agreed Order for a $100,000 judgment in favor of Plaintiff. Ten years after entry of the Agreed Order, Plaintiff moved to renew the unsatisfied judgment, and Defendant claimed that the renewal motion was untimely. The trial court granted the motion to renew the judgment, and we affirm.

Timothy B. Lenarduzzi ("the Defendant") pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and three counts of sexual exploitation of a minor. In his plea agreement, he agreed to a sentencing range of "[e]ight to [t]welve years at one hundred percent on each count to run concurrent," leaving the length of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to eleven years for each aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor conviction and eleven years for each sexual exploitation of a minor conviction, all to be served concurrently. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the length of his sentence is improper. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Steven Ray Kennedy, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded conviction for second degree murder and the resulting twenty-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because of the ineffectiveness of counsel. Following our review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

The Petitioner, Donnell Levon Robinson, Jr., appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was involuntarily and unknowingly entered. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted appellant, Eddie Hoof, for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, attempted first degree murder, and especially aggravated burglary. A jury found him guilty of two counts of second degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, and one count of especially aggravated burglary. The trial court merged the two convictions of second degree murder and sentenced appellant to an effective sentence of fifty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case to the trial court for correction of the judgment form for especially aggravated burglary to reflect a consecutive sentence.

The Defendant, April Nicole Cromwell, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at more than $10,000, a Class C felony. See T.C.A.§ 39-14-103 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to three years with one year to serve and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) failing to sentence her to community corrections or probation and (2) denying her request for judicial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Donald A. Rogers, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original three-year sentence in the Department  of Correction. He argues that the trial court erred in ordering full confinement, rather than imposing split confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a tort suit filed after a workplace injury. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that it was a statutory employer within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Law, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-113, and therefore, it was immune from the tort claim asserted on behalf of the injured worker. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee fell and struck his head in March of 2000 in the course and scope of his employment, resulting in a complex scalp laceration, post-concussion syndrome and dysfunction of the trigeminal nerve. He filed this workers’ compensation action in February of 2001, seeking temporary total disability and permanent disability benefits and medical expenses. After many delays the case was heard in September of 2011. The employee’s medical expert testified that he had a 21% permanent impairment and was temporarily disabled until 2009. The employer’s expert testified that he had a 5% impairment, had reached maximum medical improvement and was able to work at the time of his examination in 2007. The trial court awarded temporary total disability benefits from 2000 to 2007, a total of 369.98 weeks, and awarded 60% permanent partial disability, a total of 240 weeks, for a grand total of 609.98 weeks. The employer has appealed, contending that the court erred in awarding more than a total of 400 weeks, in awarding temporary total disability benefits without proper medical proof of inability to work and in awarding 60% permanent partial disability without defining the specific anatomical impairment rating. We reverse the judgment in part and affirm in part.

Defendant, Lavonta Laver Churchwell, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, and two counts of especially aggravated robbery. Defendant was convicted by a petit jury of two counts of felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of criminally negligent homicide. The trial court merged Defendant’s convictions for criminally negligent homicide into his felony murder convictions. He was sentenced by the trial court to an effective life sentence with all sentences running concurrently. In this direct appeal, Defendant asserts that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; 2) the State failed to establish the corpus delicti because the State offered no corroborating evidence of the testimony of the jailhouse informants; 3) Defendant’s admissions to the jailhouse informants were elicited in violation of Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201, 84 S. Ct. 1199, 12 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1964); and 4) the trial court erred by allowing testimony that Defendant threatened a jailhouse informant. The State responds that Defendant has waived all issues save that of sufficiency of the evidence by failing to file a timely motion for new trial. We conclude that Defendant’s motion for new trial was timely filed and review the merits of each issue. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Bedford County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Alfonzo Marquis Sutton, of conspiracy to sell and deliver .5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance, cocaine. The trial court sentenced him as a Range III persistent offender to thirteen years, forty-five percent of which he was to serve in confinement before being eligible for release. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, that prosecutorial misconduct warranted a mistrial, and that his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we conclude that prosecutorial misconduct warrants a new trial.

Defendant, Bruce D. Mendenhall, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for first degree premeditated murder, and he was convicted as charged following a jury trial. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life in prison. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence and submits the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by refusing to suppress evidence obtained from Defendant’s person, his truck, and his tractor trailer as a result of Defendant’s initial encounter with police Sgt. Postiglione, which Defendant asserts was a seizure not supported by reasonable suspicion; (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing to suppress Defendant’s statements to police officers; (3) whether Defendant’s statements to a fellow inmate should have been suppressed; (4) whether the trial court erred by admitting evidence that Defendant solicited another person to kill three potential witnesses; (5) whether the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to exclude portions of Defendant’s phone calls recorded while Defendant was incarcerated; (6) whether the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to present testimony from a ballistics expert at trial; (7) whether the trial court erred by admitting into evidence items recovered from Defendant’s truck; (8) whether the trial court erred by admitting into evidence photographs of the victim’s body; (9) whether the evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction; and (10) whether the trial court erred by ordering Defendant’s sentence to run consecutively to a previously imposed sentence. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury convicted the defendant, Cynthia Denise Gray, of one count of the promotion of the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-433 (2010). The trial court sentenced her to serve three years and six months in prison as a Range I standard offender. The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the length of the sentence, as well as the trial court’s refusal to impose an alternative sentence. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient and that there was no error in sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Candice Stinson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of fourteen counts of cruelty to animals, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-14-202 (2010). For each count, the trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with six months to be served in jail, and a $200 fine, all to be served concurrently. The court also ordered her to pay $4824 in restitution to the City of Memphis Animal Services and prohibited her from owning animals for ten years and from owning animals for commercial purposes for life. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying her full probation and requiring her to serve seventy-five percent of her sentence before becoming eligible for release. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is the second appeal by the father of three minor children challenging the termination of his parental rights. Mother’s parental rights were terminated in 2009 and are not at issue. In the first appeal, this Court found the Department of Children’s Services failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite the children with the father and therefore reversed the termination of Father’sparental rights.In re Keisheal,N.E.,No.M2009-02527-COA-R3-PT, 2010 WL 2176104, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 2010). Following the first appeal, a new petition was filed. After the second trial, the trial court found the petitioners established the ground listed in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(8)(B)(i) that: “[t]he parent . . . is incompetent to adequately provide for the further care and supervision of the child because the parent’s . . . mental condition is presently so impaired and is so likely to remain so that it is unlikely that the parent . . . will be able to assume the care and responsibility for the child in the near future. . . .” The trial court further found the Department of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to reunite the children with the father, and that termination was in the children’s best interest. We affirm.

The Mt. Juliet Beer Board suspended the beer permit of a restaurant, and the restaurant owner appealed the suspension to the chancery court by filing a petition for writ of certiorari. The City did not file an answer within the requisite time period because it did not believe Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-108, which governs appeals of beer board decisions, required this. The City actively participated in the case in other ways by filing a motion to set the case for trial, filing a comprehensive pre-trial brief, and responding to discovery requests. The restaurant owner moved for default judgment based on the City’s failure to answer the petition, after which the City filed an answer. On the day set for trial, the trial court awarded the restaurant owner a default judgment based on the City’s failure to file an answer in a timely fashion and its failure to seek leave to file a late answer. We reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Harry Coleman, of second degree murder, aggravated assault, and two counts of assault. After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective eighteen-year sentence. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that he is entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the appellant’s convictions and the trial court’s denial of the motion for new trial. However, the case is remanded to the trial court for correction of a clerical error on two of the judgments.

 A Shelby County grand jury indicted petitioner, Ronald Woods, for three counts of assault. Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of assault, and the State agreed to dismiss the two remaining counts. During the plea hearing, petitioner also pleaded guilty to several offenses in an unrelated case that was pending in the criminal court. He received an agreed-upon effective sentence of six years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days for both cases. Petitioner requested post-conviction relief, alleging: (1) that the State engaged in vindictive prosecution; (2) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) that his guilty plea was involuntary; and (4) that he was denied due process of law. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Jackson Martin, of attempted second degree murder and two counts of carjacking. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the carjacking convictions and sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty-two years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by commenting to the jury about his failure to present alibi witnesses; (2) the trial court erred by refusing to give the jury an alibi instruction; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Mother petitioned for criminal contempt against Father due to his alleged failure to pay child support as required and she further sought reimbursement for one-half of the children’s optical and dental expenses. Father counter-petitioned for contempt against Mother. The trial court found Father in criminal contempt, but it declined to impose incarceration. However, the trial court denied Mother’s request for optical and dental reimbursement, finding Father was under no obligation to pay such. We affirm in part and we reverse in part.
 

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Gary Adams, of four counts of aggravated rape. The trial court imposed four, consecutive sentences of twenty-five years for a total effective sentence of 100 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his convictions, the trial court’s refusal to merge the convictions, and the sentences imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Shawn Blair, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his two convictions for simple possession of marijuana and resulting consecutive sentences of eleven-months, twenty-nine days. On appeal, the petitioner contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because he was not advised by trial counsel or the trial court about the immigration consequences of his pleas. Upon review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.