Marian Neamtu v. Iveta Neamtu
This appeal arises from a husband’s petition to terminate his alimony payments to his former wife. The trial court declined husband’s request and instead found that there was a substantial and material change in wife’s circumstances such that an increase in alimony was necessary. Because we conclude that this appeal was not timely filed, we are without subject matter jurisdiction and therefore dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re S.S.
This appeal involves termination of the parental rights of two parents who severely abused their child. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that one ground for termination existed based on a prior adjudication of severe child abuse and that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Harley K.
Mother and Father appeal the termination of their parental rights, focusing solely on the issue of best interest. Because we conclude that the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services presented clear and convincing proof of both grounds for termination and that the child’s best interests would be served by the termination of both parents’ parental rights, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Jarred Morgan Wininger v. Paige Ashlynn Wininger
Because the notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jason Kevin Dedreux
After expiration of the maximum sentence imposed for a non-violent felony conviction, a petitioner sought full restoration of his citizenship rights. The trial court restored all of the petitioner’s rights, except for his firearm rights. Discerning that the trial court erred in limiting the restoration of the petitioner’s rights, we reverse and remand. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Edward Gilbert, Et al. v. State of Tennessee
This appeal relates to a healthcare liability action. The Claims Commission denied the State’s motion to dismiss based upon the claimants’ failure to satisfy the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122. We reverse the trial court and remand for dismissal. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Sallie Lunn Tarver v. John Kirk Tarver
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, filed by John Kirk Tarver (“Petitioner”), seeking to recuse the judge in this case involving post-divorce matters. Following our thorough review of the petition for recusal appeal filed by Petitioner, we discern no error and therefore affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Southern Steel & Concrete, Inc. v. Southern Steel & Construction, LLC, et al.
This appeal involves a payment dispute among several companies, including a construction company, a concrete company, and a fabricator company, that ultimately centered on a question of alter-ego status. The trial court found that the concrete company and the construction company were one and the same, and therefore were alter egos of each other. The trial court granted the concrete company enforcement of its lien and awarded it the funds that were deposited in the clerk’s office for the work performed on a building project. The trial court also denied the fabricator company’s cross-claim against the construction company for breach of contract for subcontracting work to the concrete company. The concrete company appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Francisco Sanchez v. Arthur Perry, III, d/b/a Arthur Perry Construction Company
Appellant appeals the judgment entered against him by the trial court, ordering him to pay Appellee unpaid wages. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Laura Cowan Coffey v. David L. Coffey
This appeal involves the calculation of post-judgment interest applying Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-121. The trial court calculated |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
James Williams v. Smyrna Residential, LLC et al.
This appeal concerns the enforceability of an arbitration agreement in a wrongful death lawsuit. James Williams (“Plaintiff”), individually as next of kin and on behalf of the wrongful death beneficiaries of Granville Earl Williams, Jr., deceased (“Decedent”), sued Smyrna Residential, LLC d/b/a Azalea Court and Americare Systems, Inc. (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Rutherford County (“the Trial Court”). Decedent was a resident of Azalea Court, an assisted living facility. Plaintiff alleged his father died because of Defendants’ negligence. Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration, citing an arbitration agreement (“the Agreement”) entered into by Decedent’s daughter and durable power of attorney Karen Sams (“Sams”) on behalf of Decedent when the latter was admitted to Azalea Court. Notably, the durable power of attorney (“the POA”) did not cover healthcare decision-making. The Trial Court held that Sams lacked authority to enter into the Agreement and that, in any event, the wrongful death beneficiaries would not be bound by the Agreement even if it were enforceable. Defendants appeal. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Halliburton v. Tennessee Board of Parole
This appeal arises from the denial of parole to an inmate by the Tennessee Board of Parole. The Tennessee Board of Parole denied the inmate parole in March 2020. The inmate’s administrative appeal was also denied. Thereafter, the inmate filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the chancery court. However, the chancery court dismissed the petition without prejudice due to outstanding costs in prior civil cases. The inmate then filed a second petition with the chancery court. The chancery court dismissed the second petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it was not filed within sixty days of the Tennessee Board of Parole’s final decision in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-9-102. The inmate appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Shaw Enterprises, LLC v. Town of Thompson's Station et al.
This is a declaratory judgment action in which the plaintiff developer objected to the defendant town’s enforcement of a new energy code after the developer received preliminary plat approval. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant town. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Alisa Bibbs v. Durham School Services, L.P., ET AL.
This extraordinary appeal arises from a school bus crash in November 2016, which resulted in the tragic death of six children attending Woodmore Elementary School in Chattanooga. Woodmore’s school secretary sued the employer of the bus driver for, inter alia, reckless infliction of emotional distress (“RIED”). The school secretary alleged that the employer’s failure to address the bus driver’s dangerous driving despite receiving numerous warnings disregarded the children’s safety, constituted reckless and outrageous conduct, and caused her serious mental injuries. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the claim, finding that the school secretary had sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct on the part of the employer and that she had met all other pleading requirements to sustain her RIED claim. Employer appeals. Although we agree with the trial court that the school secretary sufficiently alleged conduct so outrageous by the employer that it cannot be tolerated by civilized society, we hold that the secretary is not a person who falls within the reasonably foreseeable scope of the particular substantial and unjustifiable risk consciously disregarded by the employer and, therefore, cannot recover under a reckless infliction of emotional distress claim. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s finding on this latter issue and remand the case for dismissal of the action against employer. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Sherman Franklin, Jr. v. Durham School Services, L.P., Et Al.
This extraordinary appeal arises from a school bus crash in November 2016, which resulted in the tragic death of six children attending Woodmore Elementary School in Chattanooga.1 Plaintiff, an educational assistant at Woodmore, sued the employer of the bus driver for, inter alia, reckless infliction of emotional distress (“RIED”). The educational assistant alleged that the employer’s failure to address the bus driver’s dangerous driving despite receiving numerous warnings disregarded the children’s safety, constituted reckless and outrageous conduct, and caused him serious mental injuries. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the claim, finding that the educational assistant had sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct on the part of the employer and that he had met all other pleading requirements to sustain his RIED claim. Employer appeals. Although we agree with the trial court that the educational assistant sufficiently alleged conduct so outrageous by the employer that it cannot be tolerated by civilized society, we hold that the educational assistant is not a person who falls within the reasonably foreseeable scope of the particular substantial and unjustifiable risk consciously disregarded by the employer and, therefore, cannot recover under a reckless infliction of emotional distress claim. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s finding on this latter issue and remand the case for dismissal of the action against employer. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Cherri Schrick v. Durham School Services, L.P., Et Al.
This extraordinary appeal arises from a school bus crash in November 2016, which resulted in the tragic death of six children attending Woodmore Elementary School in Chattanooga.1 Plaintiff, a fourth grade math and science teacher at Woodmore, sued the employer of the bus driver for, inter alia, reckless infliction of emotional distress (“RIED”). The teacher alleged that the employer’s failure to address the bus driver’s dangerous driving despite receiving numerous warnings disregarded the children’s safety, constituted reckless and outrageous conduct, and caused her serious mental injuries. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the claim, finding that the teacher had sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct on the part of the employer and that she had met all other pleading requirements to sustain her RIED claim. Employer appeals. Although we agree with the trial court that the teacher sufficiently alleged conduct so outrageous by the employer that it cannot be tolerated by civilized society, we hold that the teacher is not a person who falls within the reasonably foreseeable scope of the particular substantial and unjustifiable risk consciously disregarded by the employer and, therefore, cannot recover under a reckless infliction of emotional distress claim. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s finding on this latter issue and remand the case for dismissal of the action against employer. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
McKayla Taylor v. Miriam's Promise et al.
This appeal involves an award of attorney fees after a remand from this Court. The appellant argues that the statute authorizing such fees is inapplicable by its terms and also unconstitutional as a violation of her right to access the courts. We affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie Muhammed Et Al. v. Durham School Services, L.P., Et Al.
This extraordinary appeal arises from a school bus crash in November 2016, which resulted in the tragic death of six children attending Woodmore Elementary School in Chattanooga.1 Plaintiff, a computer teacher at Woodmore, sued the employer of the bus driver for, inter alia, reckless infliction of emotional distress (“RIED”). The teacher alleged that the employer’s failure to address the bus driver’s dangerous driving despite receiving numerous warnings disregarded the children’s safety, constituted reckless and outrageous conduct, and caused her serious mental injuries. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the claim, finding that the teacher had sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct on the part of the employer and that she had met all other pleading requirements to sustain her RIED claim. Employer appeals. Although we agree with the trial court that the teacher sufficiently alleged conduct so outrageous by the employer that it cannot be tolerated by civilized society, we hold that the teacher is not a person who falls within the reasonably foreseeable scope of the particular substantial and unjustifiable risk consciously disregarded by the employer and, therefore, cannot recover under a reckless infliction of emotional distress claim. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s finding on this latter issue and remand the case for dismissal of the action against employer. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda Cothran Et Al. v. Durham School Services, L.P., Et Al.
This extraordinary appeal arises from a school bus crash in November 2016, which resulted in the tragic death of six children attending Woodmore Elementary School in Chattanooga.1 Plaintiff, the school principal at Woodmore, sued the employer of the bus driver for, inter alia, negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) and reckless infliction of emotional distress (“RIED”). With respect to her NIED claim, the principal alleged that by breaching its duty to keep the students safe, the employer foreseeably caused her severe emotional distress. As to her RIED claim, she averred that the employer’s failure to address the bus driver’s dangerous driving, despite receiving numerous warnings, disregarded the children’s safety, constituted reckless and outrageous conduct, and caused her serious mental injuries. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss as to both claims, finding that the principal’s allegations satisfied the pleading requirements to sustain the claims. Employer appeals. We conclude that the principal did not allege the type of relationship to the injured or deceased party required for a plaintiff who did not witness the injury-producing event to recover under a NIED claim. The principal’s allegations also failed to show conduct so outrageous by the employer that it cannot be tolerated by civilized society. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s judgment as to both issues and remand the case for dismissal of the action against the employer. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Madeline Lee Williams v. Joshua Dwain Williams
This appeal arises from a divorce action in which the trial court determined that both the husband and the wife had proven their grounds for divorce and declared the parties divorced pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-129(b). The trial court also (1) declined to adopt the wife’s proposed permanent parenting plan, (2) determined that the separate assets she contributed to the marriage had become marital property through transmutation, and (3) declined to award attorney’s fees to her as alimony in solido. The wife has appealed, and the husband seeks attorney’s fees and costs on appeal, characterizing the wife’s appeal as frivolous. We affirm the trial court’s final order of divorce but modify the order to prohibit the husband from consuming alcohol during his co-parenting time. We decline to award the husband attorney’s fees and costs on appeal. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Lawrence F. Goodine v. Erica Carol Goodine
Because appellant failed to comply with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B with regard to filing a recusal appeal, and the order appealed does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Virginia Crawley v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County Tennessee et al.
This appeal arises from the dismissal of a petition for writ of certiorari challenging a decision by a city’s planning commission. The petitioner contends that the planning commission’s approval of modifications to a site plan for a planned unit development district were not minor, such that the proposed amendments should have been referred to the city’s council for consideration. The trial court ultimately determined that the modifications were minor and did not require referral to the council; accordingly, it dismissed the petition. We concur in the conclusion of the trial court and affirm its judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Bruce Anne Steadman v. Charles Daniel Farmer
In this divorce case, Husband contests the trial court’s division of marital property and debt and the award of alimony to Wife. We affirm. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jaidon S. et al.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her four children on grounds of abandonment by failure to support, persistence of conditions, and failure to demonstrate a willingness and ability to assume physical custody or financial responsibility. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
John J. Lee v. Beach One Properties, LLC et al.
This case involves the purchase of a parcel of real property pursuant to an installment contract for deed. After entering into the contract, the purchaser discovered the existence of a natural gas pipeline easement on the property. The purchaser subsequently brought suit against the seller, arguing an anticipatory breach of contract and a breach of the warranty of title for failure to inform him of the easement. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the seller based on its finding that the easement was properly recorded and discoverable through the exercise of ordinary due diligence. On appeal, we affirm. |
Trousdale | Court of Appeals |
