Karen L. Hansen v. Jeremy C. Hansen
The father has appealed from an order designating the mother as the primary residential parent and adopting a permanent parenting plan. Because the order does not resolve all of the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Ahmed Mote Alzamzami v. Arwa Al-Sulaihi
This is an appeal of a divorce involving children, which includes issues of default judgment, jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, the statute of frauds, and attorney’s fees. The trial court granted a motion for default judgment against the husband only as to the wife’s counter-complaint for divorce and subsequently denied the motion to set aside the default judgment. Thereafter, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce holding that the wife was entitled to a divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct and dismissed the husband’s complaint for divorce. The trial court divided the marital estate and adopted a permanent parenting plan. Additionally, the trial court awarded a judgment against the husband in the amount of $15,000.00 for the wife’s attorney’s fees and litigation expenses incurred. The husband appeals. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Julius T. Malone, et al. v. ASF Intermodal, LLC
Appellant stipulated that its employee was the at-fault driver in a motor vehicle accident involving Appellee. Appellee and his wife filed suit against Appellant for personal injuries and the issue of damages was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of Appellees. Appellant appeals, arguing that the jury’s award of damages for loss of earning capacity, future medical expenses, permanent injury, and loss of consortium is contrary to the law and evidence. Because there is material evidence to support the jury’s verdict, we affirm the trial court’s judgment on same. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Wanda Cavaliere et al. v. State of Tennessee
This appeal arises from proceedings in the Tennessee Claims Commission and follows a trial concerning care received by the decedent while at the Tennessee State Veterans Home. The Claims Commission ultimately found that the claimants had failed to establish a health care liability claim and therefore dismissed the case. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of dismissal. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Hailey C.
A father filed a petition in Tennessee to domesticate and modify a Kentucky child-custody decree. The court later entered an agreed order granting the petition, which was not appealed. Three months later, the mother filed a motion to set aside the final judgment on the grounds of fraud and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court denied her Rule 60.02 motion and her subsequent Rule 59.04 motion. Because the court did not rule on the mother’s claims of fraud, we vacate the denial of the Rule 60.02 motion and remand for further proceedings. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Moore Freight Services, Inc. v. Grant Mize et al.
This is an interlocutory appeal involving a discovery dispute. The plaintiff corporation initiated this action to enforce a non-competition provision in an employment agreement, naming as defendants the plaintiff’s former chief operating officer and his current employer. Central to the discovery dispute, the plaintiff averred that it had terminated the chief operating officer’s employment for cause based on having learned that he had been involved in a payment scheme involving benefits and favors to an employee of one of the plaintiff’s customers. The defendants averred that the employment termination had actually been due to the plaintiff’s corporate restructuring. Prior to the chief operating officer’s employment termination, the plaintiff had retained outside counsel to conduct an internal investigation, and the customer whose employee had been identified as the recipient of the scheme had likewise conducted an investigation. Upon the defendants’ motion to compel discovery of materials related to the plaintiff’s internal investigation, the plaintiff opposed the motion, asserting that the materials were entitled to protection pursuant to the attorney-client privilege, common interest privilege, and work product doctrine. Following a hearing, the trial court found that the defendants had established, prima facie, that the plaintiff had waived the asserted privileges and protections by placing the internal investigation materials at issue in the litigation. The trial court then conducted an in camera review of specific materials presented to the court during the final day of the hearing. At the time these materials were submitted, it was undisputed that the only attorney work product included in the materials was “fact” or “ordinary” work product with no “opinion” work product included. Following in camera review, the trial court entered an order granting the motion to compel specifically as to the materials it had reviewed. Upon the plaintiff’s motion, the trial court entered an agreed order granting permission for application to this Court for an interlocutory appeal addressing the certified issue of whether the plaintiff had “waived the work product, attorney-client, and common interest privilege or protection by placing the internal investigation ‘at issue’ in this litigation.” This Court subsequently granted permission for interlocutory appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
New Dairy Kentucky, LLC v. Mike Tamarit
This is an action by a dairy on a sworn account against the former owner of a dairy distributor who signed a personal guaranty that obligated him to pay any past-due debts accrued by the distributorship to the plaintiff dairy. When the former owner signed the personal guaranty, he was the sole member/owner of the distributorship; however, he sold his membership interest in the distributorship in May 2015. At the time of the sale, the distributor owed $60,484.95 to the plaintiff dairy. One month later, when the plaintiff dairy learned of the sale, it created a new account for the distributor and sent both the distributor and the guarantor a demand for payment of the old account balance, the amount owing when the guarantor sold his membership interest in the distributor. Neither the distributor nor the guarantor paid the old account balance, and the dairy sued them both. The dairy later voluntarily nonsuited the distributor, with whom the dairy was continuing to do business under the new account number, leaving the guarantor as the sole defendant. Thereafter, the trial court granted the dairy’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to the guarantor’s liability and held an evidentiary hearing on damages. After the hearing, the court entered a judgment against the guarantor for $130,102.12, including the principal debt, prejudgment interest, and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the guarantor argues that the creditor breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by not seeking payment from the distribution company. We disagree. The personal guaranty obligated the guarantor to pay all amounts not paid by the distributor, whether or not the dairy sought payment from the distributor. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Cora W.
This appeal concerns the termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Macon County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Zackery B. (“Father”) and Anna H. (“Mother”) to their minor child Cora W. (“the Child”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order finding by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds of wanton disregard and severe child abuse were proven against both parents. The Juvenile Court found further, also by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. Mother and Father appeal. Among other things, both parents argue that their pre-incarceration conduct was not part of a broader pattern sufficient to sustain the ground of wanton disregard. Neither parent disputes the ground of severe child abuse, which was based upon the Child’s massive exposure to drugs including methamphetamine. We affirm the Juvenile Court. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
Kara Krulewicz v. Joshua Krulewicz
The trial court modified the divorced parties’ residential parenting schedule, increasing Father’s parenting time. Mother appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Meghan Conley v. Knox County Sheriff, Et Al.
This is a Tennessee Public Records Act case. The trial court found that Appellant willfully denied two of Appellee’s twelve public records requests, but it awarded Appellee attorney’s fees and costs incurred throughout the entire litigation. We affirm the trial court’s findings that Appellant willfully denied two of Appellee’s public records requests. However, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Appellee costs and fees incurred throughout the entire litigation. Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the trial court’s order and remand with instructions. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed, and Appellee’s request for appellate attorney’s fees and costs is denied. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Adam Garabrant v. Jeffery Chambers Et Al.
In this dispute concerning the ownership of a parcel of unimproved real property, the plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to quiet title to the property at issue. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered an order ruling in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
Reginald McWilliams v. Shelby County Land Bank, et al.
This appeal arises from a collateral attack of a tax sale of real property. The action was commenced by a pro se plaintiff against various Shelby County government entities. The plaintiff and his siblings inherited real property from their father, who died in 1992, and subsequently failed to pay property taxes for a number of years. The Shelby County Trustee’s office notified the plaintiff of the tax debt and an impending tax sale. The plaintiff did not pay the debt, and the property was sold. Several years later, the plaintiff commenced this action by filing an “‘Emergency’ Application for a Restraining Order” to prevent Defendants from “stealing” his property. After a hearing, the trial court denied the Application for a Restraining Order and dismissed the action with prejudice. This appeal followed. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Roger Baskin v. Pierce and Allred Construction, Inc.
Plaintiff Roger Baskin sued Pierce & Allred Construction, Inc. (“Defendant”) for breach of contract and breach of warranty, alleging Defendant failed to construct a house in Muscle Shoals, Alabama, in accordance with the parties’ contract. Plaintiff alleged that although he “paid construction costs totaling more than $1,700,000, [Defendant] failed to complete construction of the house and has left Plaintiff with a home riddled with construction defects that affect every major system of the home.” Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(2) and (3), asserting that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over it, and that venue was improper in Davidson County. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. We hold that Defendant’s contacts with Tennessee, including its purposeful applications for a certificate of authority to transact business and for a contractor’s license in Tennessee, are such that Defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in this state. Consequently, Tennessee courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant. We further find that Davidson County is a proper venue for this action, and therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Stromsnes et al. v. RRM et al.
The plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s grant of the defendants’ motion to involuntarily dismiss the action at the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ presentation of their evidence, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02. The plaintiffs’ brief on appeal severely fails to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6. We, therefore, find that the plaintiffs have waived their issues on appeal. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
The City of Cleveland v. The Health Services and Development Agency, State of Tennessee, et al.
This appeal concerns opposition by the City of Cleveland, Tennessee (“the City”) to an application by Middle Tennessee Treatment Centers, LLC, d/b/a Cleveland Comprehensive Treatment Center (“CCTC”) to operate a nonresidential, substitution-based treatment center for opiate addiction within the City. The City filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) against the Tennessee Health Services and Development Agency (“the Agency”) seeking to have the certificate of need granted for CCTC revoked on grounds that CCTC failed to provide proof of service upon the City by certified mail, return receipt requested, in contravention of Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-1607(c)(9)(A). CCTC intervened in the case. CCTC and the Agency (“Defendants,” collectively) filed motions to dismiss. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The City appeals. We hold, inter alia, that the purpose of the notice provision in Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-1607(c)(9)(A) is to afford the relevant officials an opportunity to participate in an Agency hearing on whether a certificate of need is granted; proof of receipt is required. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Charles E. Walker v. State of Tennessee-
A homeowner brought an action for nuisance and unlawful taking against the State of Tennessee for its alleged failure to maintain a drainage facility on an easement the State acquired from a prior owner of the property. On grant of summary judgment, the Tennessee Claims Commission found no evidence to suggest the State constructed the faulty drainage structures the homeowner alleged caused the flooding and, therefore, the State was not required to maintain or repair the faulty structures. Discerning no error, we affirm the Claims Commission’s ruling. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Eric Neff et al. v. Dennis Wood et al.
A property owner sued a neighboring property owner for breach of an easement agreement. The defendant filed a countercomplaint alleging that the plaintiff committed the first material breach. The trial court found that the defendant had violated the agreement, but the violation did not rise to the level of a material breach. The court also found that the defendant had not proven that the plaintiff breached the agreement. So the court dismissed both the complaint and the countercomplaint. But the court also granted detailed declaratory relief. On appeal, we conclude that the court erred in failing to award attorney’s fees as mandated by the easement agreement. The court also erred by imposing a construction deadline on one party that was not included in the easement agreement. In all other respects, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Eltricia Laree Cook v. Gary Lynn Fuqua et al.
A woman sued a homeowner for negligence due to injuries she sustained when a pot-bellied pig maintained on the homeowner’s property jumped on her and knocked her off of the homeowner’s front porch. The homeowner filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that he did not owe the woman a duty of reasonable care because she was a trespasser. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, and the woman appealed. Determining that genuine issues of material fact still exist because the homeowner failed to establish that the woman was a trespasser, we reverse the trial court’s judgment. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Carlee A.
This appeal follows several related cases involving a now-adopted child. The first case was a surrender proceeding filed in chancery court, the second case was a termination of parental rights proceeding filed in chancery court, and the third case was a proceeding for termination of parental rights and adoption filed in circuit court. Upon the filing of the petition for adoption, the chancery court matters were transferred to circuit court. Three individuals who were parties to the chancery court proceedings jointly filed a motion to intervene in the adoption proceeding, which the circuit court denied. The circuit court also dismissed the claims that had been filed by those three parties in chancery court. The three would-be intervenors appeal the dismissal of their claims filed in chancery court. We affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Da'Moni J. Et Al.
This appeal arises from the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor children upon the juvenile court’s finding the statutory grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of and financial responsibility for the children. The juvenile court further found that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We vacate the statutory ground of persistent conditions because we are unable to verify that this finding was the independent judgment of the juvenile court. We affirm the remaining grounds for the termination of the mother’s parental rights, as well as the juvenile court’s determination that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
James P. Little M.D. Et Al. v. City of Chattanooga, Tennessee
This is a mandamus action in which the plaintiffs seek to compel the City of Chattanooga (“the City”), pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-51-108(e), to complete the plans of services arising from a 1972 annexation and to publish annual reports of its progress pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-51-108(c). Two areas of the 1972 annexation are at issue: (1) an area known as “Tiftonia” or “Area 4” and (2) an area known as “Wauhatchee–Williams Island” or “Area 12.” The plaintiffs also seek a declaration that all annexations by the City since 1981 were void due to the City’s violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-51-102(b)(5), which prohibits a municipality from annexing additional territory while in default on a prior plan of services. After three years of trial preparation, but prior to trial, the court imposed monetary sanctions against the City under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.03 in the amount of $263,273.08 for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses caused by the City’s failure to supplement discovery responses. Thereafter, the case was tried in three phases. Following the first phase of the trial in 2017, the court found the City complied with its obligations as to Area 4; however, it found the City “materially and substantially failed to comply” with its obligations to provide street paving, street construction, and sanitary sewers in Area 12. Following the second phase of the trial in 2019, the court found the City’s failure to comply with its obligations as to Area 12 was not excused in that it was not caused by “unforeseen circumstances.” As a consequence, the court ordered the City to submit a proposed scope of services to be provided, which would, inter alia, be the subject of the Phase 3 trial. After the third and final phase of the trial in 2020, the court found the City’s proposed scope of services was insufficient and issued a writ of mandamus ordering the City to bring all streets up to current standards and install, inter alia, a gravity-fed sewer system for Area 12 within 48 months. The court also ordered the City to publish annual reports of its progress and enjoined the City from further annexations until the services were provided. Finally, the court found the plaintiffs were not entitled to additional relief for the City’s past violations of §§ 6-51-102(b)(5) and - 108(c). Both parties appealed. The plaintiffs contend, inter alia, that the trial court erred 01/25/2022 - 2 - by finding the City complied with the plan of services for Area 4 and by denying their request for additional relief under §§ 6-51-102(b)(5) and -108(c). The City contends that § 6-51-102(b)(5) and § 6-51-108(c) and (e) do not apply to the annexations of Area 4 and Area 12 because the statutes were enacted after the annexation ordinances were passed. The City also contends that the plaintiffs lack standing, and that their claims are barred by the doctrine of laches and the applicable statute of limitations. In the alternative, the City asserts that the trial court erred by finding it failed to materially and substantially comply with the plan of services for Area 12. The City also appeals the trial court’s award of sanctions for noncompliance with discovery under Rule of Civil Procedure 37.03. Following a thorough review, we reverse and modify the trial court’s judgment regarding the standards that apply to the City’s provision of street paving and construction in Area 12; vacate its judgment regarding the City’s provision of sanitary and storm sewers in Areas 4 and 12; and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm the court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Kelly R. Russell v. Chattanooga Property Management, LLC
This appeal involves a United Postal Service (“UPS”) worker who was injured when her foot went through the porch of a residence at which she was delivering a package. The UPS worker sued the property management company who leased the property, alleging it was liable for her injuries. The trial court dismissed the case on summary judgment, finding the property management company had no duty to the UPS worker. Because the record on appeal does not contain the lease agreement the trial court relied upon in granting the property management company’s motion for summary judgment, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case to the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Kim Renae Nelson v. Loring E. Justice
During a previous appeal in this action involving issues of child support and custody, this Court awarded to the mother her attorney’s fees incurred on appeal and remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions to determine the amount of such award. Following remand, the trial court conducted a hearing to consider evidence concerning the mother’s attorney’s fees. The trial court subsequently entered an order setting the mother’s award of reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of $150,218.02. The father has appealed. Based upon our thorough review of the evidence presented, we modify the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to the mother from $150,218.02 to $123,195.00. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed as modified. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Jason M. Peterson v. Jodi L. Carey
This negligence case arises from a one-car accident in which the Plaintiff Jason M. Peterson, a passenger in a car driven by Defendant Jodi L. Carey, was injured. Plaintiff filed his complaint more than one year after he was injured. Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the one-year statute of limitations for personal injuries, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(A), had run and the case was untimely filed. Plaintiff argued that because Defendant was given a citation for failure to exercise due care, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3- 104(a)(2), which provides for a two-year limitations period if “[c]riminal charges are brought against any person alleged to have caused or contributed to the injury,” applies. Defendant responded that because the police issued her citation under the Kingsport Municipal Code, the total fine was fifty dollars, a penalty that was civil and not criminal in nature. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s action with prejudice, holding it was filed too late. Because no evidence of the citation was presented to the trial court, and there is no indication in the trial court’s final judgment that it considered the arguments regarding the citation, we vacate and remand for the trial court to consider the evidence and rule on the issue presented. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Brent H. Moore v. Karen R. Moore
Following their divorce, both parents sought modification of a permanent parenting plan. The parents agreed that there had been a material change in circumstances warranting a modification. But they disagreed over the parenting schedule and who should be the primary residential parent. Among other things, the trial court retained the father as the primary residential parent and gave him sole decision making over major decisions. And the court substantially reduced the mother’s parenting time. Both parents also filed petitions for contempt against the other. In part, the father sought to hold the mother in contempt for failure to make certain payments as required by the divorce decree. Although the court dismissed all of the contempt petitions, it ordered the mother to pay the father for the missed payments anyway. We vacate the modified plan and remand for a determination of the minor child’s best interest. Otherwise, we affirm. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals |
