In Re Gracelyn H., et al.
A grandfather commenced this action for grandparent visitation after his daughter and two granddaughters moved out of his house. While the action was pending, the trial court entered an agreed order that granted temporary visitation to the grandfather. When the mother refused to comply with the agreed order, the grandfather filed a motion for civil contempt. Following several delays, the petition for grandparent visitation and the motion for contempt came on for hearing on the same day. After the final hearing, the trial court denied both the petition for grandparent visitation and the motion for civil contempt. The court found that the grandfather failed to prove that losing his relationship with the children would create a risk of substantial harm to the children. The court also found that the mother’s failure to comply with the agreed order was not willful because she had been coerced into the agreement by her former attorney. This appeal followed. We affirm the dismissal of the petition for grandparent visitation. With regard to the motion for civil contempt, we find the issue is moot because the grandfather no longer had any right to visitation after this petition was dismissed. Thus, the contempt issue is pretermitted on the basis of mootness. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Tracee Annette Higgins v. Laura Smith McCord
This personal injury action arose following a motor vehicle accident. The plaintiff timely commenced an action in which she sought $1 million in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive damages. After the defendant was served but failed to file an answer to the complaint, the plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment, which the trial court granted as to liability only, leaving open the amount of damages to be awarded. The case remained dormant for seven years until the plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint that increased the request for compensatory damages from $1 million to $2 million. The amended complaint, however, was never served on the defendant. Thereafter, a final judgment was entered in which the plaintiff was awarded the monetary damages she sought in the amended complaint, that being $2 million for compensatory damages and $1 million for punitive damages. Seventeen months later, and after paying $30,000 toward the $3 million judgment, the defendant filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(3) motion to set aside the default judgment on the ground the judgment was void ab initio for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff opposed the motion arguing, inter alia, that the Rule 60.02(3) motion was untimely and that it should be denied based on exceptional circumstances as recognized in Turner v. Turner, 473 S.W.3d 257 (Tenn. 2015). Following a hearing and finding the motion timely, the trial court determined (1) that the defendant had not been served with the amended complaint, (2) that the judgment was void, and (3) that the plaintiff had not proven the requisite exceptional circumstances to deprive the defendant of Rule 60 relief due to the plaintiff’s failure to establish another person’s detrimental reliance on the void judgment. We affirm. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
Douglas Patrick Hoering v. Marlita Dapar Hoering
In this post-divorce action, Douglas Patrick Hoering (“Husband”) petitioned for a modification of his periodic alimony payment to Marlita Dapar (“Wife”), alleging that “she is no longer suffering from a financial disadvantage, as she has obtained housing and support from her paramour for some time.” The trial court ordered a reduction in Husband’s monthly spousal support payment from $1,200 to $600, in a judgment containing no findings of fact. Based on our de novo review of the record, we hold that Husband failed to demonstrate a substantial and material change of circumstances that would warrant decreasing his payment of alimony in futuro to Wife. The judgment of the trial court is reversed. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
David Cupples, et al. v. Jonathan Alan Holmes, et al.
In this case involving a petition for grandparent visitation, where the minor child’s parents had divorced and the mother had been admitted to an inpatient rehabilitation facility, the maternal grandparents asserted that the minor child’s father had prevented them from visiting with the child once the father had obtained full custody of the child. The trial court conducted a hearing and subsequently granted to the grandparents monthly visitation with the child plus additional time during school breaks and holidays. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We decline, however, to grant an award of attorney’s fees to the grandparents on appeal. |
Decatur | Court of Appeals | |
Tony Alan Baker v. Shauna Phillips McSherry
In a parentage action, the juvenile court adopted a permanent parenting plan and determined the father’s child support obligation. The court also declined a request to change the child’s name. On appeal, both parents take issue with the parenting plan, and the mother claims that the father’s income was higher than found by the court. Despite their differences, the parents agree that the court’s order contains insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. We vacate in part and remand. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
Heather Steele Christy v. Brandon Jade Christy
In this post-divorce proceeding, Father appeals a default judgment entered against him as a sanction that: 1) modified the parties’ parenting plan and decreased his child support obligation based on the emancipation of one of his children and 2) awarded Mother a monetary judgment in the amount of $7,635 ($2,000 as reimbursement for half of the middle child’s vehicle; $500 for sanctions not paid; and $5,135 for attorney’s fees and court costs paid by Mother). Father filed a motion requesting the trial court to set aside the default judgment, asserting he did not receive proper notice of Mother’s motion for default. The trial court summarily denied Father’s motion without holding a hearing. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Beulah Blankenship, Et Al. v. Bradley Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center Et Al.
In this healthcare liability action, a decedent’s estate and her son sued a nursing home and the county that owned the nursing home, alleging that the nursing home was negligent in the care of the decedent. The nursing home and the county filed a motion to dismiss the case for failure to comply with the certificate of good faith filing requirement in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122. The trial court denied the motion, finding that an exhibit attached to the complaint satisfied the certificate of good faith filing requirement. Because the exhibit did not contain all of the information required for a certificate of good faith, we reverse and remand. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Diamond F. et al.
The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Brenda F.1 (“Mother”) and David F. (“Father”) to their three children who were then minors. As grounds, DCS alleged: (1) abandonment by failure to visit one of the children, Orian F.; (2) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home for the children; (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (4) persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal; (5) incompetency of the parents to provide care and supervision of the children; and (6) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children. The trial court found that DCS established all six grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence, and that termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Although the parents have appealed only the ground of abandonment by failure to visit and the trial court’s best interest findings, we have reviewed all of the alleged grounds, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Autumn H.
This appeal involves a mother’s petition seeking to relocate to Canada with the parties’ minor child. Determining relocation to Canada with the mother to be in the child’s best interest, the juvenile court approved the mother’s petition, and the father appealed to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee et al. v. Davidson County Election Commission
At issue is an election commission’s decision to set an election on proposed referendum measures to a local government’s charter. In pre-election litigation over this decision, the trial court concluded, for various reasons, that the election commission’s decision to hold the election should be reversed. The election commission now urges this Court to reinstate its decision to hold an election and to remand this matter to it with instructions to schedule a referendum election at a future date pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-3-204(a). As explained in more detail in this Opinion, we conclude that this requested relief is not proper under the cited statute. Moreover, because this appeal cannot serve as a vehicle to grant the election commission any relief, we consider the matter moot. Notwithstanding this posture in the case, we do find it appropriate, in the exercise of our discretion, to address one of the specific legal issues presented by this appeal as an exception to the mootness doctrine. As to that issue, which concerns the interpretation of a form requirement the local government’s charter places on petitions to amend the charter by referendum election, we agree with the trial court that the referendum petition at issue in this case ran afoul of the requirement in dispute. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Mary Bell McGraw Marlin v. Harry Whitehead Marlin, III, et al.
This appeal concerns the interpretation of a will. Mary Bell McGraw Marlin (“Decedent”), a property owner in Rutherford County, left her farm to her surviving children. Decedent’s holographic will provided equal acres to each heir, although a survey purporting to show how to divide the land was missing. After years of futile discussions over how to divide the farm, Decedent’s grandson Harry Marlin, III filed suit in chancery court seeking to partition the land. The matter was referred to the Probate Court for Rutherford County (“the Probate Court”). After a hearing, the Probate Court entered an order dividing the land amongst the heirs. Harry Marlin, III appeals. He argues that the Probate Court erred by dividing the land into equal acres without regard to the economic value of the respective tracts. We hold, inter alia, that Decedent’s will controls and it provided for equal acres, not equally valued acres. We further find that the evidence does not preponderate against the Probate Court’s determination as to which tract each heir was to receive. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Cortrease Tate, et al. v. Shelby County Board of Education
This appeal involves an action resulting from an alleged assault on a minor by a substitute teacher employed by the Shelby County Board of Education. The trial court granted Shelby County’s motion to dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 3 and 4.03 regarding process and service of process. The plaintiff appeals. We reverse and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Pamela Lott v. Veronica Mallett, M.D., et al.
Appellant initially filed suit against a doctor and the hospital where she had surgery. Nearly a year later, Appellant amended her complaint to add the doctor’s employer as an additional defendant. The first suit was voluntarily dismissed, and the plaintiff refiled against the doctor and her employer, relying on the savings statute. The trial court dismissed the claims against the doctor on the basis that Appellant failed to substantially comply with the Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121 in the second action and therefore was not entitled to an extension on the savings statute. The trial court granted the employer summary judgment on the basis that the first complaint naming it was not filed within the applicable statute of limitations. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Herbert H. Slatery, III, et al. v. Necessary Oil Co., et al.
The State filed this action against the defendants for judicial enforcement of an order and assessment entered by the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation concerning violations of the Water Quality Control Act. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the State as to the defendants’ liability for upfront civil penalties and damages due under the order. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Carla D. Gifford v. Daniel S. Greenberg
Daniel Greenberg appeals the order of the Circuit Court for Williamson County (the “trial court”), enrolling a California judgment under which Mr. Greenberg is obligated to pay child support to his ex-wife. Because his brief is not in compliance with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27, Father’s issues are waived and his appeal must be dismissed. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Jayme Holland v. Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security
The police seized a vehicle and commenced a forfeiture proceeding. The Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security notified the vehicle owner that a forfeiture warrant for the vehicle had been issued. And the owner filed a written claim and request for a hearing. But before the hearing could take place, the administrative law judge granted the Department’s request for a voluntary dismissal of the forfeiture proceeding. In a subsequent order, the administrative law judge awarded attorney’s fees to the owner under Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-325(a). The Department petitioned for judicial review of the fee award. The owner filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the administrative decision was not final because the order did not address her request for attorney’s fees under a federal statute. After denying the motion to dismiss, the trial court ruled that the fee award violated the state statute. So it vacated the administrative decision. On appeal, the owner argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss and in ruling that the fee award violated the state statute. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Martha Harrison Bane v. John Bane Et Al.
Martha Harrison Bane conveyed an approximately eight-acre tract of land to her son and daughter-in-law in 2003. Several years later, Ms. Bane sought to have the deed set aside on the basis of undue influence. A default judgment was entered against the defendants and the land was re-conveyed back to Ms. Bane by a Clerk and Master’s deed. Several years after that, the defendants had the default judgment set aside. The trial court then held a hearing on the original petition to have the deed set aside in February of 2018 and determined that the deed was valid. Ms. Bane’s estate appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. City of Memphis, et al.
Plaintiffs filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a binding judicial interpretation of a contract executed by the three defendants. Plaintiffs were not parties to the contract, nor did their complaint allege that they were third-party beneficiaries of it. The three defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim based on lack of standing, which the trial court granted. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Walker, et al. v. Rivertrail Crossing Homeowner's Association, Inc., et al.
This is a premises liability case arising from injuries sustained by Appellant Anthony Walker when he attempted to mow a section of ground within the common area controlled by Appellee, Rivertrail Crossing Homeowner’s Association. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Tristan H.
This is an appeal from a termination of parental rights proceeding. As to the mother of the child at issue, we vacate the trial court’s termination of her parental rights due to procedural concerns that are acknowledged by the Department of Children’s Services. With respect to the father of the child, however, we conclude that one ground for termination was properly established. We further conclude that the evidence clearly and convincingly shows that the termination of the father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Teli White v. Shelby County Board of Education
Appellee, a tenured high school teacher, petitioned for judicial review of Appellant Shelby County Board of Education’s decision to terminate his employment. Without making findings to explain its reasoning, the trial court remanded the case to the school board for a second hearing. From our review, neither party argued that the school board’s initial hearing was procedurally deficient. As such, the trial court’s decision to remand the case to the school board, without findings to support such decision, was error. Vacated and Remanded |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Martina Smith, et al. v. Donna Jean Walker, et al.
Appellants purchased a home from Appellee that was contaminated with mold. Appellants therefore filed suit against Appellee. The trial court granted summary judgment in Appellee’s favor. Because the trial court’s order does not comply with Rule 56.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure or Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., we vacate and remand. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Gehlen Liebetreu v. Sandra Liebetreu
Father appeals the trial court’s award of unsupervised parenting time and an award of attorney’s fees to Mother. Specifically, Father argues that Mother is a high risk for abduction of the parties’ children and that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing her unsupervised visitation. We affirm the trial court’s award of unsupervised parenting time to Mother, but we reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to her. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jayce D. et al.
This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that seven grounds for termination as to the mother were proven: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for failure to support; (3) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for wanton disregard; (4) abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; (5) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (6) persistent conditions; and (7) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. Additionally, the juvenile court found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The mother appeals. On appeal, the Department of Children’s Services does not defend the ground of abandonment by failure to visit. We reverse the juvenile court in part and affirm in part, affirming the ultimate termination of parental rights. |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re SmileDirectClub, Inc. Securities Litigation
In this action alleging violations of a federal securities law due to purported misrepresentations and omissions in an initial public stock offering, the plaintiffs sought to certify a class consisting of all persons who purchased common stock during the initial public offering. The trial court certified the class, determining that the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 23 had been satisfied. The defendants have appealed. Although we dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims under section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77l, due to lack of standing, we otherwise affirm the trial court’s certification of the proposed class. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
