In Re Emma F. Et Al.
This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor children. Following a bench trial, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence in support of one statutory ground of termination, the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the children. We vacate the judgment of the trial court, holding that the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence to support the sole statutory ground of termination found by the trial court. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee v. Abdiqani Gelle
The defendant appeals the trial court’s judgment finding that he violated a reckless driving city ordinance, Metropolitan Code of Law § 12.68.180, when he drove 65 miles per hour in a 45-mile-per-hour zone. During trial, Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, Tennessee (“Metro”) presented evidence regarding the defendant’s speed to support its allegation that the defendant was driving recklessly. Following proof of the defendant’s excessive speed, the trial court found that the defendant had failed to rebut the presumption created by ordinance that he was driving in such a way as to demonstrate “a wilful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” The defendant challenges the constitutionality of such ordinance, which provides a rebuttable presumption that the defendant was driving recklessly when driving at least fifteen miles per hour over the speed limit. However, the defendant’s issues concerning constitutionality of the ordinance were not properly raised or decided by the trial court, and upon our determination that the ordinance is not facially unconstitutional, we hold that the defendant has waived his issues regarding the constitutionality of the ordinance. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment that the defendant violated Metropolitan Code of Law § 12.68.180. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee v. Abdiqani Gelle- Dissent
John W. McClarty, J., dissenting. The majority affirms the trial court’s judgment that the defendant, Abdiqani Gelle (“Defendant”), violated a reckless driving city ordinance, Metropolitan Code of Law §12.68.180, by driving 65 miles per hour in a 45-mile-per-hour zone. The trial court determined that Defendant had failed to rebut the presumption created by the ordinance that he demonstrated “a willful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property,” i.e., drove recklessly. Defendant challenges the constitutionality of the ordinance. Specifically, Defendant raises the issue of whether the ordinance violates his due process rights under the Tennessee Constitution, article 1, section 8, whether the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) has jurisdiction to administer a “criminal-type punishment” due to violation of its ordinance, and whether such punishment would violate Defendant’s rights under the Tennessee Constitution, article 1, section 16. Metro argues that Defendant waived the issues by failing to properly raise them during the trial proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
HCTEC Partners, LLC v. James Prescott Crawford et al.
In 2012, plaintiff HCTec Partners, LLC (“HCTec”) and James Prescott Crawford (“Crawford”) entered into an employment agreement under which Crawford was prohibited from disclosing any of HCTec’s confidential information and competing with HCTec for one year after Crawford’s employment with HCTec ended. When Crawford left HCTec to work for a competitor in 2019, HCTec sought to enforce the agreement. HCTec sued Crawford for breach of contract and sued Crawford’s new employer, The Rezult Group, Inc. (“Rezult”), for inducement of breach pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-50-109. After extensive discovery, HCTec moved for summary judgment as to both claims, which the trial court granted. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision in all respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re TWT Acquisition, LLC Property ID: 003 009.04 Tax Years 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017
Two counties assessed the same property for multiple tax years. The taxpayer appealed the double assessments to the State Board of Equalization. The administrative law judge determined that Houston County had assessed the taxpayer’s real and personal property for more than five years before Stewart County assessed the same property. Based on Tennessee Code Annotated § 5-2-115(d), the judge voided the later assessment. The Assessment Appeals Commission reversed in part. The Commission ruled that the state statute only applied to real property. And because the personal property was located in Stewart County, Stewart County was the proper taxing authority for that property. The trial court affirmed the agency decision. On appeal, we conclude that Tennessee Code Annotated § 5-2-115(d) only applies to real property. Because the agency’s decision is also supported by substantial and material evidence in the record, we affirm. |
Houston | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kenneth D.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. Because the trial court’s order lacks sufficient factual findings and legal conclusions, we vacate and remand. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Naomi B.
This appeal concerns termination of parental rights. Paternal grandparents Russell B. (“Grandfather”) and Louella B. (“Grandmother”) (“Grandparents,” collectively) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Washington County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Alexandria Y. (“Mother”) and Ricky B. (“Father”) to their minor child, Naomi B. (“the Child”). After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child. Mother and Father appeal. Grandparents raise additional issues as appellees. We find, inter alia, that in addition to the grounds found by the Trial Court, the proof is clear and convincing in support of the grounds alleged by Grandparents of abandonment by failure to visit against Mother and persistent conditions against both Mother and Father. We find further, as did the Trial Court, that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court as modified, resulting in affirmance of the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
William B. Stinson v. Vest Family Limited Partnership et al.
The plaintiff in this action filed a petition for declaratory judgment to quiet title to his farm in Maury County, Tennessee. In his petition, the plaintiff asked for all relief necessary to quiet title, including a declaration on the boundaries of his farm and a declaration on his rights to the disputed property. In their answer, the defendants asserted adverse possession under Tennessee Code Annotated |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Tom Slagle et al. v. The Church of the Firstborn of Tennessee et al.
Appellants seek review of an order granting partial summary judgment. Because the order is not a final order giving rise to a Tenn. R. App. P. 3 appeal, we do not have jurisdiction; accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Jeremy C. Koffman v. Madison County Tennessee ET AL.
In this case, which stemmed from an attack on an inmate at a county jail, the trial court granted judgment in favor of the Defendants. Among other things, the trial court concluded that the assault on the inmate was not foreseeable. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Lester Stokes
This case concerns the trial court’s enforcement of an antenuptial agreement. Appellant and Decedent executed an antenuptial agreement five days prior to marriage. Decedent died two years later. Appellant petitioned the trial court for her elective share, exempt personal property, year’s support, and homestead allowance. Appellees, beneficiaries under Decedent’s will, opposed Appellant’s petition arguing that she waived her spousal rights in the antenuptial agreement. Appellant argued that the antenuptial agreement was unenforceable because she did not enter into it with the required knowledge and/or she executed it under duress. In enforcing the antenuptial agreement, the trial court found that both Appellant and Decedent entered into it with the requisite knowledge of the other’s holdings. On review, we conclude that Appellant lacked knowledge of the full nature, extent, and value of Decedent’s holdings prior to executing the antenuptial agreement. Accordingly, we hold that the agreement is unenforceable. The trial court’s order is reversed. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Calvin Dibrell v. State of Tennessee
Appellant, a former inmate with the Tennessee Department of Correction, filed a complaint against Appellee State of Tennessee in the Tennessee Claims Commission (“Commission”). Appellant asserted numerous claims based on alleged misconduct of several assistant district attorneys. The Commission granted the State’s motion to dismiss based on the Commission’s findings that Appellant’s claims were not within the Commission’s jurisdiction, and were barred by prosecutorial immunity and the applicable statute of limitations. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Haven-Lee S., et al.
Appellants seek accelerated review of a juvenile court magistrate’s denial of their motion for recusal. Because the magistrate’s decision is not subject to an accelerated interlocutory appeal under Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2, we dismiss the petition and transfer the matter to the juvenile court for the juvenile judge to review the decision under Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 4.04 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Aaliyah Butler v. Patrick Ross
A father has appealed from an order setting his child support obligation. Because the father did not file his notice of appeal with the clerk of the appellate court within the time permitted by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Eman Ibrahim Ahmad Alkhateeb v. Ahmad Mustafa Jamil Alhouwari
This is an appeal by Wife from a final decree of divorce. After a thorough review of the record and the trial court’s order, we affirm in part and vacate in part. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Robert K. Perry v. Thomas Brockway, Sr. et al.
Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his action to set aside several alleged fraudulent conveyances. Because the orders appealed do not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Kendra C. Killian v. Aubrey D. Moore
In this post-divorce proceeding, a father sought to modify a parenting plan to increase his parenting time and reduce his child support obligation. He later sought to be designated as primary residential parent for the parties’ daughter due to threats made by the mother’s then-husband. The father was designated as such on a temporary basis, and the mother filed numerous motions seeking to be restored as the primary residential parent. After a trial, the court named Father primary residential parent, finding that a material change in circumstances had occurred and that the change was in the best interest of the child. The trial court entered a new parenting plan and set Mother’s support obligation. The mother appeals the designation and raises many other issues. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Old Republic Life Insurance Company Et Al. v. Roberta Woody Et Al.
This appeal concerns a subrogation action. Roberta Woody (“Woody”) accidentally backed her tractor-trailer into one driven by Darrell King (“King”). King had an insurance policy through Old Republic Life Insurance Company (“Old Republic”). Old Republic, as King’s subrogee, sued Woody and her employer, Osborn Transportation, Inc. (“Osborn”) (“Defendants,” collectively), in the Circuit Court for McMinn County (“the Trial Court”). King later joined as a plaintiff. The Trial Court allowed Old Republic to participate at trial alongside King’s counsel, but did not allow Old Republic to reveal its identity to the jury. After trial, the jury awarded King damages. Old Republic appeals, arguing among other things that it should have been permitted to identify itself so as to make a case for its own unique and specific damages. We hold, inter alia, that in this subrogation action, Old Republic could recover damages from Defendants only to the extent King could, and the Trial Court did not commit reversible error in preventing Old Republic from identifying itself to the jury. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Erin N. ET. AL.
In this case involving termination of the father’s parental rights to his children, the Sullivan County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) determined that several statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Susan Bennett v. Duncan Geoffrey Bennett
Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Isaac D. Walker v. Robert L. McMillin et al.
This appeal arises from the summary dismissal of a negligence action filed by a plaintiff-motorist against a truck driver and the driver’s employer. The plaintiff alleged that he was injured in a single-vehicle accident on Interstate 24 in Nashville, Tennessee,when he swerved to avoid tire debris from the truck driver’s trailer. The plaintiff further alleged that the truck driver and his employer were negligent in the maintenance and inspection of the vehicle, and that the truck driver acted negligently by leaving the debris on the roadway without attempting to retrieve it, warn other motorists, or call law enforcement. After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. The trial court granted the motion in part, finding no evidence that the tire blowout was caused by a failure in the maintenance and inspection of the tire. The court also found no evidence that the truck driver’s failure to call law enforcement caused the accident. But the court asked for supplemental briefing on whether a driver has a common-law duty to remove from a roadway tire debris that came from his vehicle and/or a duty to warn motorists of the debris. After additional briefing and a second hearing, the court summarily dismissed that claim as well, ruling that the defendant truck driver had no duty as a matter of law to attempt to retrieve the tire from the interstate highway and that there were no facts to support a finding that the defendant driver had sufficient time to do so. The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend, arguing that he was entitled to the benefit of an adverse inference for spoliation of evidence as a discovery sanction because the defendants failed to preserve the blown tire. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the plaintiff knew about the potential spoliation issue for six years and failed to raise it in his response to the motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed. We affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michelle Alexa Herbert v. Fabian Jesse Herbert
A review of the record on appeal reveals that the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As such, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Martin Thompson v. Christie Lee Thompson
The sole issue on appeal in this divorce action pertains to the coverture formula employed to fund the husband’s marital interest in the wife’s retirement account via a deferred distribution method. On the morning the case was set for a final hearing, the parties and their attorneys appeared in open court and announced they had agreed to the division of the marital estate with the exception of the implementing language required to fund the husband’s marital interest in the wife’s retirement account. Because the wife had a substantially larger account than the husband but lacked the financial resources to fund a present distribution of her retirement account, the parties announced in open court that they had agreed to an offset of their respective pensions and authorized the court to enter a final judgment using the coverture formula to affect a deferred distribution. Following the entry of the final order, the wife filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04 motion to set aside the order, contending that the trial court applied a deferred distribution method that did not reflect the parties’ agreement. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Mack, ET AL. v. Cable Equipment Services INC., ET AL.
This appeal arises from litigation involving an incident that occurred in 2010. Suit was originally filed in 2011. After a voluntary nonsuit, the complaint was refiled in 2014. Years later, the plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to add additional defendants. The trial court granted leave to amend but reserved ruling on whether the claims against the new parties would relate back to the date of the original complaint under the provisions of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.03. The amended complaint was filed in 2018. The newly added defendants moved to dismiss on the basis that none of the elements required for relation back under Rule 15.03 had been shown to exist. After a hearing, the trial judge agreed and provided an oral ruling in favor of the defendants. Before a written order was entered to that effect, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit without prejudice. The trial court subsequently entered an order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The trial court found that at that point in the proceeding, the allowance of a nonsuit was discretionary, and permitting a nonsuit after its oral ruling would have been unfairly prejudicial to the defendants. As such, it granted the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the basis that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations and did not relate back to the filing of the original or refiled complaint. The plaintiffs filed motions to alter or amend or set aside the order, arguing that the trial court lost jurisdiction at the moment the plaintiffs filed their notice of nonsuit, and therefore, the order of dismissal was void. They also argued that the trial court impermissibly relied on facts that were not found within the amended complaint in resolving the motion to dismiss. The trial court denied both motions. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rhonda Lawson v. Mark Kleinman
Because appellant did not timely file a Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B recusal appeal, and the order appealed does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals |
