COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

State of Tennessee, v. Gary Lewis Thompson
03C01-9703-CR-00105
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Steven Bebb

The appellant, Gary Lewis Thompson, was indicted by a Monroe County Grand Jury for the offense of vehicular homicide, driving under the influence, third offense, and driving on a revoked license. On July 22, 1996, the appellant pled guilty to DUI, third offense, with the sentence to be determined by the trial court. Prior to the guilty plea hearing, the State moved to nolle pros the vehicular homicide charge, which was granted. Additionally, the trial court, upon appellant’s motion, dismissed the charge of driving on a revoked license. Immediately following entry of the guilty plea, the State, for the first time, requested seizure and forfeiture of the appellant’s John Deere tractor, which he was operating at the time the DUI offense occurred. Following a sentencing hearing on September 6, 1996, the trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months twenty-nine days in the county jail and assessed a fine of $7,500 for the DUI, third offense conviction. The appellant’s release percentage was fixed at 75%. The trial court also ordered that the farm tractor be “confiscated” from the appellant’s possession and forfeited to the State. On November 8, 1996, the written order to seize and forfeit the tractor was entered. The appellant appeals from the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(ii), raising the following two issues: I. Whether the period of confinement in the jail is excessive; and II. Whether § 55-10-403(k)(1) properly authorizes forfeiture of his tractor.

Bill McMurry v. Hancock County Election Commission, John Knox Walkup, Attorney General of Tennessee, et al. - Concurring
03A01-9804-CH-
Authoring Judge: Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor William Dale Young

The appellant, a nonlawyer, was elected to the office of General Sessions Judge of Hancock County in the August 1990 general election.

Jeff Hubrig v. Lockheed-Martin Energy Systems, Inc., Linc Hall, Individually; Larry Pierce, Individually, and Jim Kolling, Individually
03A01-9711-CV-00525
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Judge James B. Scott

The plaintiff describes himself as a whistle blower, as that term has come to be used, and seeks damages for his termination from employment because he allegedly refused to participate in and keep silent about certain allegedly illegal corporate activities. The allegations were denied by the defendants whose motion for summary judgment was granted. The plaintiff appeals and presents for review the issues of (1) whether he was terminated for time card abuse and sexual harassment or whether these reasons were pretextual, (2) whether a common law cause of action for retaliatory discharge remains viable in this jurisdiction, and (3) whether his termination constituted outrageous conduct by the defendants. Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial Court is denovo upon the record of the trial Court, accompanied by a presumption of thecorrectness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. R. APP. P., RULE 13(d). See, Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993). We will refer to the plaintiff as Hubrig, or as the appellant, or as the plaintiff. This record is unusually prolix; prima facie, it appeared to reflect a trial by affidavit, an impermissible use of RULE 56, see: Womack v. Blue Cross- Blue Shield, 593 S.W.2d 294 (Tenn. 1980), but an in-depth analysis reveals that the trial court correctly held that the totality of the evidence demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of fact or law. We therefore affirm the judgment.

Jerry Cunningham vs. Baker, et al
02A01-9712-CV-00299

03A01-9901-CH-00015
03A01-9901-CH-00015

Ronnie Erwin v. Moon Products
M2002-00877-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: J. B. Cox
This is an appeal from a denial of an application to compel arbitration. For the following reasons, we affirm the court below.

Regan vs. Malone
03A01-9707-CH-00281

Russell vs. Crutchfield
03A01-9708-CV-00329

McClellan vs. Stanley
03A01-9708-CV-00343

DHS vs. Epps
03A01-9710-JV-00485

Greene vs. Evans
03A01-9710-PH-00487

City of Blaine vs. Hayes
03A01-9711-CH-00520

Foulke vs. City of Greeneville
03A01-9712-CV-00523

Miller vs. Hembree
03A01-9712-CV-00537

Vaughn, et. ux. vs. King, et. ux.
01A01-9707-CV-00330
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, III

Vaughn vs. Vaughn
01A01-9707-CV-00347
Trial Court Judge: Muriel Robinson

Jimmy H. Vaughn, v. Mary Runyon Vaughn
01A01-9707-CV-00347
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Muriel Robinson

The trial court found that there had been a change of circumstances and increased Jimmy Hunter Vaughn’s [husband’s] alimony obligation to Mary Runyon Vaughn [wife] from $400.00 per month to $600.00 per month. The court also found that husband should pay $350.00 as reasonable attorney fees to wife’s attorney

Huang vs. Gates vs. Huang
01A01-9709-CV-00462
Trial Court Judge: Marietta M. Shipley

McGill vs. Hendrix
01A01-9709-PB-00536

Hampton vs. TN. Truck Sales, Inc.
01A01-9711-CH-00640
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy

Bickford vs. Bickford
01A01-9711-CH-00645

Northcott vs. Dept. of Correction
01A01-9707-CH-00355
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle

Allman vs. Allman
M1997-00251-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Thomas Goodall
This appeal involves a dispute over the interpretation of a provision in the marital dissolution agreement giving the wife an automobile but requiring the husband to continue making the car payments. After the automobile was totally destroyed in a one-vehicle accident, the wife's insurance company paid the balance remaining on the car loan. After the husband refused to pay the wife an amount equal to the balance of the car loan, the wife filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking to hold him in contempt. Following a bench trial, the trial judge ordered the husband to pay the wife $7,644.22 representing the balance of the loan when the automobile was destroyed, as well as $1,355 for her legal expenses. We have determined that the marital dissolution agreement allocated the risk of loss of the automobile to the wife and, therefore, reverse the $7,644.22 judgment. We have also determined that the $1,355 judgment must be vacated and that the case should be remanded for further proceedings.

Hoffman vs. Hoffman
03A01-9706-CV-00220

03A01-9708-CV-00377
03A01-9708-CV-00377