APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case involves the dissolution of a seventeen-year long marriage. The parties have raised on appeal issues involving spousal support, child support, their partial marital dissolution agreement and attorney fees. Upon a review of the record and the relevant law, we find that the decision of the trial court should be reversed in part and affirmed in part.

The defendant was convicted by a Sumner County jury of aggravated assault and attempted first degree murder. The defendant alleges on appeal that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to establish guilt of aggravated assault; 2) the trial court erred in allowing victim Kevin Wynn to testify that he had previously seen the defendant with a gun; and 3) the trial court erred by failing to declare a mistrial after testimony that the drug task force kicked in the defendant’s door on a prior occasion, and after testimony that the defendant had previously been arrested. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant bail bond company appeals the en banc order of the Criminal Courts of Davidson County which refused to reinstate its authority to write bail bonds. We conclude the appellant was not given proper notice of grounds relied upon for the refusal to reinstate its authority to write bonds, and the Criminal Courts of Davidson County erroneously refused to reinstate appellant's authority to write bail bonds based upon its alleged failure to notify a defendant of an arraignment date. Accordingly, the judgment refusing to reinstate appellant's ability to write bail bonds is reversed.

This appeal arises from a dispute between brothers-in-law over the sale of a partnership interest in a family dairy business. After reaching an oral  agreement regarding the price of the interest to be sold, the buyer tendered $50,000 of the purchase price to the seller and later  presented a promissory note evidencing an obligation for the $61,000 balance of the sale. The seller’s home subsequently burned and the note was destroyed.  A dispute arose between the parties as to the validity of the note and the existence of an agreement. The seller  contends that the note handed to him by the buyer does not contain the true terms of the contract. He argues that his agreement was with the buyers and not with the buyer's corporation. The buyer contends that his corporation is liable on the note and not him personally. A jury found that the note was not accepted by the seller and rendered judgment against the buyer and his wife, rather than against the corporation. In reviewing the trial court’s denial of the buyer’s motion for a directed verdict, the Court of Appeals reversed the jury’s findings and held that the seller accepted the promissory note and was estopped from denying his acceptance. Accordingly, the intermediate court reversed the judgment against the buyer and his wife, finding them not to be personally liable on the promissory note. After a close review of the record, we have concluded that while the Court of Appeals correctly  reversed the judgment against the buyer’s wife, it erred by reversing the jury’s verdict with respect to the buyer personally. We therefore reinstate the jury’s verdict and judgment against the buyer.

The defendant, Charles Chesteen, served as the Clerk and Master of the Cocke County  Chancery Court from 1984 to 1996. In 1997, he was charged with theft relating to his service in the capacity as conservator of funds of two elderly ladies and with unlawful conversion related to funds misappropriated by him in his official capacity. He pleaded guilty, with the sentencing determination to be made by the trial court. The court imposed an effective six-year incarcerative sentence along with restitution of $101,821.73. Upon review, we hold that the trial court erred in some of its sentencing determinations. We affirm in part, modify in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further determination regarding aspects of the sentencing issues.

I concur in the results reached and most of the reasoning used in the majority opinion. However, I respectfully disagree with its conclusion that the minor victims were particularly vulnerable because of their age as contemplated by Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(4). In my opinion, the fact that the defendant, as clerk and master, had control over the minors’ funds because they were minors rendered them no more vulnerable than any other litigant or party whose funds had been paid into court or otherwise put within the control of the clerk and master. I would not apply enhancement factor (4) to the offense of embezzlement in an official capacity.