APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Anthony Porrazzo, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated robbery and misdemeanor theft, contending that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress the statements he made to law enforcement officers, that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding certain witness testimony and by denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial, and that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves three former police officers who were terminated from their employment with the Union City Police Department. They filed this lawsuit claiming that they were terminated solely for refusing to remain silent about illegal activities, in violation of the Tennessee Public Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304. The trial court granted summary judgment to the City, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to establish an exclusive causal relationship between their refusal to remain silent and their discharge and that the City terminated Plaintiffs for rational and non-pretextual reasons. We affirm.

The petitioner, Shelley Denise Blair, appeals the summary dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred by relying solely on her pro se petition, and not considering the allegations of fact in the amended petition prepared by post-conviction counsel, in concluding that she failed to make out a prima facie case of mental incompetence to toll the statute of limitations.  Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition as time-barred.

The Petitioner, Timothy Shane Hixson, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of aggravated robbery and resulting twenty-four-year sentence.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Demontise Martez Drumwright a.k.a. Demontise J. Drumwright (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count each of aggravated burglary and robbery.  The trial court denied alternative sentencing, ordering the Defendant to serve his effective four-year sentence in confinement.  On this appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it (1) considered the Defendant’s pending case in Knox County as a basis for denial of alternative sentencing and (2) ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the appellant, Michael Dean Hodges, for aggravated child abuse in counts one through three and aggravated child neglect in count four.  After a jury trial, the appellant was acquitted of count one but convicted as charged in counts two and three and convicted of aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of aggravated child neglect in count four.  The trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction into the aggravated child abuse convictions and sentenced the appellant to an effective twenty-five-years in confinement to be served at 100%.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to sever the charge of aggravated child abuse in count one from the remaining two counts of aggravated child abuse; that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear a portion of his statement in which he admitted to prior bad acts; that the trial court erred by giving the jury a supplemental instruction on “knowingly” that failed to include language about non-accidental conduct; and that cumulative error warrants a new trial.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear that the appellant had been “in trouble” previously.  However, we conclude that the error was harmless. Nevertheless, we conclude that the appellant’s conviction of aggravated assault must be reversed because aggravated assault is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated child neglect.

A jury convicted the defendant, Tanya Nicole Slimick, of first degree (premeditated) murder for shooting her boyfriend.  The defendant received a life sentence.  On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, asserting that the State failed to show premeditation or to negate self-defense.  She also raises numerous challenges to the jury instructions, including that the trial court instructed the jury that the defendant had the burden of raising the issue of self-defense; that the self-defense instruction was confusing to the jury; that the jury instructions improperly failed to list the negation of self-defense in the litany of items which the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the instructions failed to list lesser included offenses whenever the “charged offense” was referenced.  The defendant also asserts that there was reversible error in the use of a demonstrative aid in the prosecution’s closing argument.  After a thorough review of the law and the facts, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is the second appeal of this eminent domain case. In the first appeal, City of Memphis v. Tandy J. Gilliland Family, LLC, et al., 391 S.W.3d 60 (2012), this Court held that Appellee City of Memphis, a municipal corporation for the use and benefit of Memphis Light, Gas, and Water Division, was entitled to condemn a portion of Appellants’ property to erect poles and other facilities to provide utility services to MLGW customers. In addition to the provision of utility services, Appellee also sought co-location rights to allow telecommunications and cable providers to attach to MLGW’s poles. In the first appeal, Appellants argued that the co-location rights transformed the condemnation from public to private use. In our first opinion, we held that the Pole Attachment Act, 47 U.S.C. § 224, mandated that MLGW would allow co-location rights. On remand, the trial court held that it was bound by the law of the case as set out in our first opinion and denied Appellants discovery concerning the co-location rights before granting those rights to Appellee. In the instant appeal, Appellants contend that our previous holding was incorrect because the Pole Attachment Act specifically exempts MLGW from the definition of “utility.” We agree, and reverse our previous holding to the extent that we held that the Pole Attachment Act is mandatory on MLGW. Because of our erroneous holding, the issues of whether MLGW is entitled to co-location rights and the proper compensation, if any, for these rights have not been addressed in the trial court. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order insofar as it grants Appellee co-location rights and remand the case for discovery and hearing on these issues. We affirm the trial court’s order insofar as it allows Appellee to condemn Appellants’ property for utility purposes.

This is an appeal by the State of Tennessee from the Tennessee Claims Commission’s award of a judgment against it. While he was an inmate in the State’s custody, Plaintiff sustained injuries when he fell out of a pickup truck that was being operated by a State employee. Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Claims Commission in which he alleged that the State’s negligence caused his injuries and sought damages for, among other things, the medical expenses that were incurred as a result of the fall. The State argued that it should receive a credit against any award of damages for the medical expenses Plaintiff incurred during his incarceration because it paid those expenses through its contracts with two private medical vendors. The Claims Commission disagreed and held that evidence of payments made by the medical vendors for Plaintiff’s treatment was barred by the collateral source rule. The Claims Commission awarded Plaintiff $125,000 in damages, which included damages for the medical expenses that he allegedly incurred. On appeal, we conclude that because the State was required by law to pay for all medical expenses Plaintiff incurred during his incarceration, the Claims Commission erred in considering the cost of the medical services provided to Plaintiff in calculating his damages. We therefore vacate the Claims Commission’s award of damages and remand this matter for a new trial on the issue of damages.

The petitioner, Mark Brooks, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2013 Shelby County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of possession of cocaine with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver, possession of marijuana with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, for which he received an effective sentence of 12 years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Tom Moore, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to set aside his 1991 convictions of aggravated rape. Because the defendant has failed to present a cognizable claim for relief under Rule 36.1, we affirm the order of summary dismissal.

Appellant pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and later filed a motion challenging his sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court summarily dismissed. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion without appointing counsel after he had stated a colorable claim for relief. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 2012, a Giles County jury convicted the Defendant, Maurice McAllister, of rape, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years of confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it: (1)  denied his motion to suppress his statements to police; (2) admitted evidence seized from his vehicle; and (3) imposed a twelve-year sentence to be served in confinement.  The Defendant lastly contends that the cumulative effect of the errors at trial require a reversal of his conviction.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, John Vernon Campbell, appeals as of right from the Johnson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends (1) that the trial court lacked jurisdiction for his premeditated first degree murder conviction because the offense was committed in the Cherokee National Forest; and (2) that the indictment charging the Petitioner was invalid due to the State’s dismissal of a charge of felony first degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Appellant, William Anthony McDaniel, filed in the Hamilton County Criminal Court a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The motion was summarily denied, and the Appellant timely appealed the ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Anthony H. Dean, was convicted in 2000 of aggravated rape of a ninety-two-year-old victim and received a forty-year sentence as a violent offender. In 2015, the Defendant allegedly filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting the correction of the judgment. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by dismissing the motion. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

Appellant, Carlos Gonzalez, stands convicted of one count of second degree murder, three counts of attempted second degree murder, one count of misdemeanor reckless endangerment (a lesser-included offense of attempted second degree murder), three counts of aggravated assault, and three counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. He was acquitted of one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of fifty-two years. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in its admission and exclusion of evidence, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder, and that the trial court erred in its sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for correction of the judgment documents.

Appellant, Quincy Howze, stands convicted of one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to serve twenty years at 100% release eligibility based on his two prior convictions of the same. Appealing his conviction and sentence, appellant raises three issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in omitting a special jury instruction on identity; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; and (3) whether the trial court erred in sentencing him to the maximum term allowed by law. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the criminal court.

I respectfully disagree with the conclusions of the majority opinion for two reasons. First, the implied consent law does not satisfy the consent exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Second, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings that the defendant did not freely and voluntarily, and without duress or coercion, consent to the blood test.

Defendant, A.D. Smith III, was arrested for driving under the influence (“DUI”) in Shelby County. Based on his prior conviction for DUI, Defendant was informed that he was subject to a mandatory blood draw under Tennessee's implied consent law. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that his consent was not freely and voluntarily given. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, and the State filed for an interlocutory appeal. Upon our review of the record, arguments, and authorities, we conclude that the trial court erred in finding that Defendant's consent was not voluntary. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

The defendant, Terry Lee Adams, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, complaining because concurrent, rather than consecutive, sentences were imposed on him in 1996 and 1998. The trial court denied relief, concluding that since he was on probation for the first conviction when the second sentence was imposed, consecutive sentencing was not required. Based upon our review, we affirm the denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Petitioner, Shaun Steven Kidd, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

This is a divorce action involving a five-year marriage between a husband who was employed overseas at the time of the parties' separation and a wife who had worked primarily during the marriage as a homemaker and caretaker of the parties' three minor children, including a child with special medical needs. Following a hearing in December 2012, during which the husband testified telephonically, the trial court ordered the husband to pay $3,500.00 per month in temporary support. Following subsequent hearings in April and May 2014, during which the husband also testified telephonically, the court, inter alia, granted the parties a divorce on stipulated grounds, delineated a residential co-parenting schedule, entered a judgment against Husband for support arrearage, and set the husband's child support obligation in the amount of $1,842.00 monthly and spousal support obligation in the amount of $1,000.00 monthly. The court reserved remaining issues for a bench trial, which it set for September 23, 2014, with notice that it would not allow the husband to testify telephonically unless the wife waived any objection to such testimony. At the beginning of trial, the court denied the husband's counsel's motion to allow the husband to testify telephonically upon the wife's objection. Also at the beginning of trial, the court ordered that the $1,000.00 previously ordered be continued as an award to the wife of alimony in futuro. The court also directed that its previous orders as to co-parenting time and child support be incorporated as a permanent parenting plan order. At the close of proof, the trial court distributed the marital estate and awarded to Wife $10,500.00 toward her attorney's fees. The husband appeals. Having determined that no income shares worksheet for child support purposes was attached to the final judgment, we vacate the amount of child support awarded and remand for the limited purpose of child support calculation according to the Child Support Guidelines based upon the trial court's previous findings concerning the parties' respective incomes and co-parenting time. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all other respects.

In this consolidated case, the defendants, Roderick Quatel Bates and Emmett Jones, appeal their convictions of aggravated burglary and first degree murder. Mr. Jones challenges the trial court's admission of a photograph of him provided by the Department of Correction and the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the out-of-court identification of him as a perpetrator. Both defendants challenge the admission of the audio-recorded statements of two witnesses, the admission of the audio recording of a 9-1-1 call made by a State's witness, and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a divorce. After almost 29 years of marriage, Kim Lewis Neas (“Husband”) filed for divorce against Patricia Erskine Heffernan Neas (“Wife”) in the Chancery Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”). After a trial, the Trial Court, among other things, divided the parties’ marital assets and liabilities. Husband appeals to this Court. The central issues in this appeal include the Trial Court’s valuation of business assets awarded to Husband and the Trial Court’s determination of Husband’s income. Because Wife leaves this marriage with more in assets than Husband and in an otherwise comparable financial position, we reverse the Trial Court’s award of attorney’s fees to Wife. We also modify the allocation of marital debt and remand for the Trial Court to effectuate this new allocation. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.