APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority in this case. For the reasons that follow, I would remand this matter to the trial court for Tipton to be placed in the community corrections program. In this appeal, Tipton contends that the trial court relied upon an erroneous interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-36-106 in finding him statutorily ineligible for placement in the community correction program. He argues that the prior convictions relied upon by the court do not constitute a pattern of prior violent offenses pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-36-102(11).1 Specifically, he contends that (1) reckless endangerment does not meet the definition of a violent offense; (2) aggravated animal cruelty, as codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-212, is classified as a property offense and not a crime of violence; and (3) the trial court improperly relied on Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-113(f)(1)-(3) (2006), rather than section 39-13-113 (2001), in finding that his 2001 charge for violating an order of a protection was a violent offense. Excluding the convictions that the trial court improperly classified as crimes of violence, Tipton claims the sole basis for the trial court‟s denial of his placement in the community correction program was charges reflected in his presentence report that did not result in convictions, which is likewise an improper basis to deny placement.

A Monroe County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Noah Keith Tipton, for one count of initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine (“the methamphetamine charge”) and fourteen counts of aggravated cruelty to animals. Pursuant to a negotiated plea, the Defendant pleaded guilty to the methamphetamine charge and two counts of aggravated cruelty to animals and was sentenced to eight years with the manner of service to be determined at a sentencing hearing. Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant was “not eligible for punishment in the community” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-36-106(a)(1) but took under advisement the Defendant’s claim that his “special needs” were treatable and could best be served in the community as provided by subsection -106(c). Following a second hearing in which no additional proof was taken, the trial court found that the Defendant’s special needs could be best served in the Department of Correction rather than in the community corrections program for Monroe County. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his placement in the community corrections program. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Bruce Anton Parks, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, claiming he received ineffective assistance of counsel on several bases. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Beau C. Vaughan, appeals as of right from the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence.  The Appellant contends (1) that the trial court erred in ruling that his sentence for a felony conviction which occurred while he was released on bond for another offense was not statutorily required to be served consecutively to the sentence for the underlying offense because the underlying offense was a misdemeanor; and (2) that the trial court erred by ruling, in the alternative, that Rule 36.1 was not applicable because the convictions occurred before Rule 36.1 was enacted in 2013.  The State concedes that the trial court erred with respect to both of the Appellant’s issues.  However, contrary to the State’s concession, the Appellant’s sentence expired long ago; therefore, his motion failed to state a colorable claim for relief.  As such, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the Appellant’s Rule 36.1 motion.

The Defendant, Janette Ebony Robinson, pleaded guilty in the Criminal Court for Davidson County to two counts of aggravated child abuse and received two concurrent twenty-five-year sentences.  See T.C.A. § 39-15-402 (2014).  The Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Timothy W. Patrick, appeals the DeKalb County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for his convictions for three counts of selling hydromorphone and ordering him to serve the remainder of his effective nine-year sentence in confinement.  The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff, a nurse, alleged that she sustained a hip injury in the course of her employment. She further alleged that she sustained an injury to the nerves of her leg as a result of treatment for the hip injury. In addition, she alleged a mental injury. Her employer contended that her hip problems were preexisting and that she failed to sustain her burden of proof as to the nerve and mental injuries. The trial court found that the hip and nerve injuries were compensable but the alleged mental injury was not. It also awarded certain medical expenses from unauthorized physicians. Employer has appealed, asserting that the evidence preponderates against the award of benefits. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse the award of medical expenses but otherwise affirm the judgment.

This is the second appeal in this condemnation proceeding in which Shelby County (“the County”) sought to condemn a parcel of real property owned by the Appellees. The original appeal involved our review of the trial court's decision to allow the County to nonsuit its case after a consent order had already been entered granting it ownership in fee simple. We concluded that the entry of voluntary dismissal was inappropriate where (1) the trial court had already granted the County ownership and (2) only the issue of compensation was left to be decided. We accordingly remanded the case for a determination as to the amount of compensation to be paid. Following the remand, the County moved for summary judgment asserting that it was entitled to relief under an adverse possession theory and Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-2-110. The trial court denied this motion. The case was later set for trial to determine the amount of compensation owed as a result of the condemnation. In response to statements made by the County's counsel during trial concerning the County's need for the property, the trial court sustained an oral motion made by the Appellees' counsel to dismiss the condemnation proceeding. A formal order of dismissal was entered in July 2012, pursuant to which the trial court transferred all title to the property from the County back to the Appellees. In the same order, the trial court reserved several issues for later ruling, including the assessment of damages, costs, and credits. After orders were eventually entered resolving these reserved issues, the County filed a timely notice of appeal. Having considered the issues raised on appeal, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of the condemnation action, transfer title to the property at issue back to the County, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Defendant, Ronald Bennett, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Because Defendant's sentences have long since expired, he has not asserted a colorable claim for relief. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's decision to summarily dismiss the motion. However, we remand the matter to the trial court for the entry of corrected judgments pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.

First Community Bank, N.A. (“Plaintiff”), brought suit against multiple defendants for fraud, constructive fraud, negligent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment, and violation of the Tennessee Securities Act, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 48-1-101—126. Three non-resident defendants, The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., and Fitch, Inc. (“Ratings Agencies”), filed motions to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, which the trial court granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal based on lack of personal jurisdiction as to the Ratings Agencies, and the Plaintiff requested permission to appeal. We granted review in this case to determine whether the trial court erred in determining that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Ratings Agencies and thereby dismissing the Plaintiff’s case as against the Ratings Agencies. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction under a theory of general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction. Therefore, we affirm the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals on these issues. With regard to the Plaintiff’s attempt to establish personal jurisdiction under a theory of conspiracy jurisdiction, we likewise conclude that the Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy jurisdiction at this point. However, we vacate the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s action against the Ratings Agencies on this theory and remand this case to the trial court to determine if the Plaintiff should be allowed to conduct jurisdictional discovery on the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction in a manner consistent with the guidelines set forth in this opinion.

Plaintiff filed this health care liability action against the defendant doctor in 2000 and voluntarily non-suited it in 2008. Plaintiff re-filed the action in 2009. The defendant moved to exclude the plaintiff's standard-of-care expert for his failure to produce certain financial documents. The trial court granted the motion and excluded the expert five days before the scheduled trial date. Plaintiff requested leave to employ another standard-of-care expert in the five days before trial, which the trial court denied. The trial court ultimately dismissed the plaintiff's entire case because, without a standard-of-care expert, he was unable to state a health care liability claim. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not permit him to “emergently arrange” for an expert in the five days preceding the scheduled trial date. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The issue presented in this case involves a vehicle services contract Appellant purchased from Appellee. The engine in Appellant's vehicle covered under the contract expired due to a lack of lubrication caused by a combination of engine sludge and low oil. Appellee denied coverage for the repairs under exclusions in the contract. Appellant filed suit alleging breach of contract and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of Appellee. We affirm.

The petitioner, Victor McMiller, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2009 Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convictions of the sale and delivery of a Schedule III controlled substance, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a retaliatory discharge case. Appellant worked for the Appellee nursing home. Appellant reported that patient abuse was occurring at her employer's facility. The Tennessee Department of Health investigated the Appellee's facility, but found no wrongdoing. In response to the Appellant's reporting, Appellee's employees allegedly harassed the Appellant. Appellant notified Appellee that she would not report to work the day after the alleged harassment. However, she also did not report to work or call in the day after that, and Appellee terminated her employment. The trial court granted Appellee's individual employees' motions to dismiss and later granted the Appellee's motion for summary judgment. The trial court also denied the Appellant's oral motion to amend her complaint at the summary judgment hearing. We affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit in the four months prior to the filing of the petition to terminate her parental rights. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). Mother also appeals the trial court's finding that termination of her parental rights is in the child's best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

The defendant, Keiahtee Jamal Terrell, pled guilty to aggravated burglary and robbery, Class C felonies, in exchange for an effective four-year sentence at 30%, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court.  On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion or probation.  After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant-Appellant, Emmanuel Bibb Houston, was convicted as charged in count 1 of possession of a Schedule VI drug with intent to sell, a Class E felony; in count 2 of possession of a Schedule VI drug with intent to deliver, a Class E felony; in count 3 of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, a Class D felony; and in count 4 of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor.  See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a), -1324(a), -425(a)(1).  The trial court merged count 2 with count 1 and imposed an effective sentence of six years.  Houston’s sole issue on appeal is that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his felony convictions.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Scott Benjamin Carroll, appeals the DeKalb County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine.  See T.C.A. § 39-17-435(a).  On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to file a motion to dismiss or request a jury instruction based on the State’s destruction of evidence recovered from a methamphetamine laboratory.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Gerald Hobbs, was convicted of one count of assault and one count of aggravated assault, while an order of protection was in effect, upon his former girlfriend and sentenced to an effective term of four years imprisonment.  On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions, that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury as to self-defense, and that the court erred in sentencing.  Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) brought this action to set aside a tax sale of real property. MERS argues that the county’s failure to provide it with notice of the tax sale violated its rights under the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution. The defendant purchaser of the real property filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings; he argued that MERS did not tender payment of the sale price plus the accrued taxes before bringing suit, as is required by statute in a suit challenging the validity of a tax sale. The defendant purchaser also argued that MERS did not have an interest in the subject property that is protected under the Due Process Clause. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that MERS did not have an interest in the property. The Court of Appeals affirmed, though based on MERS’s lack of standing to file suit. We hold that when a plaintiff who claims a protected interest in real property files suit to have a tax sale declared void for lack of notice, the pre-suit tender requirement in Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-5-2504(c) does not apply, so MERS was not required to tender payment before filing this lawsuit. We further conclude that MERS acquired no protected interest in the subject property through either the deed of trust’s designation of MERS as the beneficiary solely as nominee for the lender and its assigns or its reference to MERS having “legal title” to the subject property for the purpose of enforcing the lender’s rights. Because MERS had no protected interest in the subject property, its due process rights were not violated by the county’s failure to notify it of the tax foreclosure proceedings or the tax sale. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of the tax sale purchaser, albeit on a different basis from the Court of Appeals’ decision.

Petitioner, Larry Prewitt, appeals the summary denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, which the trial court also considered as a petition for post-conviction relief and as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because Petitioner has not made an allegation of newly discovered evidence, he is not entitled to coram nobis relief. Because Petitioner is no longer restrained of liberty by the underlying convictions, he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Because Petitioner's filing is beyond the one-year post-conviction statute of limitations and because he has alleged no grounds for due process tolling of the statute of limitations, he is not entitled to post-conviction relief. Therefore, the trial court's summary dismissal of the petition is affirmed.

Both of the appellants, Anthony Wilson and Deangelo Taylor, stand convicted of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. The trial court sentenced them to life for the first degree murder conviction and to twenty years for the attempted first degree murder conviction. The trial court aligned appellant Taylor‘s sentences consecutively and appellant Wilson‘s sentences concurrently. On appeal, appellant Taylor argues that: (1) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on criminal responsibility for the conduct of another; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support appellant‘s convictions; (3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on self-defense and defense of others; (4) the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial after the State told the jury that appellant was in jail; (5) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a close-up autopsy photograph of the victim‘s face; (6) the trial court erred in admitting Chris Williams‘ statement as substantive evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(26); (7) there was cumulative error that requires reversal; and (8) the trial court erred in aligning appellant‘s sentences consecutively. Appellant Wilson argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his Motion for Acquittal because the proof at trial was inconsistent and insufficient and also erred in admitting into evidence Jarquez McKinley‘s police statement as substantive evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(26). Following our thorough review of the arguments, record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for correction of appellant Taylor‘s attempted murder judgment.

Defendant, Walter H. Webb, was convicted by a Wilson County jury of one count of aggravated burglary, one count of aggravated assault, four counts of aggravated domestic assault, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and one count of aggravated cruelty to animals.  The trial court sentenced Defendant to a total effective sentence of twenty years’ incarceration.  On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the charge of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony on the ground that it violated the protection against double jeopardy, that the State failed to prove the requisite mens rea for aggravated assault, and that the trial court erred in determining the length of Defendant’s sentences and ordering that some of the sentences run consecutively.  Upon our review of the record, we conclude that Defendant’s convictions do not violate double jeopardy principles, that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Defendant’s convictions, and that the trial court did not err in determining the length of Defendant’s sentences.  After de novo review of Defendant’s consecutive sentences, we affirm the alignment of the sentences imposed by the trial court.

An employee filed an action seeking workers’ compensation benefits for hearing loss and breathing problems in 2003. In 2005, the hearing loss claim was settled, and the breathing dysfunction claim was dismissed with prejudice. In 2011, the employee was diagnosed with asbestosis-related lung disease. He filed this action, seeking benefits for that condition. The trial court granted his employer’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the claim was barred by the 2005 settlement and judgment. The employee has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.