APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Michael Jerome Inman a/k/a Michael Jerome Bivens, entered guilty pleas to six offenses: five counts of theft, which were three Class D felonies, a Class E felony, and a Class A misdemeanor, as well as one count of criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor. He eceived an effective fourteen-year sentence to be served on community corrections. A warrant was issued for violation of the terms of his community corrections sentence. After a hearing, the trial court found that the defendant had violated the terms of his community corrections sentence and ordered him to serve his sentence in the penitentiary. The defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the defendant to serve his sentence in confinement; and, whether the defendant had a right to be present in court when his letter to the clerk requesting jail credit was discussed. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this petition to terminate the parental rights of a biological parent, we granted permission to appeal to address whether the State is required to prove that it made reasonable efforts to reunify the parent with the child as a precondition to termination.  We hold that it is not. An action to terminate the parental rights of a biological parent is governed by Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113. The language of Section 36-1-113 makes the State’s efforts to assist the respondent parent one of the factors to be considered in determining whether termination of the parent’s rights is in the child’s best interest. After reviewing the language of Section 36-1-113, other pertinent statutes, the legislative history, and caselaw interpreting Section 36-1-113, we hold that, in a termination proceeding, the extent of the efforts made by the State is weighed in the court’s best-interest analysis, but the State need not prove that it made reasonable efforts as an essential component of its petition to terminate parental rights. In so doing, we overrule In re C.M.M., No. M2003-01122-COA-R3-PT, 2004 WL 438326 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2004), and its progeny to the extent that those cases required the State to prove reasonable efforts as an essential component of the termination petition. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the juvenile court terminating the parental rights of the respondent father.

The defendant, Patrick Leighton Ryan, Jr., was convicted of misdemeanor theft under $500 and sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days of supervised probation, with credit for time served. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred both by not requiring the State to make an election of offenses or giving a special jury instruction as to unanimity, in excluding a police property inventory from 2005, and in not taking judicial notice of the Grand Junction Police Manual and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Carmel Borum, also known as Carnel Borum, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of two felonies – theft and evading arrest. He received an effective sentence of 18 years as a persistent offender. On appeal, he claims that the trial court erroneously admitted testimony about the value of the property in question and that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon our review of the record, the briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Artterraces Buchanan, pleaded guilty to one count of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102. The trial court denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion and imposed a two-year sentence involving split confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his application for judicial diversion. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Kenneth Eugene Black, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He pled guilty to two counts of sale of a schedule I controlled substance within a school zone, Class B felonies. As part of the agreement, he received concurrent eight-year Range I sentences to be served at 100%, which is the drug-free school zone release eligibility. The petitioner now contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to provide the petitioner with all discovery materials prior to his accepting the plea. Following review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.
 

The Petitioner, Gregory D. Valentine, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief as waived or previously determined.  The State responds that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the Petitioner’s claims without a hearing.   Upon review, we reverse and remand for further proceedings with regard to the Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Cloey R. and Andrea H., the minor children (“Children”) of Leonard H. (“Father”) and Laura R. (“Mother”). The Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on July 26, 2012, upon investigation of environmental neglect and the Children’s exposure to controlled substances. On May 16, 2013, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father and Mother. Following a bench trial conducted on November 7, 2013, the trial court granted the petition upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) both parents failed to substantially comply with the reasonable responsibilities and requirements set forth in the permanency plan, (2) Father failed to legitimate Cloey R., and (3) Mother abandoned the Children by willfully failing to visit them for at least four months preceding the filing of the termination petition. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of both Father’s and Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Father has appealed. Upon careful review 1 of the record, we reverse the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights for two reasons: (1) no permanency plan was admitted into evidence upon which the trial court’s finding that Father failed to substantially comply with the plan could be based and (2) Father’s standing as a putative biological father precluded the application of the statutory ground of failure to legitimate a child.

This appeal concerns entitlement to attorneys’ fees under a marital dissolution agreement after one party’s notice of rescission. Wife attempted to rescind her acceptance of the Marital Dissolution Agreement, claiming she was under duress when she entered into the contract. The trial court found that Wife was not under duress and that her attempted rescission was a breach of contract. The trial court also awarded Husband his attorney’s fees. On appeal, Wife maintains that her attempted rescission did not constitute a breach of contract and that, in any event, the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to Husband was unreasonable. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a suit by a borrower against a servicing agent and law firm to enjoin a foreclosure sale and to set aside the assignment of the deed of trust. The action was ultimately dismissed on summary judgment. The trial court found that the borrower lacked standing to enjoin the sale because he no longer had an interest in the real property subject to the foreclosure sale. The trial court also found that, to the extent the borrower’s claims sounded in fraud, they were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Alexa Williams, also known as Elizabeth Williams El, timely appeals pro se her Carroll County Circuit Court jury convictions of one count each of driving a motor vehicle while the privilege to drive was suspended, driving an unregistered automobile, and operating a motor vehicle without evidence of financial responsibility. The defendant claims on appeal (1) that “the trial court erred by issuing an in personam judgment without personal jurisdiction over the blood and flesh woman” and (2) that “the trial court erred in procuring a trial without evidence of a motor vehicle or traffic on the highway.” Upon our review of the record and the briefs in this case, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Maston G. Lyons, III and Linda C. Lyons (“Plaintiffs”) sued attorney Fielding H. Atchley, Jr. (“Defendant”) alleging, in part, that Defendant had breached a duty that “cost the Plaintiffs their fair and complete hearing in Lyons v. Leffew et al.,” and that the alleged breach had “costs [sic] the Plaintiffs their fiduciary interest in said case.” Both sides filed motions for summary judgment. After a hearing on the parties’ motions, the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) granted Defendant summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal the grant of summary judgment and the award to Defendant of attorney’s fees for defending against Plaintiffs’ Rule 11 motion for sanctions. We find and hold that Plaintiffs sustained no damage as a result of the alleged action or inaction of Defendant and, therefore, the Trial Court did not err in granting Defendant summary judgment as a matter of law. We further find and hold that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding reasonable attorney’s fees to Defendant for opposing Plaintiffs’ Rule 11 motion for sanctions. We affirm the Trial Court’s judgment.

A Davidson County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Andrew Joseph Aborizk, charging him with theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000.  Following a jury trial , Defendant was convicted of theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000.  The trial court imposed a sentence of two years as a Range One standard offender  to be served on supervised probation.  On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his theft conviction because the State failed to prove identity of the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s conviction for theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000.

I concur in the result reached by the majority Opinion that the trial court erred in imposing additional restrictions on Defendants’ counsel with regard to the requested ex parte interviews in this particular case.

This is a healthcare liability action. The trial court granted Defendants’ joint motion for a qualified protective order pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(f)(1), but added several conditions not specifically provided in the statute. The trial court denied Defendants’ joint motion for permission to seek an interlocutory appeal, and we granted Defendants’ motion for an extraordinary appeal to this Court under Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Petitioner, Monroe Dodson, Jr., pled guilty to one count of aggravated rape, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony.  After a sentencing hearing, Petitioner received an effective sentence of eighty-two years.  He now appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his guilty plea was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.  After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s finding that Petitioner has failed to prove his ineffectiveness claim.

The Defendant, Kayln Marie Polochak, was convicted by an Overton County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, a Class A felony, especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and theft, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202, 39-13-103, 39-13-403, 39-14-103 (2014). The trial court merged the first degree and felony murder convictions and imposed a life sentence. The court also imposed concurrent sentences of fifteen years at 30% service for conspiracy to commit first degree murder, fifteen years at 100% service for especially aggravated robbery, and two years at 30% service for theft. On appeal, she contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions, (2) the trial court erred by denying her motion for a judgment of acquittal, (3) the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress her pretrial statements, (4) the trial court erred by refusing to exclude the video recording of the crime scene depicting the victim’s body at the scene and a photograph taken during the victim’s autopsy, (5) the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victim’s fear of the codefendant, (6) the trial court erred by excluding witness testimony related to the Defendant’s mother’s consenting to police questioning of the Defendant, (7) the trial court erred by failing to provide an intoxication jury instruction, (8) the trial court erred by failing to provide a duress jury instruction, (9) the mandatory life imprisonment sentence violates the federal and Tennessee constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment, and (10) the juvenile court erred by transferring her case to the criminal court. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jermaine Gwin, appeals from the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, he argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict him because (1) his indictment failed to track the language of the second degree murder statute and (2) the indictment failed to include an essential element of the offense. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we find the issues are without merit and affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Defendant, Ryan T. Brandon, was convicted of public intoxication and evading arrest. He received sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days of supervised probation for evading arrest and thirty days of supervised probation for public intoxication. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. On appeal, Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on the evading arrest charge, limitation of his crossexamination of the arresting officer, and failure to instruct the jury as to the defense of necessity. We hold that Defendant waived any claim of error with regard to the motion for judgment of acquittal by continuing to participate in the trial after the close of the State’s proof by calling his own witness. However, we review the issue for sufficiency of the evidence. Based upon our review of the record, we hold that the evidence is insufficient to support the charge of evading arrest. The trial court’s judgment as to that conviction is hereby reversed and dismissed. We hold that the evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for public intoxication. We also hold that the trial court’s exclusion of impeachment evidence, though in error, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, we hold that Defendant’s claim as to the jury instructions has been waived for failure to include the jury instructions in the record. The trial court’s judgment as to the public intoxication conviction is hereby affirmed.

A Shelby County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Jeffrey Horskins, charging him with attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, two counts of aggravated burglary, and theft of property valued at more than one-thousand dollars. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of reckless endangerment, aggravated assault, two counts of aggravated burglary, and theft of property valued between $500 and $1,000. The trial court merged the two convictions for aggravated burglary and imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for reckless endangerment, nine years for aggravated assault, nine years for aggravated burglary, and three years for theft of property. The trial court further found Defendant to be an offender whose record of criminal activity was extensive and ordered Defendant’s sentences for aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and theft to be served consecutively for an effective twenty-one-year sentence as a Range Two offender. The misdemeanor sentence for reckless endangerment was ordered to be served concurrently to the other sentences. On appeal, Defendant argues that the length of his sentences are excessive and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This post-conviction appeal involves ineffective assistance of counsel claims made by a prisoner who fatally shot his wife. A Hamilton County jury, rejecting the prisoner’s defense that his rifle had malfunctioned and fired accidentally, convicted him of first degree premeditated murder. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. State v. Kendricks, 947 S.W.2d 875 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). The prisoner later filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Criminal Court for Hamilton Countyalleging, among other things, that his trial counsel had been ineffective because he decided not to seek an expert to rebut the anticipated testimony of the prosecution’s expert and because he did not attempt to use an exception to the hearsay rule to introduce statements favorable to the prisoner. The post-conviction court conducted a hearing and denied the petition. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the post-conviction court and granted the prisoner a new trial after concluding that trial counsel’s representation had been deficient and that, but for these deficiencies, the jury might have convicted the prisoner of a lesser degree of homicide. Kendrick v. State, No. E2011-02367-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 WL 3306655 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 27, 2013). We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal. Trial counsel’s decisions not to consult an expert to rebut the anticipated testimony of a prosecution expert and not to attempt to introduce a potentially favorable hearsay statement did not amount to deficient performance that fell below the standard of reasonableness. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand for consideration of the prisoner’s remaining claims.

The Defendant, Roger Wayne Henry, Jr., was found guilty by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2014).  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to nine years and six months at 100% service.  On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred by restricting his cross-examination, (3) the trial court erred by allowing the State to elicit inadmissible hearsay testimony, (4) the trial court erred by failing to order the State to play all of the Defendant’s recorded statements to the police, (5) the trial court erred by failing to grant trial counsel’s motion to withdraw, (6) the trial court erred by denying his requests to continue the trial and for funds for an expert, and (7) the trial court erred by failing to compel the State to produce the police file relative to the victim’s acting as a confidential informant.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Teresa Deion Smith Harris, appeals the denial of her petition for writ of error coram nobis. In the circuit court, petitioner raised a claim of newly discovered evidence relating to the timing of the victim’s death and the degree of torture that he endured. The coram nobis court summarily denied the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Petitioner, Frazier Perry, appeals as of right from the Dyer County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.