Dwight Morisch v. Ryann Maenner, et al. - Dissent
Respectfully, I must dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s order granting visitation to the grandfather in this case. At the outset, I emphasize that the scope of this appeal is very narrow. On appeal, Mother raised only the issues of whether she had opposed visitation and whether Grandfather had proven that severance of the relationship with the child would occasion substantial harm to the child. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
Ricky L. Boren, et al. v. Hill Boren, PC, et al.
This appeal involves several raised issues surrounding the ownership of the Hill Boren, PC law firm. Because the record transmitted to us on appeal evidences the lack of a final judgment, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Arthur Woods v. Adam Arthur, M.D., et al.
This appeal concerns the dismissal of a health care liability action for failure to comply with a pre-suit notice content requirement in Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-29-121(a)(2). The trial court determined that the plaintiff failed to provide the defendant doctors and hospital with medical authorization forms that would permit pre-suit investigation of his claims. The plaintiff contends the dismissal was unwarranted because the medical authorizations substantially complied with the statute and the defendants already had the relevant records. The defendants argue that the forms were invalid because they lacked several required elements, including a description of the purpose for which the records could be disclosed and used. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Progressive Specialty Insurance Company v. Jee Yun Kim, Et Al.
After being injured in a car accident, a man filed a negligence lawsuit against several defendants, including the driver of the vehicle and the company that employed the driver. The insurance company that provided insurance coverage to the company in Alabama filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination of whether the policy provided liability coverage for the company in the underlying tort action. After the insurance company and the plaintiff in the underlying tort action filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment to the insurance company based on respondeat superior principles. We conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the insurance company because, under Alabama law, the policy provided liability coverage for the company at the time the accident occurred. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
At-Last, Inc. d/b/a Blackwatch Investigation and Mitigation v. Terry Glen Buckley, et al.
This case involves a company’s claim for attorneys’ fees and expenses for the alleged breach of a non-compete agreement by its former employee. After a temporary injunction hearing, the trial court determined that the former employee breached the agreement and granted the company a temporary injunction. The court did not consolidate the hearing on the merits under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 65.04(7). Later, the claims were voluntarily dismissed, and the trial court awarded the company attorneys’ fees and expenses under the “Remedies” section of the parties’ agreement. The former employee appealed the trial court’s decision to grant the company attorneys’ fees and expenses. We reverse the trial court’s award and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Azhianne G.
The trial court found that the minor child, Azhianne G. (“the Child”), was dependent and neglected in his mother’s care. The trial court also determined that the Child had been severely abused based upon his disclosures of sexual abuse perpetrated by his mother. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of L. Frank Southerland v. Joshua Soller, Et Al.
The notice of appeal filed by the appellant, Joshua Soller, stated that Mr. Soller was appealing the trial court’s order entered on November 12, 2020. Because the order from which Mr. Soller has appealed is not a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
John Raymond Kautz v. Doris Diane Kautz Berberich
This appeal concerns a divorce. John Raymond Kautz (“Husband”) sued Doris Diane Kautz Berberich (“Wife”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Polk County (“the Trial Court”). The parties entered into a marital dissolution agreement (“the MDA”), which the Trial Court approved in its final decree of divorce. Some years later, Wife filed a petition pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 seeking relief from the judgment on grounds that Husband failed to disclose certain assets. The Trial Court granted Wife’s motion. However, after a subsequent hearing, the Trial Court found that while Husband later hinted to Wife he had more assets than he disclosed, he actually had not concealed any valuable assets not already known to Wife. The Trial Court reinstated the MDA with certain amendments. Wife appeals. We decline to re-evaluate the Trial Court’s implicit credibility determinations, and the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s finding that Wife was aware of the valuable marital assets at the time the MDA was executed. We affirm. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Gladys Alene Clifton
This appeal concerns the interpretation of a will. The will divided the testator’s residual estate into as many shares as the testator had children with the further instruction that the share of a deceased child would be divided among that child’s “issue then living.” The will stated, in pertinent part, that “‘issue’ . . . includes a person who has a parent-child relationship . . . with the person through whom this person claims benefits.” When she died, the testator had two surviving children and one deceased daughter. The deceased daughter was predeceased by one of her two sons, and the deceased son was survived by two children—the testator’s great-grandchildren. The petition to admit the will named the two surviving children and the deceased daughter’s living son as the beneficiaries of the estate but excluded the testator’s great-grandchildren, whose father had predeceased the testator. When the testator’s great-grandchildren filed a motion to be included with their uncle as “issue” of the deceased daughter, the estate opposed the motion, arguing that the great-grandchildren were not “issue” of testator’s deceased daughter because the petitioners did not have a “parent-child relationship” with the daughter, who was the petitioners’ grandmother. The trial court agreed and held that the only issue of the deceased daughter who could inherit was her living son—the great-grandchildren’s uncle. We respectfully disagree. The will’s plain language “includes” persons with a “parent-child relationship” to “the person through whom [the] person claims benefits,” but does not exclude those who do not. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Jonathan King, Et Al. v. Dean Chase
Appellants, partners in a partnership that was the sole member of an LLC, filed suit against the manager of the partnership for alleged breach of fiduciary duties related to the sale of commercial real estate on behalf of the LLC. The manager and his business (a partner in the partnership, and together with manager, Appellees) filed counterclaims against Appellants, alleging breach of contractual and statutory duties. The trial court dismissed Appellants’ lawsuit on grant of summary judgment, and we affirm that decision. Appellees’ remaining claim for misrepresentation by concealment against Appellants was tried to a jury, which returned a unanimous verdict in favor of Appellees. Prior to the jury trial, the Business Court found, as a matter of law, that Appellees were entitled to indemnification by the LLC, and we affirm that decision. Because Appellants’ tort of misrepresentation by concealment resulted in a premature distribution of the sale proceeds by the LLC, the LLC was unable to fully indemnify Appellees. As such, the Business Court entered judgment against Appellants for attorney’s fees and expenses as compensatory damages. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Outpost Solar, LLC Et Al. v. Henry, Henry & Underwood, P. C. et al.
A limited liability company sued its former attorney and his law firm for legal malpractice. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court found that the action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Because the LLC’s cause of action accrued more than one year before suit was filed, we affirm. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Leilynn S.
This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights. Following a trial, the Chancery Court for Warren County (the “Trial Court”) entered an order terminating the father’s parental rights to the child based on the statutory ground of abandonment by failure to support and upon its finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Carla Brown v. Jeremy Brittenum
The defendant appeals from an order granting the plaintiff possession of real property and back rent. Because the order does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Vernon Mott v. K. Jeffrey Luethke, Esq., Et Al.
Following an automobile accident that occurred on March 22, 2016, the plaintiff filed a cause of action, in the form of a civil summons, in the Washington County General Sessions Court (“general sessions court”) on March 3, 2017, seeking an award of damages from the defendant, who was the other driver involved in the car accident. Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, however, the defendant had passed away in December 2016. On January 31, 2018, the plaintiff filed a “re-issue[d]” summons to be served upon the administrator ad litem of the decedent’s estate. After the matter was subsequently transferred to Washington County Circuit Court (“trial court”), the trial court granted the administrator’s motion for summary judgment, determining that the plaintiff had failed to timely file his tort action against the personal representative within the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court consequently dismissed the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Abigail J.J.
This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights by default judgment. The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish four statutory grounds of termination and that termination was in the best interest of the child. We vacate the order of the trial court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Metrpolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County v. Kallie Kay Dreher
This case began in the environmental court division of the general sessions court for Davidson County. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) alleged that the defendant had violated a section of the Metro Code by operating a short term rental property with the wrong type of permit. The matter was originally heard by a referee, who found that the defendant violated the Metro Code as alleged, fined the defendant fifty dollars, and declared that the property was ineligible for a short term rental permit for three years. The defendant timely requested a rehearing before the general sessions court judge. Upon rehearing, the judge ruled in favor of the defendant and dismissed the case. Metro then sought a de novo appeal before the circuit court. The circuit court concluded that the appeal must be dismissed because the general sessions court had dismissed the charge after a trial on the merits, and therefore, a trial de novo would violate principles of double jeopardy. Metro appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Pryority Partnership v. AMT Properties, LLC, Et Al.
In this action involving a commercial lease, the trial court granted judgment in favor of the lessee, determining that the lessor had materially breached the lease. The court further determined that the lessor was liable for negligent misrepresentation, due to its misrepresentations concerning the condition of the roof on the leased building and its intent to repair the roof, and constructive eviction, due to its failure to timely repair the building and render it tenantable. The court awarded compensatory damages to the lessee in the amount of $193,006.35 as well as attorney’s fees in the amount of $69,002.68. The lessor has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In re Isabella S., et al.
This appeal concerns a disposition in a dependency and neglect case. Leslie S. (“Mother”) is the mother of the subject minor children Isabella S., Macie S., and Gabriel S. (“the Children,” collectively). The Children’s maternal grandparents Sheila W. and Richard W. (“Grandparents”) filed a petition for dependency and neglect in the Juvenile Court for Williamson County (“the Juvenile Court”). The Juvenile Court adjudicated the Children dependent and neglected. In the disposition phase, the Juvenile Court awarded Grandparents permanent guardianship of the Children, with Mother to exercise only supervised visitation. Mother appealed to the Circuit Court for Williamson County (“the Circuit Court”), which reached the same result. Mother now appeals to this Court, arguing that the Children should be returned to her custody or, alternatively, that her visits be unsupervised. The Circuit Court found, among other things, that Mother’s fiancé Allen M. (“Fiancé”) had engaged in sexually predatory behavior, and that Mother was in denial about the threat Fiancé posed to the Children. The evidence does not preponderate against that or the Circuit Court’s other factual findings. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Vera Elaine Clark v. City of Mount Juliet
The plaintiff commenced this action by alleging that the City of Mount Juliet failed to adequately light a public park and neglected to make the park safe for walking at night, conditions which caused her to fall and sustain severe personal injuries. The City responded by filing a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss, claiming it was immune from suit under the Governmental Tort Liability Act. Following numerous filings by the plaintiff in opposition to the motion and after a hearing, the court granted the motion on the basis that the complaint did not plead facts sufficient to remove immunity from the City. Therefore, the court dismissed all claims. This appeal followed. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Kelly L. Phelps v. State of Tennessee
Plaintiff Kelly Phelps brought this action for sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation under the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”) against her employer, the State of Tennessee. Plaintiff worked as a server at the restaurant at Paris Landing State Park (“the park”). She alleged that Josh Walsh, the assistant park manager who was described as “second in command” at the park, sexually assaulted her at an “after-party” on State property that immediately followed a Halloween party hosted by the park at the restaurant and inn. She further alleged that after she reported the incident, Defendant, among other retaliatory actions, allowed Walsh to continue working around her at the park as usual, and to continue harassing and threatening her. Following extensive discovery, Defendant moved for summary judgment. The trial court found that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Walsh was Plaintiff’s supervisor; whether he “sexually harassed women at Paris Landing State Park prior to the Halloween party” and Defendant was aware of it; and whether “a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Mr. Walsh’s action in grabbing [Plaintiff] by the neck and thrusting his body against her in a sexual manner was ‘extremely serious’ and sufficient to impose liability on the Defendant.” However, the trial court granted summary judgment to Defendant because it found that the sexual assault did not occur “in the workplace.” Regarding the retaliation claim, the trial court held that Plaintiff did not establish that Defendant took a “materially adverse action” against her after she reported the assault. We hold that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the alleged harassment and discrimination affected a term, condition, or privilege of Plaintiff’s employment, and whether Defendant unlawfully retaliated against her. We vacate the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sheila Renee Grissette v. Don Edwin Grissette
Upon a review of the record, we have determined that the notice of appeal was not timely filed in accordance with Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) entered its judgment on November 15, 2019. Both parties timely filed motions to alter or amend pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.01. The Trial Court entered its order addressing the motions to alter or amend on February 21, 2020. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Kim Renae Nelson v. Loring E. Justice
This appeal concerns the trial court’s entry of judgment on an appeal bond for attorney fees. We affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
State, ex rel., Tynesha April Dior Moody v. Damond Julian Roker
Mother filed a petition under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, seeking establishment of paternity and a child support order against Father, who is incarcerated. The State of Tennessee is acting on Mother’s behalf, and Father is acting pro se. Father filed multiple pretrial motions in the trial court, which the trial court did not rule on before the trial on Mother’s petition. Additionally, the trial court’s order fails to comply with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and is apparently not based on any properly admitted evidence. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for a new trial. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rochelle Yvonne Lillard v. Robert Walter Lillard
This appeal arises from a post-divorce Petition to Modify Child Support and Declare Child to be Severely Disabled. After an evidentiary hearing, the court determined the parties’ daughter had a severe disability and ordered the father to continue paying child support beyond the age of 21. The father raises three issues on appeal: (1) Did the trial court err in determining that the parties’ daughter had a severe disability; (2) Did the trial court err in awarding child support beyond the age of 21 without making specific factual findings that the daughter was living under the care and supervision of the mother and it was in the daughter’s best interest to remain in the mother’s care; and (3) Did the trial court err in determining the amount of child support the father owed? We find the preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court’s determination that the daughter has a severe disability, and it is in the daughter’s best interest to remain in her mother’s care. As for the amount of the child support award, the father primarily argues the daughter is underemployed; therefore, the court should have imputed additional income to her. We have determined that the trial court correctly identified and applied the relevant legal principles, the evidence supports the trial court’s determination regarding the daughter’s ability to earn income, and the award of child support is within the range of acceptable alternatives. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision in all respects |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jessica Meeks Conine, Et Al. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc.
This appeal arises from the summary dismissal of an inmate’s petition for declaratory judgment pertaining to the calculation of his release eligibility date. The inmate was convicted of two felonies and ordered to serve a life sentence for the first felony and a 15- year sentence for the second, with the sentences to be served consecutively. When calculating his release eligibility date, the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) applied the inmate’s pretrial jail credits to the life sentence but not to the 15-year sentence. The inmate claimed that TDOC erred by failing to apply the credit to both sentences because the criminal court included the credit on both sentencing orders. While the inmate’s petition was pending, the criminal court issued a corrected sentencing order for the 15-year sentence, in accordance with Rule 36 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, removing the pretrial jail credits. Thereafter, TDOC filed a motion for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion, determining that TDOC complied with the criminal court’s judgment and the applicable law. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
