St. George Holdings LLC v. James D. Hutcherson
This appeal concerns an option agreement. St. George Holdings, LLC (“SGH”), an entity formed to purchase the old St. George Hotel (“the Hotel”) in Chattanooga, entered into an agreement with James D. Hutcherson (“Hutcherson”) under which SGH would borrow $700,000 from Hutcherson to develop the Hotel. An option agreement, one of four documents executed in the transaction, provided that if SGH was unable to obtain a full development loan in 18 months, Hutcherson could purchase the Hotel for the amount of his loan. SGH never obtained a development loan. When Hutcherson attempted to exercise his right to purchase, SGH refused to comply. Instead, SGH sued Hutcherson in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). Hutcherson filed a counterclaim. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to Hutcherson on SGH’s claims. After trial on Hutcherson’s counterclaim, the Trial Court granted him specific performance. SGH appeals, arguing among other things, that a jury waiver provision in the deed of trust did not serve to waive its right to jury under the option agreement. We hold, inter alia, that the deed of trust’s separately-initialed jury waiver, broad in its language as to its scope across the transaction, was sufficient to waive the right to jury for actions arising out of the option agreement. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in all respects. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy Weakley v. Franklin Woods Community Hospital Et Al.
This is an appeal from a trial court’s order dismissing a claim of false imprisonment against a hospital and two of its employees, wherein the trial court found that the acts alleged all constituted “health care services” as defined by the Tennessee Healthcare Liability Act. Specifically, the trial court found that the Appellant failed to provide pre-suit notice and failed to file a certificate of good faith as required by statute. As a result, the trial court dismissed the Appellant’s claims with prejudice. The Appellant now appeals the trial court’s decision. For the reasons contained herein, we affirm the decision of the trial court |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Willie Gordon v. William Louis Chapman
Two men were driving along I-40 in Memphis when their cars collided. One driver sued the other driver for damages, alleging negligence, and the other driver counter-sued, also alleging negligence. The defendant filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to supplement his discovery responses. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to serve his supplemental discovery on the defendant’s attorney by August 2, 2019, and stated that the case would be dismissed if he failed to comply. The plaintiff failed to meet the deadline or ask for an extension, and the court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. The plaintiff appeals, and we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jaylan J., et al.
This appeal involves the termination of parental rights of a mother and a father. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that several grounds for termination had been proven and that termination was in the best interest of the two children. The mother and the father separately appealed. On appeal, the Department of Children’s Services “does not defend” some of the grounds that the trial court concluded were established. However, DCS maintains that three grounds for termination were sufficiently proven against the mother and that one ground was sufficiently proven against the father. We conclude that two of the remaining grounds for termination alleged against the mother were sufficiently proven, but we do not find clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of the children. We conclude that the sole remaining ground alleged against the father was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. As such, we reverse the termination of parental rights and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re March 9, 2012 Order
In a prior appeal, this Court affirmed dismissal of this case and remanded for the trial court to determine the appropriate amount of attorney’s fees owed to the appellee due to the appellant’s frivolous appeal. On remand, the trial court ordered the appellant to pay the sum of $11,901.35. The appellant then filed a motion to alter or amend, arguing, for the first time, that the trial court’s order was “void ab initio” because it was “adjudicated by an adjudicator with compromised neutrality in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment[.]” As support for this claim, the appellant pointed to comments made by the trial judge during hearings in a separate but related case in 2010 and 2012. The appellant argued that the Fourteenth Amendment required the trial judge to disqualify herself sua sponte and that her failure to do so rendered all subsequent orders entered by the trial judge void. The trial court treated this as a request for recusal “embedded” in the motion to alter or amend and denied the motion in all respects. The appellant has appealed. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Helen Butler v. KBK Outdoor Advertising, Et Al.
A widow sued to recover the value of her late husband’s interest in a general partnership. She argued that, in compensating a deceased partner, the assets of the partnership had to be valued at fair market value. On a motion for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that the partnership agreement provided that, upon a partner’s death, partnership assets would be valued at book value. After our review of the partnership agreement, we reverse. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Tracy Darrell Adkins v. Rhonda Forlaw Adkins
This appeal involves a contentious divorce case that has been pending since 2015. The trial court entered an order purportedly certifying fourteen of the orders entered over the course of the litigation as final and appealable orders pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. We conclude that the trial court improvidently certified these orders as final and dismiss the appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Sharon Kay Story, Et Al. v. Mark Steven Meadows, Et Al.
This appeal concerns a dispute over ownership of two corporations and five limited liability companies, operating as Nashville Ready Mix. The ultimate issue on appeal is whether the Trial Court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Mark Steven Meadows; Nashville Ready Mix, Inc.; Nashville Ready Mix of Murfreesboro, Inc.; Nashville Ready Mix of Columbia, LLC; Nashville Ready Mix of Franklin, LLC; Nashville Ready Mix of Clarksville, LLC; Nashville Ready Mix of Dickson, LLC; and Nashville Ready Mix of West Nashville, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”). The plaintiffs in this action, The Meadows Community Property Trust and Sharon Kay Story and Mary Helen Meadows, as co-trustees of Meadows Community Property Trust, (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) appeal the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants and the dismissal of all their claims. Determining that there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment, we reverse the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment concerning the issues of statute of limitations, implied partnership, and accounting and remand for further proceedings. Plaintiffs have waived the issues regarding unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and de facto merger due to their noncompliance with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Ryan J. H.
This appeal concerns the termination of two parents’ parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Marshall County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Jared H. (“Father”) and Annalisa P. (“Mother”) to their minor child, Ryan J. H. (“the Child”). After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Father and Mother’s parental rights on a host of grounds and finding that termination of Father and Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. Father and Mother appeal. We reverse several grounds rightly conceded on appeal by DCS. We affirm the grounds of failure to support as to Father and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan as to both Father and Mother. In addition, we reverse the Juvenile Court’s finding that DCS failed to prove the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, and instead find that ground proven as to both Father and Mother by clear and convincing evidence. We find further that termination of Father and Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. Thus, while we reverse the Juvenile Court’s judgment in part, we affirm its termination of Father and Mother’s parental rights to the Child. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Anouck C.
This case arises from an investigatory order issued by the Juvenile Court for Rutherford County allowing DCS to investigate abuse allegations regarding a minor child pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. section 37-1-406. The order also prohibited the mother of the child from interfering with the investigation. The mother appeals. Because the issues raised by mother are moot, we dismiss the appeal. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Phillip Mahnken v. Andrew Bettis Aviation, LLC
Employee sued his former employer for the compensation that he alleged he was owed under an employment contract. Following a bench trial, the employee was awarded damages representing thirty days’ compensation. The employer appeals, arguing that its nonperformance on the contract was excused by an implied condition. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Worldwide Property Hub, LLC v. Loretta E. League
Appellee purchased real property at foreclosure and filed this forcible entry and detainer action seeking possession. Appellee received a judgment for possession in the general sessions court, and Appellant, the former owner of the property, petitioned for de novo review in the Circuit Court for Shelby County. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment; Appellant filed no response to the motion and no countervailing statement of undisputed material facts. On the undisputed facts, Appellee is the bona fide purchaser for value of the property and has good title pursuant to the “Substitute Trustee’s Deed.” The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, granting it immediate possession of the Property. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Ayanna B.
This case involves a petition to terminate parental rights. After a trial on the petition, the trial court terminated the parental rights of the biological parents. In its written order, the trial court failed to make the necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(k). For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand with instructions for the trial court to make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Tavarius M. Et Al.
Darius M. (“Father M.”) and Denzel W. (“Father W.”) appeal the juvenile court’s decision to terminate their parental rights. They also challenge the juvenile court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of their parental rights was in the best interest of the children. Because the juvenile court erred in allowing Father W.’s attorney to withdraw from representation on the first day of trial, we vacate the court’s termination of his parental rights on all grounds and remand for a new trial. We affirm the juvenile court’s termination of Father M.’s parental rights. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Walter B.
The trial court terminated a father’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse. The father argues that the trial court erred in finding that he committed severe child abuse and in finding termination to be in the child’s best interest. He asserts that there was no evidence that he knew or should have known about the child’s injuries. In light of all of the facts, including the nature of the child’s injuries, the medical evidence, and the trial court’s finding concerning the father’s credibility, we conclude that the trial court did not err in terminating the father’s parental rights. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Carman, Et Al. v. Joshua Kellon Et Al.
A jury found the mother of an adult child liable for negligent entrustment after the adult child injured a jogger while driving his truck. The mother moved for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff’s proof, which the court denied. After the jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs, the mother failed to file a post-trial motion seeking a new trial. On appeal, we conclude that the mother waived her right to contest the trial court’s denial of her motion for a directed verdict by failing to file a motion asking for a new trial as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e). |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
April Hawthorne v. Morgan & Morgan Nashville, PLLC, et al.
A Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B petition for recusal appeal was filed in this Court following the denial of a motion that sought the disqualification of the trial court judge. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Shantonio Lovett Hunter v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Shantonio Lovett Hunter, was indicted for six counts of aggravated child abuse, one count of aggravated child neglect, and two counts of felony murder. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Petitioner entered a guilty plea to second degree murder in exchange for a sentence of 28 years. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, alleging that her trial counsel was ineffective and her plea was involuntarily and unknowingly entered. Following an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied relief. Petitioner has appealed, and having reviewed the entire record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Ryan Kimble v. Dyer County, Tennessee, et al.
The trial court dismissed plaintiff/Appellant’s Governmental Tort Liability action against the county and an unknown deputy. The trial court determined that Appellant’s lawsuit was barred by the Public Duty Doctrine. Because Appellant has not pled facts sufficient to establish a special duty exception to the Public Duty Doctrine, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the lawsuit. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
In Re James T. Et Al.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on grounds of persistence of conditions, mental incompetence, and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville And Davidson County, Tennessee v. Civil Service Commission Of The Metropolitan Government of Nashville And Davidson County, Tennessee, Et Al.
In this judicial review of an administrative decision, the trial court reversed the civil service commission’s decision to reinstate a police officer to his position upon finding that the commission’s reversal of the police department’s termination of the employee was arbitrary and capricious. The employee has appealed. Having determined that the findings of the civil service commission were supported by substantial and material evidence but that its ultimate decision was arbitrary and capricious, we affirm the judgment of the trial court reversing the commission’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Zarmina Folad Et Al. v. Quillco, LLC D/B/A The Bottle Shop At McEwen Et Al.
This appeal concerns injuries allegedly caused by dogs running loose and the application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 44-8-413. Under this statute, the “owner of a dog has a duty to keep that dog under reasonable control at all times, and to keep that dog from running at large.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-8-413(a)(1). “A person who breaches that duty is subject to civil liability for any damages suffered by a person who is injured by the dog while in a public place or lawfully in or on the private property of another.” Id. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellee/Defendant, an LLC, where the dogs had been kept prior to the incident, as to an alleged violation of section 44-8-413, holding that the Appellee/Defendant never assumed ownership of the dogs at the center of this dispute. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment on this issue. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy A. Baxter v. Jennifer D. Rowan
This case involves an unwed father’s right to visitation with his minor child. After an initial denial of Father’s request for visitation, the trial court later granted Father and Father’s mother visitation rights following the filing of a Rule 60 motion. In granting relief, the trial court found that Father had standing, having previously executed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity. Mother filed a timely appeal arguing that the trial court erred in granting Father relief. Notably, Mother contested Father’s standing to sue for visitation, arguing that the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity did not vest Father with standing to sue. For the reasons contained herein, we affirm in part and vacate in part the trial court’s order granting Father relief. Further, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s order granting visitation rights to Father’s mother. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy A. Baxter v. Jennifer D. Rowan - Concur
I concur in the majority’s holding that an unwed father, who previously executed a VAP, has standing to sue for custody and visitation rights to his minor child. I also concur in the holding reversing the trial court’s award of visitation rights to the paternal grandmother. I write separately only to highlight my concern about the procedure used by the unwed father in this case to obtain his visitation rights. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Jessie J. Lake
The administrator of Appellee estate filed a declaratory judgment action against Geneva Cosey, seeking to quiet title to real property owned by decedent. Geneva Cosey died during the trial court proceedings, and the administrator filed a suggestion of death. However, neither party filed a substitution of party. As such, the trial court granted a default judgment in favor of the estate (and the administrator as the sole heir) on the declaratory judgment action. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 25.01. Thereafter, Geneva Cosey’s daughter, Eloise Cosey, filed an appeal to this Court. The notice of appeal was brought in the name of Geneva Cosey, deceased, and Eloise Cosey, as Geneva Cosey’s next of kin. The notice was signed and submitted by attorney Matthew Edwards. Because neither Eloise Cosey nor Mr. Edwards satisfy the standing requirement under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 19(a), the notice of appeal is ineffective and the appeal is dismissed. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals |
